Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-QHWX-74W5-XHXQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-01 15:41 – Updated: 2026-10-01 15:41

Summary

vm2: NodeVM builtin allowlist bypass via node:test.run() execArgv allows sandbox escape

Details

Summary

On Node.js 24 and newer, vm2 can expose the host node:test module to sandboxed NodeVM code when the embedder explicitly allows the node:test builtin. Sandbox code can reach that module through require('node:node:test') and call run() with attacker-controlled execArgv.

node:test.run() starts a separate Node process for process-isolated test execution and forwards the supplied execArgv values to that process. Supplying --eval=<JavaScript> therefore executes arbitrary JavaScript in an unrestricted host Node process, outside the NodeVM sandbox.

The PoC confirms that direct sandbox imports of fs, child_process, module, and process remain denied before the spawned process imports host fs and writes a harmless marker.

Affected versions and environment

Package: vm2
Affected versions: >=3.9.6, <=3.11.5
Latest reproduced version: 3.11.5
Reproduced runtime: Node.js v24.18.0
Exact path is not present on Node.js 22 because module.builtinModules does not expose the scheme-only node:test entry there
Configuration prerequisite:

require: {
  builtin: ['node:test'],
  external: false
}

The lower version boundary was tested directly: vm2@3.9.5 blocks require('node:node:test'), while vm2@3.9.6 permits the exploit path. Representative releases through 3.11.5 were also reproduced.

Root cause

The issue is a combination of builtin admission, generic host passthrough, and prefix normalization:

On Node.js 24+, module.builtinModules includes the scheme-only key node:test.
lib/builtin.js builds BUILTIN_MODULES from that array. The family-based DANGEROUS_BUILTINS protection does not include test, so node:test remains eligible.
When the embedder explicitly allows node:test, addDefaultBuiltin() stores it through the generic loader:

builtins.set(key, special ? special : vm => vm.readonly(hostRequire(key)));

In lib/setup-node-sandbox.js, requireImpl() strips one node: prefix before builtin lookup:

if (localStringPrototypeStartsWith(filename, 'node:')) {
  id = localStringPrototypeSlice(filename, 5);
  nmod = loadBuiltinModule(id);
}

Consequently, sandbox code requesting node:node:test is normalized to the stored key node:test and receives a readonly proxy to the host module.
The readonly proxy does not make node:test.run() safe. Calls are forwarded to the host implementation, which accepts attacker-controlled execArgv for a newly spawned Node process.
--eval=<attacker JavaScript> runs outside vm2 and has normal host builtin access.

The doubled prefix is the reachability mechanism, but the security boundary failure is broader: the generic host-passthrough loader treats the test builtin family as safe even though its run() API can launch unrestricted Node processes.

Proof of concept

From the poc directory:

npm ci --ignore-scripts --no-audit --no-fund
node repro.js

Expected successful result on Node.js 24+ includes:

{
  "vm2Version": "3.11.5",
  "nodeVersion": "v24.18.0",
  "markerExists": true,
  "childIsDistinctProcess": true,
  "marker": {
    "hostCodeExecution": true
  }
}

The PoC writes only host-rce-marker.json in its own directory and does not invoke a shell, contact a network service, or access third-party data.

Impact

An attacker who is intentionally permitted to execute untrusted JavaScript in the affected NodeVM configuration can escape the sandbox and execute arbitrary JavaScript under the embedder's operating-system identity.

This provides the spawned process with the host user's filesystem, environment, network, and process-execution permissions. It can therefore result in complete confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact for the hosting service.

Suggested remediation

Treat the normalized test builtin family as dangerous before wildcard expansion and explicit builtin registration.

For example, add test to DANGEROUS_BUILTINS so the existing prefix and family checks reject both node:test and node:test/reporters:

const DANGEROUS_BUILTINS = new Set([
  // existing entries
  'test'
]);

If test helpers must be exposed, provide a sandbox-local wrapper through mock or override that does not expose run(), process isolation, execArgv, or other host process controls.

