GHSA-RWJ8-P9VQ-25GV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-18 17:44 – Updated: 2026-03-05 22:00
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw has a LFI in BlueBubbles media path handling
Details

Summary

The BlueBubbles extension accepted attacker-controlled local filesystem paths via mediaPath and could read arbitrary local files from disk before sending them as media attachments.

Details

When sendBlueBubblesMedia received a non-HTTP media source, the previous implementation resolved it to a local path and read it directly from disk. There was no required allowlist of safe directories, so values like /etc/passwd (or equivalent sensitive paths on other platforms) could be requested and exfiltrated.

The fix hardens local media loading by requiring explicit configured roots (channels.bluebubbles.mediaLocalRoots) and by enforcing canonical-path containment checks before reading local files. Paths outside allowed roots are rejected.

Fix PR: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/16322 Fix commit: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/71f357d9498cebb0efe016b0496d5fbe807539fc

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected: < v2026.2.14
  • Fixed: >= v2026.2.14 (planned)

Impact

An attacker able to trigger BlueBubbles media sends could exfiltrate local files accessible to the OpenClaw process.

Remediation

Upgrade to a release that includes commit 71f357d9498cebb0efe016b0496d5fbe807539fc and configure channels.bluebubbles.mediaLocalRoots to explicit trusted directories.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-29611"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T17:44:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe BlueBubbles extension accepted attacker-controlled local filesystem paths via `mediaPath` and could read arbitrary local files from disk before sending them as media attachments.\n\n### Details\nWhen `sendBlueBubblesMedia` received a non-HTTP media source, the previous implementation resolved it to a local path and read it directly from disk. There was no required allowlist of safe directories, so values like `/etc/passwd` (or equivalent sensitive paths on other platforms) could be requested and exfiltrated.\n\nThe fix hardens local media loading by requiring explicit configured roots (`channels.bluebubbles.mediaLocalRoots`) and by enforcing canonical-path containment checks before reading local files. Paths outside allowed roots are rejected.\n\nFix PR: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/16322\nFix commit: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/71f357d9498cebb0efe016b0496d5fbe807539fc\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003c v2026.2.14`\n- Fixed: `\u003e= v2026.2.14` (planned)\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker able to trigger BlueBubbles media sends could exfiltrate local files accessible to the OpenClaw process.\n\n### Remediation\nUpgrade to a release that includes commit `71f357d9498cebb0efe016b0496d5fbe807539fc` and configure `channels.bluebubbles.mediaLocalRoots` to explicit trusted directories.",
  "id": "GHSA-rwj8-p9vq-25gv",
  "modified": "2026-03-05T22:00:36Z",
  "published": "2026-02-18T17:44:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-rwj8-p9vq-25gv"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/16322"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/71f357d9498cebb0efe016b0496d5fbe807539fc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.14"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw has a LFI in BlueBubbles media path handling"
}



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