GHSA-Q7Q8-3MGW-Q67R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 15:40 – Updated: 2026-07-02 15:40Summary
Message read actions could skip channel allowlist checks. In affected versions, a lower-trust caller with access to the affected message read action could request messages without the same channel allowlist check used by normal delivery.
This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.
Impact
When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could expose messages from a channel that was not intended for that caller. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.
Patched Versions
The first stable patched version is 2026.5.19.
Mitigations
limit message read actions to trusted operators and keep channel allowlists narrow. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.5.19-beta.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.5.19"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53815"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T15:40:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-11T21:16:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nMessage read actions could skip channel allowlist checks. In affected versions, a lower-trust caller with access to the affected message read action could request messages without the same channel allowlist check used by normal delivery.\n\nThis advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw\u0027s trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.\n\n### Impact\n\nWhen the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could expose messages from a channel that was not intended for that caller. Practical impact depends on the operator\u0027s configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.\n\n### Patched Versions\n\nThe first stable patched version is `2026.5.19`.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nlimit message read actions to trusted operators and keep channel allowlists narrow. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.",
"id": "GHSA-q7q8-3mgw-q67r",
"modified": "2026-07-02T15:40:01Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T15:40:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-q7q8-3mgw-q67r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53815"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-channel-allowlist-bypass-in-message-read-actions"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Message read actions could skip channel allowlist checks"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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