GHSA-VC32-4GWF-77XP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-15 20:14 – Updated: 2026-10-15 20:14Summary
An OTP-enabled authenticated user who cannot use the HTTP configuration mutation endpoints without a valid secure session can still mutate Nginx configuration through /mcp and /mcp_message using only ordinary authentication.
Details
The HTTP configuration mutation surface is explicitly grouped behind middleware.RequireSecureSession(). By contrast, the MCP endpoints are exposed with only middleware.AuthRequired(). The MCP server exposes configuration mutation tools including nginx_config_add and nginx_config_modify, so OTP-enabled users gain an alternate path around the intended step-up requirement.
Relevant code paths: - api/config/router.go - internal/middleware/secure_session.go - mcp/router.go - mcp/config/config_add.go - mcp/config/config_modify.go
This is a security-control bypass rather than a missing feature. The product already established that OTP-enabled users should complete a secure session before high-impact configuration mutations are accepted on the HTTP path.
PoC
I verified this locally in an isolated environment with a temporary end-to-end harness that exercised the real /mcp and /mcp_message routes.
What the executed test did:
1. Created a temporary config directory and configured Nginx control commands to harmless local values (true) to avoid touching the host.
2. Created a real OTP-enabled user in a temporary SQLite database.
3. Generated a real JWT for that OTP-enabled user.
4. Started a local test server exposing the real /mcp and /mcp_message routes.
5. Opened an authenticated SSE connection to /mcp with the JWT and no X-Secure-Session-ID.
6. Initialized the MCP session over /mcp_message.
7. Called the real nginx_config_add tool over /mcp_message.
8. Verified that the tool succeeded and created mcp-bypass.conf in the managed config directory without any secure-session step-up.
Observed result from the actual local verification:
- The MCP session initialized successfully without any X-Secure-Session-ID.
- The config file was written through the MCP tool path using only JWT authentication.
Impact
OTP-enabled accounts lose the intended step-up protection for high-impact Nginx configuration changes when MCP is enabled. A user who should be blocked until re-authenticating can still create or modify configuration files and trigger reload behavior through MCP.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-84360"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-288"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-15T20:14:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-12T21:17:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAn OTP-enabled authenticated user who cannot use the HTTP configuration mutation endpoints without a valid secure session can still mutate Nginx configuration through `/mcp` and `/mcp_message` using only ordinary authentication.\n\n### Details\nThe HTTP configuration mutation surface is explicitly grouped behind `middleware.RequireSecureSession()`. By contrast, the MCP endpoints are exposed with only `middleware.AuthRequired()`. The MCP server exposes configuration mutation tools including `nginx_config_add` and `nginx_config_modify`, so OTP-enabled users gain an alternate path around the intended step-up requirement.\n\nRelevant code paths:\n- [api/config/router.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/api/config/router.go:14)\n- [internal/middleware/secure_session.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/middleware/secure_session.go:52)\n- [mcp/router.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/mcp/router.go:9)\n- [mcp/config/config_add.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/mcp/config/config_add.go:34)\n- [mcp/config/config_modify.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/mcp/config/config_modify.go:55)\n\nThis is a security-control bypass rather than a missing feature. The product already established that OTP-enabled users should complete a secure session before high-impact configuration mutations are accepted on the HTTP path.\n\n### PoC\nI verified this locally in an isolated environment with a temporary end-to-end harness that exercised the real `/mcp` and `/mcp_message` routes.\n\nWhat the executed test did:\n1. Created a temporary config directory and configured Nginx control commands to harmless local values (`true`) to avoid touching the host.\n2. Created a real OTP-enabled user in a temporary SQLite database.\n3. Generated a real JWT for that OTP-enabled user.\n4. Started a local test server exposing the real `/mcp` and `/mcp_message` routes.\n5. Opened an authenticated SSE connection to `/mcp` with the JWT and no `X-Secure-Session-ID`.\n6. Initialized the MCP session over `/mcp_message`.\n7. Called the real `nginx_config_add` tool over `/mcp_message`.\n8. Verified that the tool succeeded and created `mcp-bypass.conf` in the managed config directory without any secure-session step-up.\n\nObserved result from the actual local verification:\n- The MCP session initialized successfully without any `X-Secure-Session-ID`.\n- The config file was written through the MCP tool path using only JWT authentication.\n\n### Impact\nOTP-enabled accounts lose the intended step-up protection for high-impact Nginx configuration changes when MCP is enabled. A user who should be blocked until re-authenticating can still create or modify configuration files and trigger reload behavior through MCP.",
"id": "GHSA-vc32-4gwf-77xp",
"modified": "2026-10-15T20:14:10Z",
"published": "2026-10-15T20:14:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-vc32-4gwf-77xp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84360"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/23d1934099b05b2a01589b48129dc3d3159d91c2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.4.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Nginx UI: OTP secure-session step-up can be bypassed via MCP configuration tools"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.