Recommended regression cases:

explicit builtin: ['node:test']
wildcard builtin configurations
require('node:test')
require('node:node:test')
node:test/reporters and prefixed variants
direct low-level builtin registration
attempts to pass --eval, --require, or --import through test-runner process options vm2-node-test-ghsa-submission.zip

Severity

9.9 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.11.6"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "vm2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.9.6"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.11.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-92948"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-01T15:41:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nOn Node.js 24 and newer, `vm2` can expose the host `node:test` module to sandboxed `NodeVM` code when the embedder explicitly allows the `node:test` builtin. Sandbox code can reach that module through `require(\u0027node:node:test\u0027)` and call `run()` with attacker-controlled `execArgv`.\n\n`node:test.run()` starts a separate Node process for process-isolated test execution and forwards the supplied `execArgv` values to that process. Supplying `--eval=\u003cJavaScript\u003e` therefore executes arbitrary JavaScript in an unrestricted host Node process, outside the `NodeVM` sandbox.\n\nThe PoC confirms that direct sandbox imports of `fs`, `child_process`, `module`, and `process` remain denied before the spawned process imports host `fs` and writes a harmless marker.\n\n## Affected versions and environment\n\n- Package: `vm2`\n- Affected versions: `\u003e=3.9.6, \u003c=3.11.5`\n- Latest reproduced version: `3.11.5`\n- Reproduced runtime: Node.js `v24.18.0`\n- Exact path is not present on Node.js 22 because `module.builtinModules` does not expose the scheme-only `node:test` entry there\n- Configuration prerequisite:\n\n```js\nrequire: {\n  builtin: [\u0027node:test\u0027],\n  external: false\n}\n```\n\nThe lower version boundary was tested directly: `vm2@3.9.5` blocks `require(\u0027node:node:test\u0027)`, while `vm2@3.9.6` permits the exploit path. Representative releases through `3.11.5` were also reproduced.\n\n## Root cause\n\nThe issue is a combination of builtin admission, generic host passthrough, and prefix normalization:\n\n1. On Node.js 24+, `module.builtinModules` includes the scheme-only key `node:test`.\n2. `lib/builtin.js` builds `BUILTIN_MODULES` from that array. The family-based `DANGEROUS_BUILTINS` protection does not include `test`, so `node:test` remains eligible.\n3. When the embedder explicitly allows `node:test`, `addDefaultBuiltin()` stores it through the generic loader:\n\n```js\nbuiltins.set(key, special ? special : vm =\u003e vm.readonly(hostRequire(key)));\n```\n\n4. In `lib/setup-node-sandbox.js`, `requireImpl()` strips one `node:` prefix before builtin lookup:\n\n```js\nif (localStringPrototypeStartsWith(filename, \u0027node:\u0027)) {\n  id = localStringPrototypeSlice(filename, 5);\n  nmod = loadBuiltinModule(id);\n}\n```\n\n5. Consequently, sandbox code requesting `node:node:test` is normalized to the stored key `node:test` and receives a readonly proxy to the host module.\n6. The readonly proxy does not make `node:test.run()` safe. Calls are forwarded to the host implementation, which accepts attacker-controlled `execArgv` for a newly spawned Node process.\n7. `--eval=\u003cattacker JavaScript\u003e` runs outside vm2 and has normal host builtin access.\n\nThe doubled prefix is the reachability mechanism, but the security boundary failure is broader: the generic host-passthrough loader treats the `test` builtin family as safe even though its `run()` API can launch unrestricted Node processes.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nFrom the `poc` directory:\n\n```bash\nnpm ci --ignore-scripts --no-audit --no-fund\nnode repro.js\n```\n\nExpected successful result on Node.js 24+ includes:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"vm2Version\": \"3.11.5\",\n  \"nodeVersion\": \"v24.18.0\",\n  \"markerExists\": true,\n  \"childIsDistinctProcess\": true,\n  \"marker\": {\n    \"hostCodeExecution\": true\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe PoC writes only `host-rce-marker.json` in its own directory and does not invoke a shell, contact a network service, or access third-party data.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who is intentionally permitted to execute untrusted JavaScript in the affected `NodeVM` configuration can escape the sandbox and execute arbitrary JavaScript under the embedder\u0027s operating-system identity.\n\nThis provides the spawned process with the host user\u0027s filesystem, environment, network, and process-execution permissions. It can therefore result in complete confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact for the hosting service.\n\n## Suggested remediation\n\nTreat the normalized `test` builtin family as dangerous before wildcard expansion and explicit builtin registration.\n\nFor example, add `test` to `DANGEROUS_BUILTINS` so the existing prefix and family checks reject both `node:test` and `node:test/reporters`:\n\n```js\nconst DANGEROUS_BUILTINS = new Set([\n  // existing entries\n  \u0027test\u0027\n]);\n```\n\nIf test helpers must be exposed, provide a sandbox-local wrapper through `mock` or `override` that does not expose `run()`, process isolation, `execArgv`, or other host process controls.\n\nRecommended regression cases:\n\n- explicit `builtin: [\u0027node:test\u0027]`\n- wildcard builtin configurations\n- `require(\u0027node:test\u0027)`\n- `require(\u0027node:node:test\u0027)`\n- `node:test/reporters` and prefixed variants\n- direct low-level builtin registration\n- attempts to pass `--eval`, `--require`, or `--import` through test-runner process options\n[vm2-node-test-ghsa-submission.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29930119/vm2-node-test-ghsa-submission.zip)",
  "id": "GHSA-qhwx-74w5-xhxq",
  "modified": "2026-10-01T15:41:31Z",
  "published": "2026-10-01T15:41:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-qhwx-74w5-xhxq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92948"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/415339f698f0d52d3c5ad358b12b79c8072d5b4b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vm2-3.9.6-through-3.11.5-sandbox-escape-via-node-test"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "vm2: NodeVM builtin allowlist bypass via node:test.run() execArgv allows sandbox escape"
}

