GHSA-R7VR-M4JW-R794
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-09 12:31 – Updated: 2026-06-05 14:27Apache Airflow versions 3.0.0 through 3.1.8 DagRun wait endpoint returns XCom result values even to users who only have DAG Run read permissions, such as the Viewer role.This behavior conflicts with the FAB RBAC model, which treats XCom as a separate protected resource, and with the security model documentation that defines the Viewer role as read-only.
Airflow uses the FAB Auth Manager to manage access control on a per-resource basis. The Viewer role is intended to be read-only by default, and the security model documentation defines Viewer users as those who can inspect DAGs without accessing sensitive execution results.
Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache Airflow 3.2.0 which resolves this issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "apache-airflow"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34538"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-668"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T19:31:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-09T10:16:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Apache Airflow versions 3.0.0 through 3.1.8 DagRun wait endpoint returns XCom result values even to users who only have DAG Run read permissions, such as the Viewer role.This behavior conflicts with the FAB RBAC model, which treats XCom as a separate protected resource, and with the security model documentation that defines the Viewer role as read-only.\n\nAirflow uses the FAB Auth Manager to manage access control on a per-resource basis. The Viewer role is intended to be read-only by default, and the security model documentation defines Viewer users as those who can inspect DAGs without accessing sensitive execution results.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to Apache Airflow 3.2.0 which resolves this issue.",
"id": "GHSA-r7vr-m4jw-r794",
"modified": "2026-06-05T14:27:15Z",
"published": "2026-04-09T12:31:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34538"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/64415"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow/releases/tag/3.2.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/apache-airflow/PYSEC-2026-21.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/9mq3msqhmgjwdzbr6bgthj4brb3oz9fl"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/09/9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Apache Airflow has an authorization bypass in DagRun wait endpoint"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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