GHSA-VXX9-2994-Q338

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-13 20:04 – Updated: 2026-03-16 22:01
VLAI
Summary
Yamux vulnerable to remote Panic via malformed Data frame with SYN set and len = 262145
Details

Summary

The Rust implementation of Yamux can panic when processing a crafted inbound Data frame that sets SYN and uses a body length greater than DEFAULT_CREDIT (e.g. 262145). On the first packet of a new inbound stream, stream state is created and a receiver is queued before oversized-body validation completes. When validation fails, the temporary stream is dropped and cleanup may call remove(...).expect("stream not found"), triggering a panic in the connection state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal Yamux session and does not require authentication. kind of vulnerability is it? Who is

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a Yamux session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single validly encoded Yamux Data|SYN frame with an oversized body: 1. Establish a standard authenticated transport session that negotiates Yamux. 2. Send one Yamux frame with: - Tag = Data - Flags = SYN - StreamId = 1 (or any new inbound stream id) - Length = DEFAULT_CREDIT + 1 (e.g. 262145) - Body of matching size This can trigger a panic (stream not found) and terminate the process, depending on host application panic policy.

Patches

Users should upgrade to yamux v0.13.10

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "yamux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.13.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32314"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248",
      "CWE-617"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-13T20:04:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-16T14:19:34Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe Rust implementation of Yamux can panic when processing a crafted inbound Data frame that sets SYN and uses a body length greater than DEFAULT_CREDIT (e.g. 262145).\nOn the first packet of a new inbound stream, stream state is created and a receiver is queued before oversized-body validation completes. When validation fails, the temporary stream is dropped and cleanup may call remove(...).expect(\"stream not found\"), triggering a panic in the connection state machine.\nThis is remotely reachable over a normal Yamux session and does not require authentication. kind of vulnerability is it? Who is \n#### Attack Scenario  \nAn attacker that can establish a Yamux session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single validly encoded Yamux Data|SYN frame with an oversized body:\n1. Establish a standard authenticated transport session that negotiates Yamux.\n2. Send one Yamux frame with:\n   - Tag = Data\n   - Flags = SYN\n   - StreamId = 1 (or any new inbound stream id)\n   - Length = DEFAULT_CREDIT + 1 (e.g. 262145)\n   - Body of matching size\nThis can trigger a panic (stream not found) and terminate the process, depending on host application panic policy.\n### Patches\nUsers should upgrade to `yamux` `v0.13.10`\n\nThis vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program",
  "id": "GHSA-vxx9-2994-q338",
  "modified": "2026-03-16T22:01:11Z",
  "published": "2026-03-13T20:04:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/rust-yamux/security/advisories/GHSA-vxx9-2994-q338"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32314"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/rust-yamux"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Yamux vulnerable to remote Panic via malformed Data frame with SYN set and len = 262145"
}



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