GHSA-QRXM-FQHP-JWVM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-27 19:02 – Updated: 2026-10-27 19:02Impact
undici crashes the client process when a TLS 1.2 server renegotiates after the connection is established and presents a different, CA-trusted certificate whose hostname does not match the requested host. Node.js re-runs hostname verification on the renegotiated handshake and destroys the socket with ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID. undici's established socket error handler asserted that this error code could never occur, so the peer-controlled error became an uncaught AssertionError that terminates the Node.js process. Both the HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 paths are affected.
A malicious or compromised HTTPS endpoint reached through undici or the global fetch() can crash the client with a single server-initiated renegotiation, taking down all in-flight requests and background work in the process. Only TLS 1.2 is affected, because TLS 1.3 does not support renegotiation. Exploitation does not require a CA compromise: the attacker controls the endpoint and can present two ordinary valid certificates, the first matching the requested URL and the second intentionally not matching it.
Patches
Upgrade to undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, or 8.12.2.
Workarounds
Restrict outbound connections to TLS 1.3, for example by setting connect: { minVersion: 'TLSv1.3', maxVersion: 'TLSv1.3' } on the client or agent, so that renegotiation cannot occur, when the target endpoints support TLS 1.3.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "undici"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2.1"
},
{
"fixed": "6.29.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "undici"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.30.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "undici"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.12.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-87018"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248",
"CWE-617"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-27T19:02:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-15T19:17:46Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nundici crashes the client process when a TLS 1.2 server renegotiates after the connection is established and presents a different, CA-trusted certificate whose hostname does not match the requested host. Node.js re-runs hostname verification on the renegotiated handshake and destroys the socket with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. undici\u0027s established socket error handler asserted that this error code could never occur, so the peer-controlled error became an uncaught `AssertionError` that terminates the Node.js process. Both the HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 paths are affected.\n\nA malicious or compromised HTTPS endpoint reached through undici or the global `fetch()` can crash the client with a single server-initiated renegotiation, taking down all in-flight requests and background work in the process. Only TLS 1.2 is affected, because TLS 1.3 does not support renegotiation. Exploitation does not require a CA compromise: the attacker controls the endpoint and can present two ordinary valid certificates, the first matching the requested URL and the second intentionally not matching it.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, or 8.12.2.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict outbound connections to TLS 1.3, for example by setting `connect: { minVersion: \u0027TLSv1.3\u0027, maxVersion: \u0027TLSv1.3\u0027 }` on the client or agent, so that renegotiation cannot occur, when the target endpoints support TLS 1.3.",
"id": "GHSA-qrxm-fqhp-jwvm",
"modified": "2026-10-27T19:02:21Z",
"published": "2026-10-27T19:02:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-qrxm-fqhp-jwvm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87018"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/12cfd96c3f430897656e3edc1c5e02be8c1cd309"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/b40fbfc0651703cf9fa9f6ced68b679f28d8bb28"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/e257e9f8fb42eedd50727b9cf65e548c8925e4a8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v6.29.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v7.30.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v8.12.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "undici vulnerable to Denial of Service via TLS 1.2 certificate-changing renegotiation"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.