GHSA-X2C2-Q32W-4W6M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-30 18:42 – Updated: 2024-11-22 20:46Summary
Vyper compiler allows passing a value in builtin raw_call even if the call is a delegatecall or a staticcall. But in the context of delegatecall and staticcall the handling of value is not possible due to the semantics of the respective opcodes, and vyper will silently ignore the value= argument.
A contract search was performed and no vulnerable contracts were found in production.
Details
The IR for raw_call is built in the RawCall class:
https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/blob/9136169468f317a53b4e7448389aa315f90b95ba/vyper/builtins/functions.py#L1100
However, the compiler doesn't validate that if either delegatecall or staticall are provided as kwargs, that value wasn't set. For example, the following compiles without errors:
raw_call(self, call_data2, max_outsize=255, is_delegate_call=True, value=msg.value/2)
Impact
If the semantics of the EVM are unknown to the developer, he could suspect that by specifying the value kwarg, exactly the given amount will be sent along to the target. However in fact, no value will be sent.
Here is an example of an potentially problematic implementation of multicall utilizing the raw_call built-in:
value_accumulator: uint256 = empty(uint256)
results: DynArray[Result, max_value(uint8)] = []
return_data: Bytes[max_value(uint8)] = b""
success: bool = empty(bool)
for batch in data:
msg_value: uint256 = batch.value
value_accumulator = unsafe_add(value_accumulator, msg_value)
if (batch.allow_failure == False):
return_data = raw_call(self, batch.call_data, max_outsize=255, value=msg_value, is_delegate_call=True)
success = True
results.append(Result({success: success, return_data: return_data}))
else:
success, return_data = \
raw_call(self, batch.call_data, max_outsize=255, value=msg_value, is_delegate_call=True, revert_on_failure=False)
results.append(Result({success: success, return_data: return_data}))
assert msg.value == value_accumulator, "Multicall: value mismatch"
return results
Patches
Fixed in https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/pull/3755
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "vyper"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-24567"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-754"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-01-30T18:42:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-30T21:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nVyper compiler allows passing a value in builtin `raw_call` even if the call is a `delegatecall` or a `staticcall`. But in the context of `delegatecall` and `staticcall` the handling of value is not possible due to the semantics of the respective opcodes, and vyper will silently ignore the `value=` argument.\n\nA contract search was performed and no vulnerable contracts were found in production.\n\n### Details\nThe IR for `raw_call` is built in the `RawCall` class:\nhttps://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/blob/9136169468f317a53b4e7448389aa315f90b95ba/vyper/builtins/functions.py#L1100\n\nHowever, the compiler doesn\u0027t validate that if either `delegatecall` or `staticall` are provided as kwargs, that `value` wasn\u0027t set. For example, the following compiles without errors:\n```python\nraw_call(self, call_data2, max_outsize=255, is_delegate_call=True, value=msg.value/2)\n```\n\n### Impact\nIf the semantics of the EVM are unknown to the developer, he could suspect that by specifying the `value` kwarg, exactly the given amount will be sent along to the target. However in fact, no `value` will be sent.\n\nHere is an example of an potentially problematic implementation of multicall utilizing the `raw_call` built-in:\n```python\nvalue_accumulator: uint256 = empty(uint256)\n results: DynArray[Result, max_value(uint8)] = []\n return_data: Bytes[max_value(uint8)] = b\"\"\n success: bool = empty(bool)\n for batch in data:\n msg_value: uint256 = batch.value\n value_accumulator = unsafe_add(value_accumulator, msg_value)\n if (batch.allow_failure == False):\n return_data = raw_call(self, batch.call_data, max_outsize=255, value=msg_value, is_delegate_call=True)\n success = True\n results.append(Result({success: success, return_data: return_data}))\n else:\n success, return_data = \\\n raw_call(self, batch.call_data, max_outsize=255, value=msg_value, is_delegate_call=True, revert_on_failure=False)\n results.append(Result({success: success, return_data: return_data}))\n assert msg.value == value_accumulator, \"Multicall: value mismatch\"\n return results\n```\n\n### Patches\nFixed in https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/pull/3755\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\n### References\n_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_\n",
"id": "GHSA-x2c2-q32w-4w6m",
"modified": "2024-11-22T20:46:32Z",
"published": "2024-01-30T18:42:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/security/advisories/GHSA-x2c2-q32w-4w6m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-24567"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/pull/3755"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/commit/a2df08888c318713742c57f71465f32a1c27ed72"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/vyper/PYSEC-2024-151.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/blob/9136169468f317a53b4e7448389aa315f90b95ba/vyper/builtins/functions.py#L1100"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Vyper\u0027s raw_call `value=` kwargs not disabled for static and delegate calls"
}
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