GHSA-V222-6MR4-QJ29
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-31 23:27 – Updated: 2023-05-16 15:46Impact
Applications using Asciidoctor (Ruby) with asciidoctor-include-ext (prior to version 0.4.0), which render user-supplied input in AsciiDoc markup, may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary system commands on the host operating system. ~~This attack is possible even when allow-uri-read is disabled!~~ (EDIT: it’s not)
Patches
The vulnerability has been fixed in commit c7ea001 (and further improved in cbaccf3), which is included in version 0.4.0.
Workarounds
require 'asciidoctor/include_ext'
class Asciidoctor::IncludeExt::IncludeProcessor
# Overrides superclass private method to mitigate Command Injection
# vulnerability in asciidoctor-include-ext <0.4.0.
def target_uri?(target)
target.downcase.start_with?('http://', 'https://') \
&& URI.parse(target).is_a?(URI::HTTP)
rescue URI::InvalidURIError
false
end
end
References
- https://sakurity.com/blog/2015/02/28/openuri.html
Credits
This vulnerability was discovered by Joern Schneeweisz from the GitLab Security Research Team.
For more information
See commit message c7ea001.
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory open an issue in jirutka/asciidoctor-include-ext.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "asciidoctor-include-ext"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-24803"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-03-31T23:27:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-04-01T00:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nApplications using [Asciidoctor (Ruby)](https://github.com/asciidoctor/asciidoctor) with [asciidoctor-include-ext](https://github.com/jirutka/asciidoctor-include-ext) (prior to version 0.4.0), which render user-supplied input in AsciiDoc markup, may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary system commands on the host operating system. ~~This attack is possible even when `allow-uri-read` is disabled!~~ (EDIT: it\u2019s not)\n\n\n### Patches\n\nThe vulnerability has been fixed in commit c7ea001 (and further improved in cbaccf3), which is included in version [0.4.0](https://rubygems.org/gems/asciidoctor-include-ext/versions/0.4.0).\n\n### Workarounds\n\n```rb\nrequire \u0027asciidoctor/include_ext\u0027\n\nclass Asciidoctor::IncludeExt::IncludeProcessor\n # Overrides superclass private method to mitigate Command Injection\n # vulnerability in asciidoctor-include-ext \u003c0.4.0.\n def target_uri?(target)\n target.downcase.start_with?(\u0027http://\u0027, \u0027https://\u0027) \\\n \u0026\u0026 URI.parse(target).is_a?(URI::HTTP)\n rescue URI::InvalidURIError\n false\n end\nend\n```\n\n### References\n\n* https://sakurity.com/blog/2015/02/28/openuri.html\n\n### Credits\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered by Joern Schneeweisz from the GitLab Security Research Team.\n\n\n### For more information\n\nSee commit message c7ea001.\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory open an issue in [jirutka/asciidoctor-include-ext](https://github.com/jirutka/asciidoctor-include-ext/issues/).",
"id": "GHSA-v222-6mr4-qj29",
"modified": "2023-05-16T15:46:19Z",
"published": "2022-03-31T23:27:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jirutka/asciidoctor-include-ext/security/advisories/GHSA-v222-6mr4-qj29"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24803"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jirutka/asciidoctor-include-ext/commit/c7ea001a597c7033575342c51483dab7b87ae155"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jirutka/asciidoctor-include-ext/commit/cbaccf3de533cbca224bf61d0b74e4b84d41d8ee"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jirutka/asciidoctor-include-ext"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/asciidoctor-include-ext/CVE-2022-24803.yml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Command Injection vulnerability in asciidoctor-include-ext"
}
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