GHSA-V924-7RP8-4MXH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 21:38 – Updated: 2026-11-10 21:38Impact
ActiveStorage::Blob#open writes a blob to a tempfile whose name carries the extension of the uploaded filename, and hands that path to ffprobe (VideoAnalyzer, AudioAnalyzer), ffmpeg (VideoPreviewer) and ImageMagick (ImageAnalyzer, the :mini_magick variant processor). These tools select a decoder from the file extension when the content does not identify its own format, so an attacker who chooses the filename and declares the content type of an upload chooses which decoder processes it. An FFmpeg built with AviSynth support treats a file with the .avs extension as an AviSynth script and evaluates it, which could disclose files readable by the application process through the preview image, or load a native library the attacker has also uploaded, possibly leading to remote code execution in the FFmpeg process. ImageMagick selects its coders and delegates from the extension in the same way.
Details
The fixed releases keep the uploaded extension on the tempfile only when Marcel maps that extension to the blob's recorded content type, and name the tempfile with no extension otherwise. A form upload whose Rack tempfile fails the same check is copied to a correctly named tempfile before processing. Files whose uploaded extension disagrees with their content type are still processed; the external tool detects their format from the content. The Active Storage CHANGELOG describes the change.
Affected applications
An application is affected if it meets all of these requirements: - Accepts uploads from untrusted users. - Analyzes video or audio attachments (which Active Storage does on attach by default), generates video previews, or processes images with ImageMagick.
The AviSynth attack additionally requires an FFmpeg built with --enable-avisynth and the AviSynthPlus runtime on the host. Upstream FFmpeg and the common Linux distribution and Homebrew packages do not enable it; the GPL builds distributed for Windows and Linux from ffmpeg.org do. Other decoders that FFmpeg or ImageMagick select from the extension may be reachable without AviSynth.
Mitigation
- Upgrade to a fixed version of
activestorage.
Expire and change secrets
Upgrading closes the vulnerability but does not undo a disclosure that already occurred. An application that meets the AviSynth requirement above should treat every secret readable by the application process as potentially exposed and change it, including secret_key_base, the master key and everything in config/credentials.yml.enc that it decrypts, the Active Storage service credentials, database credentials, and tokens for third-party services. Changing secret_key_base expires active sessions and invalidates signed and encrypted cookies, signed global IDs and Active Storage URLs. Do not retain an exposed secret as a fallback.
Workarounds
Applications that cannot upgrade can stop Active Storage from running FFmpeg on uploaded files by removing ActiveStorage::Previewer::VideoPreviewer from config.active_storage.previewers, and ActiveStorage::Analyzer::VideoAnalyzer and ActiveStorage::Analyzer::AudioAnalyzer from config.active_storage.analyzers. Running an FFmpeg built without AviSynth support closes the AviSynth attack but not the extension-selected decoders of ImageMagick.
Releases
The fixed releases are available at the normal locations.
Patches for those who cannot upgrade at once: - 8.1: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/72136ff39153bc8d63ecbc899993848eb3d6573e.patch - 8.0: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/8106938fb0a595f11006dd1497cd409e27d7d636.patch
Versions affected
- activestorage < 8.0.5.2
- activestorage >= 8.1, < 8.1.4.1
Credit
This issue was responsibly reported by HackerOne researcher pirikara.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "activestorage"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.1.0.beta1"
},
{
"fixed": "8.1.4.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "activestorage"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.5.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-126186"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-646"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-10T21:38:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n`ActiveStorage::Blob#open` writes a blob to a tempfile whose name carries the extension of the uploaded filename, and hands that path to `ffprobe` (`VideoAnalyzer`, `AudioAnalyzer`), `ffmpeg` (`VideoPreviewer`) and ImageMagick (`ImageAnalyzer`, the `:mini_magick` variant processor). These tools select a decoder from the file extension when the content does not identify its own format, so an attacker who chooses the filename and declares the content type of an upload chooses which decoder processes it. An FFmpeg built with AviSynth support treats a file with the `.avs` extension as an AviSynth script and evaluates it, which could disclose files readable by the application process through the preview image, or load a native library the attacker has also uploaded, possibly leading to remote code execution in the FFmpeg process. ImageMagick selects its coders and delegates from the extension in the same way.\n\n### Details\nThe fixed releases keep the uploaded extension on the tempfile only when Marcel maps that extension to the blob\u0027s recorded content type, and name the tempfile with no extension otherwise. A form upload whose Rack tempfile fails the same check is copied to a correctly named tempfile before processing. Files whose uploaded extension disagrees with their content type are still processed; the external tool detects their format from the content. The Active Storage CHANGELOG describes the change.\n\n### Affected applications\nAn application is affected if it meets all of these requirements:\n- Accepts uploads from untrusted users.\n- Analyzes video or audio attachments (which Active Storage does on attach by default), generates video previews, or processes images with ImageMagick.\n\nThe AviSynth attack additionally requires an FFmpeg built with `--enable-avisynth` and the AviSynthPlus runtime on the host. Upstream FFmpeg and the common Linux distribution and Homebrew packages do not enable it; the GPL builds distributed for Windows and Linux from ffmpeg.org do. Other decoders that FFmpeg or ImageMagick select from the extension may be reachable without AviSynth.\n\n### Mitigation\n- Upgrade to a fixed version of `activestorage`.\n\n### Expire and change secrets\nUpgrading closes the vulnerability but does not undo a disclosure that already occurred. An application that meets the AviSynth requirement above should treat every secret readable by the application process as potentially exposed and change it, including `secret_key_base`, the master key and everything in `config/credentials.yml.enc` that it decrypts, the Active Storage service credentials, database credentials, and tokens for third-party services. Changing `secret_key_base` expires active sessions and invalidates signed and encrypted cookies, signed global IDs and Active Storage URLs. Do not retain an exposed secret as a fallback.\n\n### Workarounds\nApplications that cannot upgrade can stop Active Storage from running FFmpeg on uploaded files by removing `ActiveStorage::Previewer::VideoPreviewer` from `config.active_storage.previewers`, and `ActiveStorage::Analyzer::VideoAnalyzer` and `ActiveStorage::Analyzer::AudioAnalyzer` from `config.active_storage.analyzers`. Running an FFmpeg built without AviSynth support closes the AviSynth attack but not the extension-selected decoders of ImageMagick.\n\n### Releases\nThe fixed releases are available at the normal locations.\n\nPatches for those who cannot upgrade at once:\n- 8.1: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/72136ff39153bc8d63ecbc899993848eb3d6573e.patch\n- 8.0: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/8106938fb0a595f11006dd1497cd409e27d7d636.patch\n\n### Versions affected\n- activestorage \u003c 8.0.5.2\n- activestorage \u003e= 8.1, \u003c 8.1.4.1\n\n### Credit\nThis issue was responsibly reported by HackerOne researcher [pirikara](https://hackerone.com/pirikara).",
"id": "GHSA-v924-7rp8-4mxh",
"modified": "2026-11-10T21:38:55Z",
"published": "2026-11-10T21:38:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rails/rails/security/advisories/GHSA-v924-7rp8-4mxh"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/72136ff39153bc8d63ecbc899993848eb3d6573e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/8106938fb0a595f11006dd1497cd409e27d7d636"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rails/rails"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rails/rails/releases/tag/v8.0.5.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rails/rails/releases/tag/v8.1.4.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/activestorage/GHSA-v924-7rp8-4mxh.yml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Active Storage: Possible arbitrary file read and remote code execution in video previews, analysis and image processing"
}
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