GHSA-QRPV-Q767-XQQ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 21:16 – Updated: 2026-07-07 22:14Summary
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in /api/v1/responses endpoint allows an authenticated attacker to execute any flow belonging to another user by specifying the victim's flow ID in the request.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name helper function in src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py (lines 399-414).
When a flow is accessed via UUID (flow_id), the function queries the database directly without verifying if the authenticated user owns that flow:
# src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py:399-414
async def get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name(flow_id_or_name: str, user_id: str | UUID | None = None) -> FlowRead:
async with session_scope() as session:
try:
flow_id = UUID(flow_id_or_name)
# When using UUID, query directly WITHOUT checking user_id
flow = await session.get(Flow, flow_id) # ❌ No user_id check!
except ValueError:
endpoint_name = flow_id_or_name
stmt = select(Flow).where(Flow.endpoint_name == endpoint_name)
# Only when using endpoint_name is user_id checked
if user_id:
stmt = stmt.where(Flow.user_id == uuid_user_id)
This function is used by the /api/v1/responses endpoint (defined in src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/openai_responses.py:589).
PoC (Proof of Concept)
# Attacker (user A) with API_KEY_A tries to execute victim (user B)'s flow
curl -X POST "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/responses" \
-H "x-api-key: sk-ATTACKER_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"model": "VICTIM_FLOW_ID",
"input_value": "test",
"stream": false
}'
# Returns 200 and executes the victim's flow
Impact
Any authenticated user can: 1. Execute any flow in the system by knowing its flow ID 2. Access potentially sensitive data processed by victim's flows 3. Consume victim's resources
Fixes
Fixed in PR #12832 (fix(security): close IDOR in get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name), merged 2026-04-22, released in Langflow 1.9.1.
The helper normalizes user_id once and enforces ownership on both lookup branches (UUID and endpoint_name):
flow_id = UUID(flow_id_or_name)
flow = await session.get(Flow, flow_id)
if flow is not None and uuid_user_id is not None and flow.user_id != uuid_user_id:
flow = None # cross-user lookup falls through to the shared 404
Key points:
- Cross-user lookups return 404 (not 403), so flow existence is not disclosed via a 403-vs-404 oracle.
- /api/v1/responses and /api/v2/workflow pass user_id explicitly, so fixing the helper closes them directly; the /api/v1/run* routes were additionally moved from a bare Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name) to auth-aware wrapper dependencies (defense in depth).
- A malformed user_id now fails closed (404 instead of a raw 500).
- Webhook routes intentionally keep the unscoped lookup (public by design / explicit ownership check elsewhere).
- Regression tests cover the cross-user UUID case and reproduce the original PoC against /api/v1/responses.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to the security researchers who responsibly disclosed this vulnerability: * @yzeirnials * @johnatzeropath * @LeftenantZero * @Zwique
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "langflow"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.9.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55255"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:16:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T17:17:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nInsecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` endpoint allows an authenticated attacker to execute any flow belonging to another user by specifying the victim\u0027s flow ID in the request.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in the `get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name` helper function in [`src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py` (lines 399-414)](https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/v1.9.0/src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py#L399C1-L414C67).\n\nWhen a flow is accessed via UUID (flow_id), the function queries the database directly without verifying if the authenticated user owns that flow:\n\n```python\n# src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py:399-414\nasync def get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name(flow_id_or_name: str, user_id: str | UUID | None = None) -\u003e FlowRead:\n async with session_scope() as session:\n try:\n flow_id = UUID(flow_id_or_name)\n # When using UUID, query directly WITHOUT checking user_id\n flow = await session.get(Flow, flow_id) # \u274c No user_id check!\n except ValueError:\n endpoint_name = flow_id_or_name\n stmt = select(Flow).where(Flow.endpoint_name == endpoint_name)\n # Only when using endpoint_name is user_id checked\n if user_id:\n stmt = stmt.where(Flow.user_id == uuid_user_id)\n```\n\nThis function is used by the `/api/v1/responses` endpoint (defined in [`src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/openai_responses.py:589`](https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/v1.9.0/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/openai_responses.py#L589)).\n\n## PoC (Proof of Concept)\n\n```bash\n# Attacker (user A) with API_KEY_A tries to execute victim (user B)\u0027s flow\ncurl -X POST \"http://localhost:7860/api/v1/responses\" \\\n -H \"x-api-key: sk-ATTACKER_API_KEY\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"model\": \"VICTIM_FLOW_ID\",\n \"input_value\": \"test\",\n \"stream\": false\n }\u0027\n# Returns 200 and executes the victim\u0027s flow\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAny authenticated user can:\n1. Execute any flow in the system by knowing its flow ID\n2. Access potentially sensitive data processed by victim\u0027s flows\n3. Consume victim\u0027s resources\n\n## Fixes\n\nFixed in **PR #12832** (`fix(security): close IDOR in get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name`), merged 2026-04-22, released in **Langflow 1.9.1**.\n\nThe helper normalizes `user_id` once and enforces ownership on **both** lookup branches (UUID *and* `endpoint_name`):\n\n```python\nflow_id = UUID(flow_id_or_name)\nflow = await session.get(Flow, flow_id)\nif flow is not None and uuid_user_id is not None and flow.user_id != uuid_user_id:\n flow = None # cross-user lookup falls through to the shared 404\n```\n\nKey points:\n- Cross-user lookups return **404** (not 403), so flow existence is not disclosed via a 403-vs-404 oracle.\n- `/api/v1/responses` and `/api/v2/workflow` pass `user_id` explicitly, so fixing the helper closes them directly; the `/api/v1/run*` routes were additionally moved from a bare `Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name)` to auth-aware wrapper dependencies (defense in depth).\n- A malformed `user_id` now fails closed (404 instead of a raw 500).\n- Webhook routes intentionally keep the unscoped lookup (public by design / explicit ownership check elsewhere).\n- Regression tests cover the cross-user UUID case and reproduce the original PoC against `/api/v1/responses`.\n\n\n\n\n\n## Acknowledgements\n\nThanks to the security researchers who responsibly disclosed this vulnerability:\n* @yzeirnials\n* @johnatzeropath\n* @LeftenantZero\n* @Zwique",
"id": "GHSA-qrpv-q767-xqq2",
"modified": "2026-07-07T22:14:36Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T21:16:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-qrpv-q767-xqq2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55255"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/12832"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/commit/2c9f498d664a3c32698b57d7c5e752625291060e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/langflow/PYSEC-2026-221.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://webflow.sysdig.com/blog/understanding-langflow-cve-2026-55255-and-why-higher-cvss-vulnerabilities-arent-always-the-most-exploited"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-55255"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Langflow: IDOR Vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` Endpoint Allows Authenticated Attackers to Access Another User\u0027s Flow"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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