MAL-2026-13423
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (74e0a6afc9e0684beee9d75d2f4966507178bed2499c8f5453629a0b827a80ef)
On npm install, the package's postinstall script reads a config URL (defaulting to https://slimopump.vercel.app/config/clob-math.json), fetches a.tgz bundle referenced by that config, extracts it, runs npm install inside the extracted directory, then require()s the extracted peer-math.js and invokes syncSession(). The remote bundle is unpinned and unverified (no hash/signature check), and the host is not the package's registry or a publisher-matched domain, so arbitrary Node code chosen by the operator of slimopump.vercel.app executes on the installer's machine at install time. The advertised purpose (Polymarket/Chainlink TWAP via RTDS WebSocket) does not match the shipped code, which is limited to a trivial Kelly-stake arithmetic helper (computeKellyStake/formatStakeUsd/roundStake) — the functional payload is delivered exclusively via the postinstall fetch.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "scripts/install-check.cjs",
"sha256": "3e15f1692c4075cf29cefa94c84d564a95086ab7a6838a97ea25cd02475a282d",
"tlsh": "6ad1659915a272770bb0e7a4cb53a41eeb6394233511c364f6cdc6952ff6164c213dec"
},
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "20bd28b0dfedcff6a8b1eaa77ecaa7928140269ddaaa3019b5c5ce7750d2dd43",
"tlsh": "c7f02837daa08d3728b8ca8a59255000f5554b2f62a44c0bb1bba15c8fb756205abb65"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "fetchrtds-1.1.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "2befab02b56bbb8e2440ef6b1755ad646705301f",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-d1BNLgAp9oQtmuqPa5nHuOx8gTUZlx5j+1VMFIGl+WHvt5JqFrx9PNrW2eyJOHXNs9LQ3kZib0PcNYejicWAhg=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "fetchrtds"
},
"versions": [
"1.1.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-016547",
"import_time": "2026-08-06T14:19:54.861291768Z",
"modified_time": "2026-08-06T13:56:39Z",
"sha256": "74e0a6afc9e0684beee9d75d2f4966507178bed2499c8f5453629a0b827a80ef",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.1.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (74e0a6afc9e0684beee9d75d2f4966507178bed2499c8f5453629a0b827a80ef)\nOn npm install, the package\u0027s postinstall script reads a config URL (defaulting to https://slimopump.vercel.app/config/clob-math.json), fetches a.tgz bundle referenced by that config, extracts it, runs `npm install` inside the extracted directory, then require()s the extracted `peer-math.js` and invokes `syncSession()`. The remote bundle is unpinned and unverified (no hash/signature check), and the host is not the package\u0027s registry or a publisher-matched domain, so arbitrary Node code chosen by the operator of slimopump.vercel.app executes on the installer\u0027s machine at install time. The advertised purpose (Polymarket/Chainlink TWAP via RTDS WebSocket) does not match the shipped code, which is limited to a trivial Kelly-stake arithmetic helper (computeKellyStake/formatStakeUsd/roundStake) \u2014 the functional payload is delivered exclusively via the postinstall fetch.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-13423",
"modified": "2026-08-06T13:56:39Z",
"published": "2026-08-06T13:56:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/fetchrtds/v/1.1.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in fetchrtds (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.