Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-X32G-JVVM-4725

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-20 21:08 – Updated: 2026-10-20 21:08

Summary

A2A Java SDK: Push notification credentials logged in cleartext on protobuf parse failure

Details

*Impact.** Push notification bearer tokens and authentication credentials submitted by clients are written to server log files in cleartext. Any operator, log aggregation system, or attacker with log access can read these secrets and use them to authenticate to the client's push notification endpoints, potentially sending forged task status updates.

Where. transport/rest/src/main/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/transport/rest/handler/RestHandler.java:676 in parseRequestBody

What. The parseRequestBody method logs the entire JSON request body at SEVERE level when JsonFormat.parser().merge() throws InvalidProtocolBufferException. This method is called from createTaskPushNotificationConfiguration (line 377), where the body contains client-supplied push notification bearer tokens (field token) and authentication credentials (field authentication.credentials). These secrets are written to server log files in full.

Exploit scenario. A client creates a push notification configuration by POSTing to /v1/tenants/{tenant}/tasks/{taskId}/pushNotificationConfigs with a body containing {"url": "https://client.example.com/webhook", "token": "secret-bearer-token", "authentication": {"scheme": "Bearer", "credentials": "oauth-access-token"}, "extraField": "value"}. The extra field causes JsonFormat.parser().merge() to throw InvalidProtocolBufferException. The entire body including secret-bearer-token and oauth-access-token is logged at SEVERE level. An attacker with log access retrieves the cleartext credentials.

Preconditions. - Attacker must have access to server log files (centralized logging, log aggregation, shared infrastructure, or insider access) - Push notification capability must be enabled - A request body must fail protobuf deserialization while being valid JSON (unknown fields with strict parsing, schema mismatches)

Fix. Do not log the raw request body. Log only a sanitized summary — body length and content type, not content. Replace the log call with something like: log.log(Level.SEVERE, "Error parsing JSON request body (length={0})", body != null ? body.length() : 0).

Verification. 3/3 lens verifiers confirmed.

Severity

5.7 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.a2aproject.sdk:a2a-java-sdk-transport-rest"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.3.0.Final"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-111762"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-532"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-20T21:08:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T15:17:13Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### *Impact.** Push notification bearer tokens and authentication credentials submitted by clients are written to server log files in cleartext. Any operator, log aggregation system, or attacker with log access can read these secrets and use them to authenticate to the client\u0027s push notification endpoints, potentially sending forged task status updates.\n\n**Where.** `transport/rest/src/main/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/transport/rest/handler/RestHandler.java:676` in `parseRequestBody`\n\n**What.** The `parseRequestBody` method logs the entire JSON request body at `SEVERE` level when `JsonFormat.parser().merge()` throws `InvalidProtocolBufferException`. This method is called from `createTaskPushNotificationConfiguration` (line 377), where the body contains client-supplied push notification bearer tokens (field `token`) and authentication credentials (field `authentication.credentials`). These secrets are written to server log files in full.\n\n**Exploit scenario.** A client creates a push notification configuration by POSTing to `/v1/tenants/{tenant}/tasks/{taskId}/pushNotificationConfigs` with a body containing `{\"url\": \"https://client.example.com/webhook\", \"token\": \"secret-bearer-token\", \"authentication\": {\"scheme\": \"Bearer\", \"credentials\": \"oauth-access-token\"}, \"extraField\": \"value\"}`. The extra field causes `JsonFormat.parser().merge()` to throw `InvalidProtocolBufferException`. The entire body including `secret-bearer-token` and `oauth-access-token` is logged at SEVERE level. An attacker with log access retrieves the cleartext credentials.\n\n**Preconditions.**\n- Attacker must have access to server log files (centralized logging, log aggregation, shared infrastructure, or insider access)\n- Push notification capability must be enabled\n- A request body must fail protobuf deserialization while being valid JSON (unknown fields with strict parsing, schema mismatches)\n\n**Fix.** Do not log the raw request body. Log only a sanitized summary \u2014 body length and content type, not content. Replace the log call with something like: `log.log(Level.SEVERE, \"Error parsing JSON request body (length={0})\", body != null ? body.length() : 0)`.\n\n**Verification.** 3/3 lens verifiers confirmed.",
  "id": "GHSA-x32g-jvvm-4725",
  "modified": "2026-10-20T21:08:33Z",
  "published": "2026-10-20T21:08:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/advisories/GHSA-x32g-jvvm-4725"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111762"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/commit/88827105fee0daaac0d883a4a68eb644571d7230"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/releases/tag/v1.3.0.Final"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "A2A Java SDK: Push notification credentials logged in cleartext on protobuf parse failure"
}

