GHSA-MW35-8RX3-XF9R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-24 16:15 – Updated: 2026-05-13 13:37Ray Data registers custom Arrow extension types (ray.data.arrow_tensor, ray.data.arrow_tensor_v2, ray.data.arrow_variable_shaped_tensor) globally in PyArrow. When PyArrow reads a Parquet file containing one of these extension types, it calls __arrow_ext_deserialize__ on the field's metadata bytes. Ray's implementation passes these bytes directly to cloudpickle.loads(), achieving arbitrary code execution during schema parsing, before any row data is read.
In May 2024, Ray fixed a related vulnerability in PyExtensionType-based extension types (issue #41314, PR #45084). In July 2025, PR #54831 introduced cloudpickle.loads() into the replacement extension types' deserialization path, reintroducing the same class of vulnerability.
Impact
- Affected versions: Ray 2.49.0 through 2.54.0 (latest release as of March 2026). The vulnerable
_deserialize_with_fallbackfunction withcloudpickle.loads()was introduced in commitf6d21db1a4(PR #54831, July 2025), first released in Ray 2.49.0. - Affected configurations: Any process that uses Ray Data and reads Parquet files. The extension types are registered globally in PyArrow, so all Parquet reads in the process are affected, including
ray.data.read_parquet(),pyarrow.parquet.read_table(),pandas.read_parquet(), etc. - Attacker prerequisites: The attacker must place a crafted Parquet file where a Ray Data pipeline reads it. No authentication or cluster access is required. The Parquet file must contain a column with a
ray.data.arrow_tensor(or v2, or variable-shaped) extension type name, which makes this a targeted attack against Ray Data users.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "ray"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.49.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.55.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41486"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502",
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-24T16:15:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T22:16:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Ray Data registers custom Arrow extension types (`ray.data.arrow_tensor`, `ray.data.arrow_tensor_v2`, `ray.data.arrow_variable_shaped_tensor`) globally in PyArrow. When PyArrow reads a Parquet file containing one of these extension types, it calls `__arrow_ext_deserialize__` on the field\u0027s metadata bytes. Ray\u0027s implementation passes these bytes directly to `cloudpickle.loads()`, achieving arbitrary code execution during schema parsing, before any row data is read.\n\nIn May 2024, Ray fixed a related vulnerability in `PyExtensionType`-based extension types ([issue #41314](https://github.com/ray-project/ray/issues/41314), [PR #45084](https://github.com/ray-project/ray/pull/45084)). In July 2025, [PR #54831](https://github.com/ray-project/ray/pull/54831) introduced `cloudpickle.loads()` into the replacement extension types\u0027 deserialization path, reintroducing the same class of vulnerability.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Affected versions**: Ray 2.49.0 through 2.54.0 (latest release as of March 2026). The vulnerable `_deserialize_with_fallback` function with `cloudpickle.loads()` was introduced in commit `f6d21db1a4` ([PR #54831](https://github.com/ray-project/ray/pull/54831), July 2025), first released in Ray 2.49.0.\n- **Affected configurations**: Any process that uses Ray Data and reads Parquet files. The extension types are registered globally in PyArrow, so all Parquet reads in the process are affected, including `ray.data.read_parquet()`, `pyarrow.parquet.read_table()`, `pandas.read_parquet()`, etc.\n- **Attacker prerequisites**: The attacker must place a crafted Parquet file where a Ray Data pipeline reads it. No authentication or cluster access is required. The Parquet file must contain a column with a `ray.data.arrow_tensor` (or v2, or variable-shaped) extension type name, which makes this a targeted attack against Ray Data users.",
"id": "GHSA-mw35-8rx3-xf9r",
"modified": "2026-05-13T13:37:51Z",
"published": "2026-04-24T16:15:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ray-project/ray/security/advisories/GHSA-mw35-8rx3-xf9r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41486"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ray-project/ray/pull/54831"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ray-project/ray/pull/62056"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ray-project/ray/commit/c02bd31ae31996805868baa446a131a8d304525f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ray-project/ray"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ray-project/ray/releases/tag/ray-2.55.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Ray: Remote Code Execution via Parquet Arrow Extension Type Deserialization"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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