GHSA-WPQ5-3366-MQW4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-14 15:23 – Updated: 2025-02-14 22:18
VLAI
Summary
Label Studio allows Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via GET request to `/projects/upload-example` endpoint
Details

Description

Label Studio's /projects/upload-example endpoint allows injection of arbitrary HTML through a GET request with an appropriately crafted label_config query parameter. By crafting a specially formatted XML label config with inline task data containing malicious HTML/JavaScript, an attacker can achieve Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). While the application has a Content Security Policy (CSP), it is only set in report-only mode, making it ineffective at preventing script execution.

The vulnerability exists because the upload-example endpoint renders user-provided HTML content without proper sanitization on a GET request. This allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary JavaScript in victims' browsers by getting them to visit a maliciously crafted URL.

This is considered vulnerable because it enables attackers to execute JavaScript in victims' contexts, potentially allowing theft of sensitive data, session hijacking, or other malicious actions.

Steps to reproduce

  1. Create a malicious label config that includes an XSS payload in embedded task data:
<View><!-- {"data": {"text": "<div><img src=x
onerror=eval(atob(`YWxlcnQoIlhTUyIp`))></div>"}} --><HyperText name="text"
value="$text"/></View>
  1. URL encode the payload and access the following URL:

  2. http://app/projects/upload-example/?label_config=%3CView%3E%3C!--%20{%22data%22:%20{%22text%22:%20%22%3Cdiv%3E%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=eval(atob(YWxlcnQoIlhTUyIp))%3E%3C/div%3E%22}}%20--%3E%3CHyperText%20name=%22text%22%20value=%22$text%22/%3E%3C/View%3E

When executed, the payload causes the application to render an HTML page containing an img tag that fails to load, triggering the onerror event handler which executes base64-decoded JavaScript, demonstrating successful XSS execution in the victim's browser.

Mitigations

  • Enable the Content Security Policy in enforcement mode instead of report-only mode to actively block unauthorized script execution
  • Deprecate the GET behavior at the example-config endpoint since it's not used

Impact

The vulnerability requires no special privileges and can be exploited by getting a victim to visit a crafted URL. The impact is high as it allows arbitrary JavaScript execution in victims' browsers, potentially exposing sensitive data or enabling account takeover through session theft.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "label-studio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.16.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-25296"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-14T15:23:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-14T20:15:36Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Description\nLabel Studio\u0027s `/projects/upload-example` endpoint allows injection of arbitrary HTML through a `GET` request with an appropriately crafted `label_config` query parameter. By crafting a specially formatted XML label config with inline task data containing malicious HTML/JavaScript, an attacker can achieve Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). While the application has a Content Security Policy (CSP), it is only set in report-only mode, making it ineffective at preventing script execution.\n\nThe vulnerability exists because the upload-example endpoint renders user-provided HTML content without proper sanitization on a GET request. This allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary JavaScript in victims\u0027 browsers by getting them to visit a maliciously crafted URL.\n\nThis is considered vulnerable because it enables attackers to execute JavaScript in victims\u0027 contexts, potentially allowing theft of sensitive data, session hijacking, or other malicious actions.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n1. Create a malicious label config that includes an XSS payload in embedded task data:\n\n```xml\n\u003cView\u003e\u003c!-- {\"data\": {\"text\": \"\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cimg src=x\nonerror=eval(atob(`YWxlcnQoIlhTUyIp`))\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\"}} --\u003e\u003cHyperText name=\"text\"\nvalue=\"$text\"/\u003e\u003c/View\u003e\n```\n\n\n2. URL encode the payload and access the following URL:\n\n- http://app/projects/upload-example/?label_config=%3CView%3E%3C!--%20{%22data%22:%20{%22text%22:%20%22%3Cdiv%3E%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=eval(atob(`YWxlcnQoIlhTUyIp`))%3E%3C/div%3E%22}}%20--%3E%3CHyperText%20name=%22text%22%20value=%22$text%22/%3E%3C/View%3E\n\nWhen executed, the payload causes the application to render an HTML page containing an img tag that fails to load, triggering the onerror event handler which executes base64-decoded JavaScript, demonstrating successful XSS execution in the victim\u0027s browser.\n   \n## Mitigations\n- Enable the Content Security Policy in enforcement mode instead of report-only mode to actively block unauthorized script execution\n- Deprecate the `GET` behavior at the `example-config` endpoint since it\u0027s not used \n\n## Impact\nThe vulnerability requires no special privileges and can be exploited by getting a victim to visit a crafted URL. The impact is high as it allows arbitrary JavaScript execution in victims\u0027 browsers, potentially exposing sensitive data or enabling account takeover through session theft.",
  "id": "GHSA-wpq5-3366-mqw4",
  "modified": "2025-02-14T22:18:12Z",
  "published": "2025-02-14T15:23:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/security/advisories/GHSA-wpq5-3366-mqw4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25296"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/commit/8cf6958e1e27ef6a03ed287e674470975d340885"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Label Studio allows Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via GET request to `/projects/upload-example` endpoint"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.