CVE-2026-111762 (GCVE-0-2026-111762)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-20 14:56 – Updated: 2026-10-20 14:56

Title

A2A Java SDK: Push notification credentials logged in cleartext on protobuf parse failure

Summary

A2A Java SDK is the official Java SDK for the Agent2Agent (A2A) Protocol. Prior to 1.3.0.Final, RestHandler.parseRequestBody in `transport/rest/src/main/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/transport/rest/handler/RestHandler.java` logs the entire JSON request body at SEVERE level when JsonFormat.parser().merge() throws InvalidProtocolBufferException. With push notifications enabled, createTaskPushNotificationConfiguration reaches this parser for requests to `/v1/tenants/{tenant}/tasks/{taskId}/pushNotificationConfigs`, whose token and authentication.credentials fields can contain bearer tokens and authentication credentials for client push endpoints. A valid JSON body that fails protobuf deserialization, including an unknown field under strict parsing or a schema mismatch, causes those secrets to be written to the server logs in cleartext. An attacker with access to the server logs or a log aggregation system can retrieve the credentials and potentially use the credentials to send forged task status updates to the client's push notification endpoint. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.0.Final.

Severity

5.7 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CWE

CWE-532 - Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7658 records in the last 180 days details

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/a…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/commit/888…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/releases/t…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
a2aproject	a2a-java	Affected: < 1.3.0.Final

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JSON

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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "a2a-java",
          "vendor": "a2aproject",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 1.3.0.Final"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "A2A Java SDK is the official Java SDK for the Agent2Agent (A2A) Protocol. Prior to 1.3.0.Final, RestHandler.parseRequestBody in `transport/rest/src/main/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/transport/rest/handler/RestHandler.java` logs the entire JSON request body at SEVERE level when JsonFormat.parser().merge() throws InvalidProtocolBufferException. With push notifications enabled, createTaskPushNotificationConfiguration reaches this parser for requests to `/v1/tenants/{tenant}/tasks/{taskId}/pushNotificationConfigs`, whose token and authentication.credentials fields can contain bearer tokens and authentication credentials for client push endpoints. A valid JSON body that fails protobuf deserialization, including an unknown field under strict parsing or a schema mismatch, causes those secrets to be written to the server logs in cleartext. An attacker with access to the server logs or a log aggregation system can retrieve the credentials and potentially use the credentials to send forged task status updates to the client\u0027s push notification endpoint. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.0.Final."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
            "attackVector": "LOCAL",
            "baseScore": 5.7,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-532",
              "description": "CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-20T14:56:57.632Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/advisories/GHSA-x32g-jvvm-4725",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/advisories/GHSA-x32g-jvvm-4725"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/commit/88827105fee0daaac0d883a4a68eb644571d7230",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/commit/88827105fee0daaac0d883a4a68eb644571d7230"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/releases/tag/v1.3.0.Final",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/releases/tag/v1.3.0.Final"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-x32g-jvvm-4725",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "A2A Java SDK: Push notification credentials logged in cleartext on protobuf parse failure"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-111762",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-20T14:56:57.632Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-10-16T17:52:09.082Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-20T14:56:57.632Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

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Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
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