CVE-2026-92948 (GCVE-0-2026-92948)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-17 13:46 – Updated: 2026-09-18 19:31

Title

vm2 3.9.6 through 3.11.5 Sandbox Escape via node:test

Summary

vm2 versions >= 3.9.6 and <= 3.11.6 are affected by a NodeVM builtin allowlist bypass that permits a sandbox escape on Node.js 24 and newer when the embedder explicitly allows the node:test builtin (e.g. require: { builtin: ['node:test'] }). On Node.js 24+, module.builtinModules exposes the scheme-only key node:test, which is not covered by vm2's family-based DANGEROUS_BUILTINS protection, so it is stored in the generic host-passthrough loader. Because requireImpl() in lib/setup-node-sandbox.js strips a single 'node:' prefix before the builtin lookup, sandbox code calling require('node:node:test') resolves to the stored node:test key and receives a readonly proxy to the host module. Calls to node:test.run() are forwarded to the host implementation, which spawns a separate Node process for process-isolated test execution and passes through attacker-controlled execArgv values; supplying --eval=<JavaScript> therefore executes arbitrary JavaScript in an unrestricted host Node process outside the NodeVM sandbox. Fixed in vm2 3.11.7.

Severity

9.4 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

9.9 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-09-18 19:31 UTC

CWE

CWE-693 - Protection Mechanism Failure

Assigner

VulnCheck mitre root Scorecard

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advis…	vendor-advisory
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vm2-3.9.6-th…	third-party-advisory

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
patriksimek	vm2	Affected: 3.9.6 , < 3.11.7 (semver) Unaffected: 3.11.7 (semver)

Date Public

2026-08-24 00:00

Credits

the-vibe-dev

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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  "containers": {
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        "metrics": [
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                "id": "CVE-2026-92948",
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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-QHWX-74W5-XHXQ

Summary

Affected versions and environment

Root cause

Proof of concept

Impact

Suggested remediation

CVE-2026-92948 (GCVE-0-2026-92948)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour