GHSA-VC2W-4V3P-2MQW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-21 15:31 – Updated: 2026-01-21 22:57
VLAI
Summary
Apache Solr: Insufficient file-access checking in standalone core-creation requests
Details

The "create core" API of Apache Solr 8.6 through 9.10.0 lacks sufficient input validation on some API parameters, which can cause Solr to check the existence of and attempt to read file-system paths that should be disallowed by Solr's "allowPaths" security setting https://https://solr.apache.org/guide/solr/latest/configuration-guide/configuring-solr-xml.html#the-solr-element .  These read-only accesses can allow users to create cores using unexpected configsets if any are accessible via the filesystem.  On Windows systems configured to allow UNC paths this can additionally cause disclosure of NTLM "user" hashes. 

Solr deployments are subject to this vulnerability if they meet the following criteria: * Solr is running in its "standalone" mode. * Solr's "allowPath" setting is being used to restrict file access to certain directories. * Solr's "create core" API is exposed and accessible to untrusted users.  This can happen if Solr's RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin https://solr.apache.org/guide/solr/latest/deployment-guide/rule-based-authorization-plugin.html is disabled, or if it is enabled but the "core-admin-edit" predefined permission (or an equivalent custom permission) is given to low-trust (i.e. non-admin) user roles.

Users can mitigate this by enabling Solr's RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin (if disabled) and configuring a permission-list that prevents untrusted users from creating new Solr cores.  Users should also upgrade to Apache Solr 9.10.1 or greater, which contain fixes for this issue.

Severity
7.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.solr:solr-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.6.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.10.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-22444"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-21T22:57:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-21T14:16:06Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The \"create core\" API of Apache Solr 8.6 through 9.10.0 lacks sufficient input validation on some API parameters, which can cause Solr to check the existence of and attempt to read file-system paths that should be disallowed by Solr\u0027s  \"allowPaths\" security setting https://https://solr.apache.org/guide/solr/latest/configuration-guide/configuring-solr-xml.html#the-solr-element .\u00a0 These read-only accesses can allow users to create cores using unexpected configsets if any are accessible via the filesystem.\u00a0 On Windows systems configured to allow UNC paths this can additionally cause disclosure of NTLM \"user\" hashes.\u00a0\n\nSolr deployments are subject to this vulnerability if they meet the following criteria:\n  *  Solr is running in its \"standalone\" mode.\n  *  Solr\u0027s \"allowPath\" setting is being used to restrict file access to certain directories.\n  *  Solr\u0027s \"create core\" API is exposed and accessible to untrusted users.\u00a0 This can happen if Solr\u0027s  RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin https://solr.apache.org/guide/solr/latest/deployment-guide/rule-based-authorization-plugin.html  is disabled, or if it is enabled but the \"core-admin-edit\" predefined permission (or an equivalent custom permission) is given to low-trust (i.e. non-admin) user roles.\n\nUsers can mitigate this by enabling Solr\u0027s RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin (if disabled) and configuring a permission-list that prevents untrusted users from creating new Solr cores.\u00a0 Users should also upgrade to Apache Solr 9.10.1 or greater, which contain fixes for this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-vc2w-4v3p-2mqw",
  "modified": "2026-01-21T22:57:58Z",
  "published": "2026-01-21T15:31:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22444"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/solr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SOLR-18058"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/qkrb9dd4xrlqmmq73lrhkbfkttto2d1m"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/01/20/5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Apache Solr: Insufficient file-access checking in standalone core-creation requests"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.