GHSA-MHG6-2Q2V-9H2C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-11 00:24 – Updated: 2026-03-19 21:02Summary
Sigstore::Verifier#verify does not propagate the VerificationFailure returned by verify_in_toto when the artifact digest does not match the digest in the in-toto attestation subject. As a result, verification of DSSE bundles containing in-toto statements returns VerificationSuccess regardless of whether the artifact matches the attested subject.
Details
In lib/sigstore/verifier.rb, the verify method calls verify_in_toto (line 176) without capturing or checking its return value:
verify_in_toto(input, in_toto)
When verify_in_toto detects a digest mismatch, it returns a VerificationFailure object. Because the caller discards this return value, execution unconditionally falls through to return VerificationSuccess. This is the only verification sub-check in the method (out of 12) whose failure is not propagated.
The message_signature code path is not affected.
Impact
An attacker who possesses a valid signed DSSE bundle containing an in-toto attestation for artifact A can present it as a valid attestation for a different artifact B. All other verification checks (DSSE envelope signature, certificate chain, Rekor inclusion, SCTs, policy) pass because they are independent of the artifact content. Only the in-toto subject digest check detects the mismatch, and its result is discarded.
This allows an attacker to bypass artifact-to-attestation binding for any consumer that relies on Sigstore::Verifier#verify to validate DSSE/in-toto bundles.
Workarounds
None. Consumers cannot work around this without patching the library.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "sigstore"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.2.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-31830"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-252"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-11T00:24:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T22:16:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`Sigstore::Verifier#verify` does not propagate the `VerificationFailure` returned by `verify_in_toto` when the artifact digest does not match the digest in the in-toto attestation subject. As a result, verification of DSSE bundles containing in-toto statements returns `VerificationSuccess` regardless of whether the artifact matches the attested subject.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `lib/sigstore/verifier.rb`, the verify method calls `verify_in_toto` (line 176) without capturing or checking its return value:\n\n`verify_in_toto(input, in_toto)`\n\nWhen `verify_in_toto` detects a digest mismatch, it returns a `VerificationFailure` object. Because the caller discards this return value, execution unconditionally falls through to return `VerificationSuccess`. This is the only verification sub-check in the method (out of 12) whose failure is not propagated.\n\nThe message_signature code path is not affected.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who possesses a valid signed DSSE bundle containing an in-toto attestation for artifact A can present it as a valid attestation for a different artifact B. All other verification checks (DSSE envelope signature, certificate chain, Rekor inclusion, SCTs, policy) pass because they are independent of the artifact content. Only the in-toto subject digest check detects the mismatch, and its result is discarded.\n\nThis allows an attacker to bypass artifact-to-attestation binding for any consumer that relies on `Sigstore::Verifier#verify` to validate DSSE/in-toto bundles.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone. Consumers cannot work around this without patching the library.",
"id": "GHSA-mhg6-2q2v-9h2c",
"modified": "2026-03-19T21:02:46Z",
"published": "2026-03-11T00:24:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-ruby/security/advisories/GHSA-mhg6-2q2v-9h2c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31830"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/sigstore/CVE-2026-31830.yml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-ruby"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "sigstore-ruby verifier returns success for DSSE bundles with mismatched in-toto subject digest"
}
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