GHSA-XHHM-F6HP-2QWJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 21:58 – Updated: 2026-09-16 21:58Impact
The live (WebSocket) transport authorizes a mount via check_view_auth, not Django's View.dispatch() chain. As a result, standard Django authorization — LoginRequiredMixin, PermissionRequiredMixin, UserPassesTestMixin, @method_decorator(login_required, name="dispatch"), and custom dispatch() guards — and the djust admin extension's staff gate (applied only in the HTTP as_view wrapper) were enforced on the initial HTTP GET but silently bypassed over WebSocket, where all events and state flow. An anonymous or under-privileged client could open a WebSocket and mount such a view — including admin list/create/change/delete — and dispatch its handlers.
Patches
Fixed in djust 1.0.7. check_view_auth now honors the Django AccessMixin family on every transport; a new system check S004 fails loud at startup on auth patterns the runtime cannot safely replay (decorator/overridden-dispatch forms); and the admin base mixin declares login_required = True + an active-staff check_permissions gate.
Workarounds
Gate views using djust's login_required / permission_required / check_permissions attributes (honored on all transports) rather than HTTP-only mixins/decorators.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "djust"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-61594"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-16T21:58:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThe live (WebSocket) transport authorizes a mount via `check_view_auth`, not Django\u0027s `View.dispatch()` chain. As a result, standard Django authorization \u2014 `LoginRequiredMixin`, `PermissionRequiredMixin`, `UserPassesTestMixin`, `@method_decorator(login_required, name=\"dispatch\")`, and custom `dispatch()` guards \u2014 **and** the djust admin extension\u0027s staff gate (applied only in the HTTP `as_view` wrapper) were enforced on the initial HTTP GET but **silently bypassed over WebSocket**, where all events and state flow. An anonymous or under-privileged client could open a WebSocket and mount such a view \u2014 including admin list/create/change/delete \u2014 and dispatch its handlers.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in **djust 1.0.7**. `check_view_auth` now honors the Django `AccessMixin` family on every transport; a new system check **S004** fails loud at startup on auth patterns the runtime cannot safely replay (decorator/overridden-`dispatch` forms); and the admin base mixin declares `login_required = True` + an active-staff `check_permissions` gate.\n\n### Workarounds\nGate views using djust\u0027s `login_required` / `permission_required` / `check_permissions` attributes (honored on all transports) rather than HTTP-only mixins/decorators.",
"id": "GHSA-xhhm-f6hp-2qwj",
"modified": "2026-09-16T21:58:05Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T21:58:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/security/advisories/GHSA-xhhm-f6hp-2qwj"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/releases/tag/v1.0.7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "djust has an authorization bypass on the WebSocket/SSE mount path"
}
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