GHSA-M6JQ-G7GQ-5W3C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-03 20:47 – Updated: 2026-02-04 17:45Summary
Description A Cross-site Scripting (CWE-79) vulnerability in Qwik.js' server-side rendering virtual attribute serialization allows a remote attacker to inject arbitrary web scripts into server-rendered pages via virtual attributes. Successful exploitation permits script execution in a victim's browser in the context of the affected origin. This affects qwik-city before version 1.19.0. This has been patched in qwik-city version 1.19.0.
Impact
This vulnerability impacts applications that dynamically populate Virtual Node attributes with keys/values that users can influence. Applications that hard-code these keys/values are unaffected.
Qwik doesn't use traditional hydration. Instead, it serializes application state into the HTML so the client can resume execution from the server-rendered output. To support this, Qwik v1 marks component boundaries with HTML comments. SSR builds comment content for Virtual components by concatenating structural attribute names and values without any escaping or quoting. An attacker-controlled key or value can prematurely close the HTML comment and inject arbitrary HTML/JS.
Successful exploitation permits script execution in a victim’s browser in the context of the affected origin. Additionally, because Qwik uses these serialized comment markers for resumability, breaking comment structure can lead to resume/hydration desync and unexpected client-side behavior.
Patches
This has been patched in qwik-city version 1.19.0. Users are strongly encouraged to update to the latest available release.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@builder.io/qwik-city"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.19.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25148"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-03T20:47:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-03T22:16:30Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n**Description**\nA Cross-site Scripting (CWE-79) vulnerability in Qwik.js\u0027 server-side rendering virtual attribute serialization allows a remote attacker to inject arbitrary web scripts into server-rendered pages via virtual attributes. Successful exploitation permits script execution in a victim\u0027s browser in the context of the affected origin. This affects qwik-city before version 1.19.0. This has been patched in qwik-city version 1.19.0.\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability impacts applications that dynamically populate Virtual Node attributes with keys/values that users can influence. Applications that hard-code these keys/values are unaffected.\n\nQwik doesn\u0027t use traditional hydration. Instead, it serializes application state into the HTML so the client can resume execution from the server-rendered output. To support this, Qwik v1 marks component boundaries with HTML comments. SSR builds comment content for Virtual components by concatenating structural attribute names and values without any escaping or quoting. An attacker-controlled key or value can prematurely close the HTML comment and inject arbitrary HTML/JS.\n\nSuccessful exploitation permits script execution in a victim\u2019s browser in the context of the affected origin. Additionally, because Qwik uses these serialized comment markers for resumability, breaking comment structure can lead to resume/hydration desync and unexpected client-side behavior.\n\n### Patches\nThis has been patched in qwik-city version 1.19.0. Users are strongly encouraged to update to the latest available release.",
"id": "GHSA-m6jq-g7gq-5w3c",
"modified": "2026-02-04T17:45:39Z",
"published": "2026-02-03T20:47:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/QwikDev/qwik/security/advisories/GHSA-m6jq-g7gq-5w3c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25148"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/QwikDev/qwik/commit/fe2d9232c0bcec99411d51a00dae29295871d094"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/QwikDev/qwik"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Qwik SSR XSS via Unsafe Virtual Node Serialization"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.