GHSA-XFRW-HXR5-GHQF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-06-17 20:10 – Updated: 2026-06-09 13:02Impact
When the {% include_block %} template tag is used to output the value of a plain-text StreamField block (CharBlock, TextBlock or a similar user-defined block derived from FieldBlock), and that block does not specify a template for rendering, the tag output is not properly escaped as HTML. This could allow users to insert arbitrary HTML or scripting. This vulnerability is only exploitable by users with the ability to author StreamField content (i.e. users with 'editor' access to the Wagtail admin).
Patches
Patched versions have been released as Wagtail 2.11.8 (for the LTS 2.11 branch), Wagtail 2.12.5, and Wagtail 2.13.2 (for the current 2.13 branch).
Site implementors who wish to retain the existing behaviour of allowing editors to insert HTML content in these blocks (and are willing to accept the risk of untrusted editors inserting arbitrary code) may disable the escaping by surrounding the relevant {% include_block %} tag in {% autoescape off %}...{% endautoescape %}.
Workarounds
Site implementors who are unable to upgrade to a current supported version should audit their use of {% include_block %} to ensure it is not used to output CharBlock / TextBlock values with no associated template. Note that this only applies where {% include_block %} is used directly on that block (uses of include_block on a block containing a CharBlock / TextBlock, such as a StructBlock, are unaffected). In these cases, the tag can be replaced with Django's {{ ... }} syntax - e.g. {% include_block my_title_block %} becomes {{ my_title_block }}.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Karen Tracey for reporting this issue.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Visit Wagtail's support channels
- Email us at security@wagtail.io (if you wish to send encrypted email, the public key ID is
0x6ba1e1a86e0f8ce8)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "wagtail"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.11.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "wagtail"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.12"
},
{
"fixed": "2.12.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "wagtail"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.13"
},
{
"fixed": "2.13.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-32681"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-06-17T18:56:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-06-17T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nWhen the `{% include_block %}` template tag is used to output the value of a plain-text StreamField block (`CharBlock`, `TextBlock` or a similar user-defined block derived from `FieldBlock`), and that block does not specify a template for rendering, the tag output is not properly escaped as HTML. This could allow users to insert arbitrary HTML or scripting. This vulnerability is only exploitable by users with the ability to author StreamField content (i.e. users with \u0027editor\u0027 access to the Wagtail admin).\n\n### Patches\nPatched versions have been released as Wagtail 2.11.8 (for the LTS 2.11 branch), Wagtail 2.12.5, and Wagtail 2.13.2 (for the current 2.13 branch).\n\nSite implementors who wish to retain the existing behaviour of allowing editors to insert HTML content in these blocks (and are willing to accept the risk of untrusted editors inserting arbitrary code) may disable the escaping by surrounding the relevant `{% include_block %}` tag in `{% autoescape off %}...{% endautoescape %}`.\n\n### Workarounds\nSite implementors who are unable to upgrade to a current supported version should audit their use of `{% include_block %}` to ensure it is not used to output `CharBlock` / `TextBlock` values with no associated template. Note that this only applies where `{% include_block %}` is used directly on that block (uses of `include_block` on a block _containing_ a CharBlock / TextBlock, such as a StructBlock, are unaffected). In these cases, the tag can be replaced with Django\u0027s `{{ ... }}` syntax - e.g. `{% include_block my_title_block %}` becomes `{{ my_title_block }}`.\n\n### Acknowledgements\nMany thanks to Karen Tracey for reporting this issue.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\n* Visit Wagtail\u0027s [support channels](https://docs.wagtail.io/en/stable/support.html)\n* Email us at security@wagtail.io (if you wish to send encrypted email, the public key ID is `0x6ba1e1a86e0f8ce8`)",
"id": "GHSA-xfrw-hxr5-ghqf",
"modified": "2026-06-09T13:02:48Z",
"published": "2021-06-17T20:10:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail/security/advisories/GHSA-xfrw-hxr5-ghqf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32681"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/wagtail/PYSEC-2021-103.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail/releases/tag/v2.11.8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail/releases/tag/v2.12.5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail/releases/tag/v2.13.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Cross-site Scripting in wagtail"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.