GHSA-V77H-2W3M-94HX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:32 – Updated: 2026-09-11 21:32Summary
A token lifecycle validation vulnerability was discovered in ZITADEL's external JWT Identity Provider (IdP) implementation
Specifically, within the validation pipeline, if an incoming JWT omits the exp claim entirely, the expiration block is silently skipped rather than rejected. The token is treated as valid forever.
Per the OIDC Core 1.0 specification, identity token validation pipelines must strictly handle and enforce session expiration. ZITADEL's silent acceptance of tokens missing these temporal constraints compromises session integrity.
Impact
An attacker in possession of a token lacking an exp claim holds a permanent credential with no automatic expiration or revocation window.
Affected Versions
Systems running one of the following versions are affected:
- 4.x:
4.0.0through4.15.1(including RC versions) - 3.x:
3.0.0through3.4.11(including RC versions)
Patches
The vulnerability has been addressed in the latest releases. ZITADEL now explicitly rejects tokens that lack an exp claim.
Workarounds
The recommended solution is to update ZITADEL to a patched version.
If an immediate upgrade is not feasible, ensure at the upstream Identity Provider level that an external IdP explicitly includes the exp claim in all signed JWTs.
Publication Note
This issue was originally disclosed as part of a unified security bulletin published under GHSA-wxg7-w2v3-w38g. To satisfy CVE Numbering Authority regulations regarding independently fixable logic flaws, the missing token expiration validation (exp) has been moved into this separate tracking entry so a distinct CVE ID can be correctly mapped to it.
Questions
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, send an email to security@zitadel.com
Credits
ZITADEL thanks Android-Login-Analysis, Jason Zhou and Pedro Giglioti for reporting this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/zitadel/zitadel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0-rc.1"
},
{
"fixed": "4.15.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/zitadel/zitadel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.4.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-56665"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-613"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-11T21:32:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T18:16:24Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA token lifecycle validation vulnerability was discovered in ZITADEL\u0027s external JWT Identity Provider (IdP) implementation\nSpecifically, within the validation pipeline, if an incoming JWT omits the `exp` claim entirely, the expiration block is silently skipped rather than rejected. The token is treated as valid forever.\n\nPer the OIDC Core 1.0 specification, identity token validation pipelines must strictly handle and enforce session expiration. ZITADEL\u0027s silent acceptance of tokens missing these temporal constraints compromises session integrity.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker in possession of a token lacking an `exp` claim holds a permanent credential with no automatic expiration or revocation window.\n\n### Affected Versions\n\nSystems running one of the following versions are affected:\n\n* **4.x**: `4.0.0` through `4.15.1` (including RC versions)\n* **3.x**: `3.0.0` through `3.4.11` (including RC versions)\n\n### Patches\n\nThe vulnerability has been addressed in the latest releases. ZITADEL now explicitly rejects tokens that lack an `exp` claim.\n\n* **4.x**: Upgrade to $\\ge$ [4.15.2](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/releases/tag/v4.15.2)\n* **3.x**: Upgrade to $\\ge$ [3.4.12](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/releases/tag/v3.4.12)\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThe recommended solution is to update ZITADEL to a patched version.\n\nIf an immediate upgrade is not feasible, ensure at the upstream Identity Provider level that an external IdP explicitly includes the `exp` claim in all signed JWTs.\n\n### Publication Note\n\nThis issue was originally disclosed as part of a unified security bulletin published under [GHSA-wxg7-w2v3-w38g](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/security/advisories/GHSA-wxg7-w2v3-w38g). To satisfy CVE Numbering Authority regulations regarding independently fixable logic flaws, the missing token expiration validation (`exp`) has been moved into this separate tracking entry so a distinct CVE ID can be correctly mapped to it.\n\n### Questions\n\nIf there are any questions or comments about this advisory, send an email to [security@zitadel.com](mailto:security@zitadel.com)\n\n### Credits\n\nZITADEL thanks [Android-Login-Analysis](https://github.com/Android-Login-Analysis), Jason Zhou and [Pedro Giglioti](https://github.com/Punisher100) for reporting this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-v77h-2w3m-94hx",
"modified": "2026-09-11T21:32:14Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:32:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/security/advisories/GHSA-v77h-2w3m-94hx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56665"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/commit/4925fab849d39a88674485d937b79e54318b48a8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/commit/d1c3aa84af8fcb0f33910ada30b866f4afb551ac"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/releases/tag/v3.4.12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/releases/tag/v4.15.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "ZITADEL: Missing Token Expiration (`exp`) Validation in JWT IdP Provider"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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