GHSA-VH56-5M88-39RQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-21 17:15 – Updated: 2026-10-21 17:15
VLAI
Summary
ApostropheCMS: GET /api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/:id bypasses viewRole restriction and exposes viewPermission-gated fields to lower-privileged users
Details

Summary

The getOne REST endpoint for pages does not apply viewRole type-level restrictions or viewPermission field-level redaction. An editor-level user who knows a document _id can read the full content of admin-only pages and their privileged fields, while the getAll endpoint correctly enforces both restrictions.

Details

Finding 3 — viewRole bypass: modules/@apostrophecms/page/index.js exposes getRestQuery(req, omitPermissionCheck = false). The getAll path calls publicApiCheckAsync and threads the full query builder pipeline including viewRole filtering. The getOne path uses a divergent code path that skips this pipeline.

A page type declared with viewRole: 'admin' is inaccessible via GET /api/v1/@apostrophecms/page?type=secretPage (returns 403 to an editor) but is fully returned by GET /api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/:id:en:published to the same editor.

Finding 4 — viewPermission field leak: Fields decorated with viewPermission: { action: 'edit', type: '@apostrophecms/page' } are stripped by removeForbiddenFields in the getAll path but are returned verbatim in getOne. An editor who knows any document _id can read all viewPermission-restricted fields.

PoC

# Log in as editor, get session jar
EDITOR_JAR="..."

# getAll — correctly blocked
curl -b "$EDITOR_JAR" \
  "http://TARGET/api/v1/@apostrophecms/page?type=secretPage"
# → 403 Forbidden

# getOne — bypassed, returns full document including viewPermission fields
curl -b "$EDITOR_JAR" \
  "http://TARGET/api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/ADMIN_PAGE_ID:en:published"
# → 200 OK, full doc including secretField value

Impact

Editors can read the full content of any page — including those restricted to admins via viewRole — if they know or can guess the _id. Sensitive field values gated by viewPermission are also fully exposed. This breaks the content access control model for any site using these decorators.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "apostrophe"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.34.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-112957"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-21T17:15:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T17:17:33Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe `getOne` REST endpoint for pages does not apply `viewRole` type-level restrictions\nor `viewPermission` field-level redaction. An editor-level user who knows a document\n`_id` can read the full content of admin-only pages and their privileged fields, while\nthe `getAll` endpoint correctly enforces both restrictions.\n\n### Details\n**Finding 3 \u2014 viewRole bypass:**\n`modules/@apostrophecms/page/index.js` exposes `getRestQuery(req, omitPermissionCheck =\nfalse)`. The `getAll` path calls `publicApiCheckAsync` and threads the full query builder\npipeline including `viewRole` filtering. The `getOne` path uses a divergent code path\nthat skips this pipeline.\n\nA page type declared with `viewRole: \u0027admin\u0027` is inaccessible via `GET\n/api/v1/@apostrophecms/page?type=secretPage` (returns 403 to an editor) but is fully\nreturned by `GET /api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/:id:en:published` to the same editor.\n\n**Finding 4 \u2014 viewPermission field leak:**\nFields decorated with `viewPermission: { action: \u0027edit\u0027, type: \u0027@apostrophecms/page\u0027 }`\nare stripped by `removeForbiddenFields` in the `getAll` path but are returned verbatim\nin `getOne`. An editor who knows any document `_id` can read all\n`viewPermission`-restricted fields.\n\n### PoC\n```bash\n# Log in as editor, get session jar\nEDITOR_JAR=\"...\"\n\n# getAll \u2014 correctly blocked\ncurl -b \"$EDITOR_JAR\" \\\n  \"http://TARGET/api/v1/@apostrophecms/page?type=secretPage\"\n# \u2192 403 Forbidden\n\n# getOne \u2014 bypassed, returns full document including viewPermission fields\ncurl -b \"$EDITOR_JAR\" \\\n  \"http://TARGET/api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/ADMIN_PAGE_ID:en:published\"\n# \u2192 200 OK, full doc including secretField value\n```\n\n### Impact\nEditors can read the full content of any page \u2014 including those restricted to admins via\n`viewRole` \u2014 if they know or can guess the `_id`. Sensitive field values gated by\n`viewPermission` are also fully exposed. This breaks the content access control model\nfor any site using these decorators.",
  "id": "GHSA-vh56-5m88-39rq",
  "modified": "2026-10-21T17:15:21Z",
  "published": "2026-10-21T17:15:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-vh56-5m88-39rq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112957"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/06e4b377f3c360f9e89c32dccd7e505ad5ddf498"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/40b989b1a9dd23d30029b8ce7668634265cfe5ea"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/releases/tag/apostrophe@4.34.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ApostropheCMS: GET /api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/:id bypasses viewRole restriction and exposes viewPermission-gated fields to lower-privileged users"
}



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