GHSA-VQG6-3FW6-J9JG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 19:58 – Updated: 2026-09-24 19:58Impact
The partial-pipeline resume mechanism accepted partial_token as a bearer credential without binding it to the browser session that created it.
Applications using resumable partial pipeline steps could allow an attacker to start an authentication flow, obtain a valid partial token and verification data, and cause a victim's browser to resume that attacker-controlled flow. This could authenticate the victim's browser as the attacker's account.
The issue affects applications using partial pipeline steps such as mail_validation or custom steps decorated with @partial.
Patches
The issue has been fixed by binding partial pipeline resumes to the originating browser session.
Users should upgrade to a patched version.
Fix:
- https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/pull/1816
- https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-docs/pull/444
- https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-app-django/pull/1009
Workarounds
Applications that cannot upgrade immediately should disable resumable partial pipeline steps, including mail_validation and custom steps decorated with @partial.
If those flows are required, applications should avoid accepting partial resume links from untrusted contexts until a patched version can be deployed.
There is no complete workaround while continuing to use the vulnerable partial-pipeline resume mechanism.
Credits
Reported through GitHub private vulnerability reporting by Liyi Zhou, Ziyue Wang, Strick, Maurice, and Chenchen Yu from the University of Sydney security research team.
Reporter references:
- https://lzhou1110.github.io/
- https://zyy0530.github.io/
- https://str1ckl4nd.github.io/
- https://maurice.busystar.org/
- https://7thparkk.github.io/
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "social-auth-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-57179"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-384"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-24T19:58:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T18:17:15Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe partial-pipeline resume mechanism accepted `partial_token` as a bearer credential without binding it to the browser session that created it.\n\nApplications using resumable partial pipeline steps could allow an attacker to start an authentication flow, obtain a valid partial token and verification data, and cause a victim\u0027s browser to resume that attacker-controlled flow. This could authenticate the victim\u0027s browser as the attacker\u0027s account.\n\nThe issue affects applications using partial pipeline steps such as `mail_validation` or custom steps decorated with `@partial`.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue has been fixed by binding partial pipeline resumes to the originating browser session.\n\nUsers should upgrade to a patched version.\n\nFix:\n\n* https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/pull/1816\n* https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-docs/pull/444\n* https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-app-django/pull/1009\n\n### Workarounds\n\nApplications that cannot upgrade immediately should disable resumable partial pipeline steps, including `mail_validation` and custom steps decorated with `@partial`.\n\nIf those flows are required, applications should avoid accepting partial resume links from untrusted contexts until a patched version can be deployed.\n\nThere is no complete workaround while continuing to use the vulnerable partial-pipeline resume mechanism.\n\n### Credits\n\nReported through GitHub private vulnerability reporting by Liyi Zhou, Ziyue Wang, Strick, Maurice, and Chenchen Yu from the University of Sydney security research team.\n\nReporter references:\n\n* https://lzhou1110.github.io/\n* https://zyy0530.github.io/\n* https://str1ckl4nd.github.io/\n* https://maurice.busystar.org/\n* https://7thparkk.github.io/",
"id": "GHSA-vqg6-3fw6-j9jg",
"modified": "2026-09-24T19:58:14Z",
"published": "2026-09-24T19:58:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/security/advisories/GHSA-vqg6-3fw6-j9jg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57179"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/pull/1816"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/commit/0418782454ac7bbc6a9230ea21f7f5066fe89686"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/releases/tag/5.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "social-auth-core has a Session Fixation issue"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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