GHSA-M6HV-X64C-27MM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-10 01:20 – Updated: 2026-03-10 18:45Summary
The nohtml config option, intended to prevent execution of JavaScript in user-uploaded HTML files, did not apply to SVG images.
Details
A user with write-permission could upload an SVG containing embedded JavaScript, which would execute in the context of whichever user opens it.
This in itself is not a vulnerability; it is intended behavior according to the SVG spec. The vulnerability is that the nohtml volflag, when enabled, did not prevent this.
nohtml, intended for use on volumes which contains untrusted files, would correctly prevent execution of javascript in HTML files, but did not consider SVG images. This has been fixed in v1.20.11.
Impact
The malicious JavaScript could move or delete existing files on the server, or upload new files, using the account of the person who opens the SVG.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.20.10"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "copyparty"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.20.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-30974"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-10T01:20:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T18:18:56Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe `nohtml` config option, intended to prevent execution of JavaScript in user-uploaded HTML files, did not apply to SVG images.\n\n### Details\nA user with write-permission could upload an SVG containing embedded JavaScript, which would execute in the context of whichever user opens it.\n\nThis in itself is not a vulnerability; it is intended behavior according to [the SVG spec](https://www.w3.org/TR/SVG11/script.html). The vulnerability is that the `nohtml` volflag, when enabled, did not prevent this.\n\n`nohtml`, intended for use on volumes which contains untrusted files, would correctly prevent execution of javascript in HTML files, but did not consider SVG images. This has been fixed in v1.20.11.\n\n### Impact\nThe malicious JavaScript could move or delete existing files on the server, or upload new files, using the account of the person who opens the SVG.",
"id": "GHSA-m6hv-x64c-27mm",
"modified": "2026-03-10T18:45:39Z",
"published": "2026-03-10T01:20:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/9001/copyparty/security/advisories/GHSA-m6hv-x64c-27mm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30974"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/9001/copyparty/commit/1c9f894e149b6be3cc7de81efc93a4ce4766e0e5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/9001/copyparty"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/9001/copyparty/releases/tag/v1.20.11"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "copyparty: volflag `nohtml` did not block javascript in svg files"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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