GHSA-QP59-X883-77QV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-21 01:06 – Updated: 2026-01-21 01:06Summary
A memory leak vulnerability exists in the LoadOpenCLDeviceBenchmark() function in MagickCore/opencl.c. When parsing a malformed OpenCL device profile XML file that contains <device elements without proper /> closing tags, the function fails to release allocated memory for string members (platform_name, vendor_name, name, version), leading to memory leaks that could result in resource exhaustion.
Affected Version: ImageMagick 7.1.2-12 and possibly earlier versions
Details
The vulnerability is located in MagickCore/opencl.c, function LoadOpenCLDeviceBenchmark() (lines 754-911).
Root Cause Analysis:
- When a
<devicetag is encountered, aMagickCLDeviceBenchmarkstructure is allocated (line 807-812) - String attributes (
platform,vendor,name,version) are allocated viaConstantString()(lines 878, 885, 898, 900) - These strings are only freed when a
/>closing tag is encountered (lines 840-849) - At function exit (lines 908-910), only the
device_benchmarkstructure is freed, but its member variables are not freed if/>was never parsed
Vulnerable Code (lines 908-910):
token=(char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(token);
device_benchmark=(MagickCLDeviceBenchmark *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
device_benchmark); // BUG: members (platform_name, vendor_name, name, version) not freed!
Correct cleanup (only executed when /> is found, lines 840-849):
device_benchmark->platform_name=(char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(device_benchmark->platform_name);
device_benchmark->vendor_name=(char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(device_benchmark->vendor_name);
device_benchmark->name=(char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(device_benchmark->name);
device_benchmark->version=(char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(device_benchmark->version);
device_benchmark=(MagickCLDeviceBenchmark *) RelinquishMagickMemory(device_benchmark);
PoC
Environment:
- OS: Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS (Linux 6.8.0-87-generic x86_64)
- Compiler: GCC 11.4.0
- ImageMagick: 7.1.2-13 (commit a52c1b402be08ef8ae193f28ac5b2e120f2fa26f)
Step 1: Build ImageMagick with AddressSanitizer
cd ImageMagick
./configure \
CFLAGS="-g -O0 -fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer" \
CXXFLAGS="-g -O0 -fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer" \
LDFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" \
--disable-openmp
make -j$(nproc)
Step 2: Create malformed XML file
Step 3: Place file in OpenCL cache directory
mkdir -p ~/.cache/ImageMagick
cp malformed_opencl_profile.xml ~/.cache/ImageMagick/ImagemagickOpenCLDeviceProfile.xml
Step 4: Run ImageMagick with leak detection
export ASAN_OPTIONS="detect_leaks=1:symbolize=1"
./utilities/magick -size 100x100 xc:red output.png
ASAN Output:
=================================================================
==2543490==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 96 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
#0 ... in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:536
#1 ... in LoadOpenCLDeviceBenchmark MagickCore/opencl.c:807
Direct leak of 16 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 ... in ConstantString MagickCore/string.c:692
#1 ... in LoadOpenCLDeviceBenchmark MagickCore/opencl.c:878 ← name
Direct leak of 14 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 ... in ConstantString MagickCore/string.c:692
#1 ... in LoadOpenCLDeviceBenchmark MagickCore/opencl.c:885 ← platform_name
Direct leak of 14 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 ... in ConstantString MagickCore/string.c:692
#1 ... in LoadOpenCLDeviceBenchmark MagickCore/opencl.c:898 ← vendor_name
Direct leak of 15 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 ... in ConstantString MagickCore/string.c:692
#1 ... in LoadOpenCLDeviceBenchmark MagickCore/opencl.c:900 ← version
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 203 byte(s) leaked in 18 allocation(s).
