GHSA-Q29V-XC37-WH5M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-03 21:15 – Updated: 2026-10-19 19:56
VLAI
Summary
Docling: Unsafe URI and Path Handling in HTML Backend
Details

Impact

The HTML backend did not perform sufficient validation during resource handling: - Accepted file:// URIs enabling local file system access when enable_local_fetch=True - Path resolution allowed traversal outside intended directories via ../ sequences and absolute paths - Did not block internal network resources under enable_remote_fetch=True - HTTP redirects were not validated, potentially redirecting to unintended schemes - No resource limits for remote image downloads and data: URIs

Patches

Fixed in versions 2.91.0 (initial fixes) and 2.94.0 (additional improvements). The fixes implement: - Updated local path treatment: absolute files always blocked, relative paths require enable_local_fetch=True (default: False) and containment within configured base_path for path traversal protection - file:// scheme stripped & treated as local path (above) - IP address validation to prevent SSRF - HTTP redirect validation, connection and read timeouts - Size limit for both remote images (with streaming download) and base64-decoded data URIs

Workarounds

Keep both enable_local_fetch=False and enable_remote_fetch=False (defaults) when processing untrusted HTML documents.

References

Severity
7.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "docling"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.94.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47214"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-03T21:15:02Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-26T16:16:31Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe HTML backend did not perform sufficient validation during resource handling:\n- Accepted `file://` URIs enabling local file system access when `enable_local_fetch=True`\n- Path resolution allowed traversal outside intended directories via `../` sequences and absolute paths\n- Did not block internal network resources under `enable_remote_fetch=True`\n- HTTP redirects were not validated, potentially redirecting to unintended schemes\n- No resource limits for remote image downloads and `data:` URIs\n\n### Patches\nFixed in versions 2.91.0 (initial fixes) and 2.94.0 (additional improvements). The fixes implement:\n- Updated local path treatment: absolute files always blocked, relative paths require `enable_local_fetch=True` (default: False) and containment within configured `base_path` for path traversal protection\n- `file://` scheme stripped \u0026 treated as local path (above)\n- IP address validation to prevent SSRF\n- HTTP redirect validation, connection and read timeouts\n- Size limit for both remote images (with streaming download) and base64-decoded data URIs\n\n### Workarounds\nKeep both `enable_local_fetch=False` and `enable_remote_fetch=False` (defaults) when processing untrusted HTML documents.\n\n### References\n- Initial fixes: [v2.91.0](https://github.com/docling-project/docling/releases/tag/v2.91.0)\n- Additional improvements: [v2.94.0](https://github.com/docling-project/docling/releases/tag/v2.94.0)",
  "id": "GHSA-q29v-xc37-wh5m",
  "modified": "2026-10-19T19:56:41Z",
  "published": "2026-06-03T21:15:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/docling-project/docling/security/advisories/GHSA-q29v-xc37-wh5m"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47214"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/docling-project/docling/pull/3400"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/docling-project/docling/pull/3407"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/docling-project/docling"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/docling-project/docling/releases/tag/v2.91.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/docling-project/docling/releases/tag/v2.94.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/docling/PYSEC-2026-2146.yaml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Docling: Unsafe URI and Path Handling in HTML Backend"
}



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