GHSA-Q4C5-2J6F-R476
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 20:37 – Updated: 2026-09-22 20:37Impact
This is an authorization bypass that escalates into unauthorized server-side job execution.
-
Primary impact - self-approval: The approver checks (approver-group membership,
changepermission on the object under review, one-response-per-user) are enforced only in theapprove/denyactions onApprovalWorkflowStage. The genericApprovalWorkflowStageResponsecreate endpoint enforces none of them, so a user holding onlyextras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponsecanPOSTapproved responses directly and drive a stage past itsmin_approversthreshold with no legitimate approver involved. The serializer also exposesuserandstateas writable, letting the attacker attribute responses to arbitrary users. -
Escalated impact job activation: Because the approval workflow gates a
ScheduledJob, self-approval does not stop at the approval record. Stage approval cascades throughApprovalWorkflow.save()toon_workflow_approved(), which sets the target job to enabled/active.
Patches
Fixed in Nautobot v3.1.8
Workarounds
Restrict the extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse permission so that no untrusted user holds it; approval responses should only ever be created via the stage approve/deny actions. There is no configuration flag that disables the generic create endpoint prior to the patch.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nautobot"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-83805"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T20:37:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThis is an authorization bypass that escalates into unauthorized server-side job execution.\n\n1. Primary impact - self-approval: The approver checks (approver-group membership, `change` permission on the object under review, one-response-per-user) are enforced only in the `approve`/`deny` actions on `ApprovalWorkflowStage`. The generic `ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse` create endpoint enforces none of them, so a user holding only `extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse` can `POST` approved responses directly and drive a stage past its `min_approvers` threshold with no legitimate approver involved. The serializer also exposes `user` and `state` as writable, letting the attacker attribute responses to arbitrary users.\n\n2. Escalated impact job activation: Because the approval workflow gates a `ScheduledJob`, self-approval does not stop at the approval record. Stage approval cascades through `ApprovalWorkflow.save()` to `on_workflow_approved()`, which sets the target job to enabled/active.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in Nautobot v3.1.8\n\n### Workarounds\nRestrict the `extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse` permission so that no untrusted user holds it; approval responses should only ever be created via the stage `approve`/`deny` actions. There is no configuration flag that disables the generic create endpoint prior to the patch.",
"id": "GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476",
"modified": "2026-09-22T20:37:33Z",
"published": "2026-09-22T20:37:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/security/advisories/GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/commit/8682707d0391cbfd7694e3276127b78dc9cf29d8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/releases/tag/v3.1.8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Nautobot: Authorization bypass in approval workflow REST API allows self-approval and unauthorized activation of scheduled jobs"
}
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