Impact
Vulnerability Type: CWE-401 (Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime)
Severity: Low
Who is impacted:
- Users who have OpenCL enabled in ImageMagick
- Systems where an attacker can place or modify files in the OpenCL cache directory (~/.cache/ImageMagick/)
- Long-running ImageMagick processes or services that repeatedly initialize OpenCL
Potential consequences: - Memory exhaustion over time if the malformed configuration is repeatedly loaded - Denial of Service (DoS) in resource-constrained environments
Attack Vector: Local - requires write access to the user's OpenCL cache directory
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"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-763"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-21T01:06:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA memory leak vulnerability exists in the `LoadOpenCLDeviceBenchmark()` function in `MagickCore/opencl.c`. When parsing a malformed OpenCL device profile XML file that contains `\u003cdevice` elements without proper `/\u003e` closing tags, the function fails to release allocated memory for string members (`platform_name`, `vendor_name`, `name`, `version`), leading to memory leaks that could result in resource exhaustion.\n\n**Affected Version**: ImageMagick 7.1.2-12 and possibly earlier versions\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability is located in `MagickCore/opencl.c`, function `LoadOpenCLDeviceBenchmark()` (lines 754-911).\n\n**Root Cause Analysis:**\n\n1. When a `\u003cdevice` tag is encountered, a `MagickCLDeviceBenchmark` structure is allocated (line 807-812)\n2. String attributes (`platform`, `vendor`, `name`, `version`) are allocated via `ConstantString()` (lines 878, 885, 898, 900)\n3. These strings are **only freed** when a `/\u003e` closing tag is encountered (lines 840-849)\n4. At function exit (lines 908-910), only the `device_benchmark` structure is freed, but **its member variables are not freed** if `/\u003e` was never parsed\n\n**Vulnerable Code (lines 908-910):**\n\n```c\ntoken=(char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(token);\ndevice_benchmark=(MagickCLDeviceBenchmark *) RelinquishMagickMemory(\n device_benchmark); // BUG: members (platform_name, vendor_name, name, version) not freed!\n```\n\n**Correct cleanup (only executed when `/\u003e` is found, lines 840-849):**\n\n```c\ndevice_benchmark-\u003eplatform_name=(char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(device_benchmark-\u003eplatform_name);\ndevice_benchmark-\u003evendor_name=(char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(device_benchmark-\u003evendor_name);\ndevice_benchmark-\u003ename=(char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(device_benchmark-\u003ename);\ndevice_benchmark-\u003eversion=(char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(device_benchmark-\u003eversion);\ndevice_benchmark=(MagickCLDeviceBenchmark *) RelinquishMagickMemory(device_benchmark);\n```\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\n**Environment:**\n- OS: Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS (Linux 6.8.0-87-generic x86_64)\n- Compiler: GCC 11.4.0\n- ImageMagick: 7.1.2-13 (commit `a52c1b402be08ef8ae193f28ac5b2e120f2fa26f`)\n\n**Step 1: Build ImageMagick with AddressSanitizer**\n\n```bash\ncd ImageMagick\n./configure \\\n CFLAGS=\"-g -O0 -fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer\" \\\n CXXFLAGS=\"-g -O0 -fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer\" \\\n LDFLAGS=\"-fsanitize=address\" \\\n --disable-openmp\nmake -j$(nproc)\n```\n\n**Step 2: Create malformed XML file**\n\n**Step 3: Place file in OpenCL cache directory**\n\n```bash\nmkdir -p ~/.cache/ImageMagick\ncp malformed_opencl_profile.xml ~/.cache/ImageMagick/ImagemagickOpenCLDeviceProfile.xml\n```\n\n**Step 4: Run ImageMagick with leak detection**\n\n```bash\nexport ASAN_OPTIONS=\"detect_leaks=1:symbolize=1\"\n./utilities/magick -size 100x100 xc:red output.png\n```\n\n**ASAN Output:**\n\n```\n=================================================================\n==2543490==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks\n\nDirect leak of 96 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:\n #0 ... in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:536\n #1 ... in LoadOpenCLDeviceBenchmark MagickCore/opencl.c:807\n\nDirect leak of 16 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:\n #0 ... in ConstantString MagickCore/string.c:692\n #1 ... in LoadOpenCLDeviceBenchmark MagickCore/opencl.c:878 \u2190 name\n\nDirect leak of 14 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:\n #0 ... in ConstantString MagickCore/string.c:692\n #1 ... in LoadOpenCLDeviceBenchmark MagickCore/opencl.c:885 \u2190 platform_name\n\nDirect leak of 14 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:\n #0 ... in ConstantString MagickCore/string.c:692\n #1 ... in LoadOpenCLDeviceBenchmark MagickCore/opencl.c:898 \u2190 vendor_name\n\nDirect leak of 15 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:\n #0 ... in ConstantString MagickCore/string.c:692\n #1 ... in LoadOpenCLDeviceBenchmark MagickCore/opencl.c:900 \u2190 version\n\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 203 byte(s) leaked in 18 allocation(s).\n```\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n**Vulnerability Type:** CWE-401 (Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime)\n\n**Severity:** Low\n\n**Who is impacted:**\n- Users who have OpenCL enabled in ImageMagick\n- Systems where an attacker can place or modify files in the OpenCL cache directory (`~/.cache/ImageMagick/`)\n- Long-running ImageMagick processes or services that repeatedly initialize OpenCL\n\n**Potential consequences:**\n- Memory exhaustion over time if the malformed configuration is repeatedly loaded\n- Denial of Service (DoS) in resource-constrained environments\n\n**Attack Vector:** Local - requires write access to the user\u0027s OpenCL cache directory",
"id": "GHSA-qp59-x883-77qv",
"modified": "2026-01-21T01:06:34Z",
"published": "2026-01-21T01:06:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/security/advisories/GHSA-qp59-x883-77qv"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dlemstra/Magick.NET/releases/tag/14.10.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "ImageMagick has a Memory Leak in LoadOpenCLDeviceBenchmark() when parsing malformed XML"
}
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