GHSA-W52V-V783-GW97
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-18 21:50 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:22Impact
A SQL injection vulnerability existed in Ghost's Content API that allowed unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary data from the database.
Vulnerable Versions
This vulnerability is present in Ghost v3.24.0 to v6.19.0.
Patches
v6.19.1 contains a fix for this issue.
Note: as this vulnerability lets an attacker gain access to a site's API keys, we recommend reviewing staff users and rotating keys. We generally recommend always updating Ghost to its most current version.
Workarounds
There is no application-level workaround. The Content API key is public by design, so restricting key access does not mitigate this vulnerability.
As a temporary mitigation, a reverse proxy or WAF rule can be used to block Content API requests containing slug%3A%5B or slug:[ in the query string filter parameter. Note that this may break legitimate slug filter functionality.
References
We thank Nicholas Carlini using Claude, Anthropic for disclosing this vulnerability responsibly.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@ghost.org.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "ghost"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.24.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.19.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-26980"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T21:50:23Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-20T02:16:54Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nA SQL injection vulnerability existed in Ghost\u0027s Content API that allowed unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary data from the database. \n\n### Vulnerable Versions\n\nThis vulnerability is present in Ghost v3.24.0 to v6.19.0.\n\n### Patches\n\nv6.19.1 contains a fix for this issue. \n\n**Note:** as this vulnerability lets an attacker gain access to a site\u0027s API keys, we recommend reviewing staff users and rotating keys. We generally recommend always updating Ghost to its most current version. \n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere is no application-level workaround. The Content API key is public by design, so restricting key access does not mitigate this vulnerability.\n\nAs a temporary mitigation, a reverse proxy or WAF rule can be used to block Content API requests containing `slug%3A%5B` or `slug:[` in the query string filter parameter. Note that this may break legitimate slug filter functionality.\n\n### References\n\nWe thank Nicholas Carlini using Claude, Anthropic for disclosing this vulnerability responsibly. \n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [security@ghost.org](mailto:security@ghost.org).",
"id": "GHSA-w52v-v783-gw97",
"modified": "2026-06-08T23:22:31Z",
"published": "2026-02-18T21:50:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/security/advisories/GHSA-w52v-v783-gw97"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26980"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/commit/30868d632b2252b638bc8a4c8ebf73964592ed91"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.xlab.qianxin.com/ghost-cms-page-poisoning-cve-2026-26980"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/releases/tag/v6.19.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Ghost has a SQL injection in Content API"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.