GHSA-PMRX-695R-4349
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-28 21:19 – Updated: 2024-05-28 21:19Summary
Binding to INADDR_ANY (0.0.0.0) or IN6ADDR_ANY (::) exposes an application on all network interfaces, increasing the risk of unauthorized access.
While doing some static analysis and code inspection, I found the following code binding a socket to INADDR_ANY by passing "" as the address. This effectively binds to any network interface on the local system, not just localhost (127.0.0.1).
Details
As stated in the Python docs, a special form for address is accepted instead of a host address: '' represents INADDR_ANY, equivalent to "0.0.0.0". On systems with IPv6, '' represents IN6ADDR_ANY, which is equivalent to "::".
https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-core/blob/main/core/dbt/task/docs/serve.py#L23C38-L23C39
The text around this code also imply the intention is to host docs only on localhost.
PoC
To recreate, run the docs ServeTask.run() to stand up the HTTP server. Then run netstat to see what addresses this process is bound.
Impact
A user who serves docs on an unsecured public network, may unknowingly be hosting an unsecured (http) web site for any remote user/system to access on the same network.
Further references: https://docs.python.org/3/library/socket.html#socket-families https://docs.securesauce.dev/rules/PY030 https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1327.html
Patches
The issue has has been mitigated in dbt-core v1.6.15, dbt-core v1.7.15, and dbt-core v1.8.1 by binding to localhost explicitly by default in dbt docs serve (https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-core/issues/10209).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "dbt-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "dbt-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "dbt-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.8.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.8.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-36105"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1327"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-05-28T21:19:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-27T18:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nBinding to `INADDR_ANY (0.0.0.0)` or `IN6ADDR_ANY (::)` exposes an application on all network interfaces, increasing the risk of unauthorized access.\n\nWhile doing some static analysis and code inspection, I found the following code binding a socket to `INADDR_ANY` by passing `\"\"` as the address. This effectively binds to any network interface on the local system, not just localhost (127.0.0.1). \n\n### Details\n\nAs stated in the Python docs, a special form for address is accepted instead of a host address: `\u0027\u0027` represents `INADDR_ANY`, equivalent to `\"0.0.0.0\"`. On systems with IPv6, \u0027\u0027 represents `IN6ADDR_ANY`, which is equivalent to `\"::\"`. \n\nhttps://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-core/blob/main/core/dbt/task/docs/serve.py#L23C38-L23C39\n\nThe text around this code also imply the intention is to host docs only on localhost.\n\n### PoC\n\nTo recreate, run the docs ServeTask.run() to stand up the HTTP server. Then run `netstat` to see what addresses this process is bound.\n\n### Impact\n\nA user who serves docs on an unsecured public network, may unknowingly be hosting an unsecured (http) web site for any remote user/system to access on the same network.\n\nFurther references:\nhttps://docs.python.org/3/library/socket.html#socket-families\nhttps://docs.securesauce.dev/rules/PY030\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1327.html\n\n### Patches\nThe issue has has been mitigated in [dbt-core v1.6.15](https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-core/releases/tag/v1.6.15), [dbt-core v1.7.15](https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-core/releases/tag/v1.7.15), and [dbt-core v1.8.1](https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-core/releases/tag/v1.8.1) by binding to localhost explicitly by default in `dbt docs serve` (https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-core/issues/10209).\n",
"id": "GHSA-pmrx-695r-4349",
"modified": "2024-05-28T21:19:14Z",
"published": "2024-05-28T21:19:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-core/security/advisories/GHSA-pmrx-695r-4349"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36105"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-core/issues/10209"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-core/pull/10208"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-core/commit/0c08d7a19ad1740be3cb0b2e6d9d64f6537176f7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1327.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.python.org/3/library/socket.html#socket-families"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.securesauce.dev/rules/PY030"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-core"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-core/blob/main/core/dbt/task/docs/serve.py#L23C38-L23C39"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-core/releases/tag/v1.6.15"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-core/releases/tag/v1.7.15"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-core/releases/tag/v1.8.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "dbt allows Binding to an Unrestricted IP Address via socketsocket"
}
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