GHSA-JF5H-36MG-RP6X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-21 16:59 – Updated: 2026-10-21 16:59Review scope and evidence limits
Package: @apostrophecms/import-export, version 3.7.0.
Release tag reviewed: @apostrophecms/import-export@3.7.0, commit 9500b8b0e1d630d5e07fbb5fd2c25ed0943845ce (September 30, 2026).
Current main reviewed: 5ce3732be0ebdebb4db0f8ef160c81e8671157e6.
The importer, gzip extractor, import permission gate, and core permission implementation have no differences between that release tag and the reviewed main. This follow-up is a static remediation review. We have not repeated the original end-to-end reproductions against the latest release or tested a deployed site. Current exploitability and impact therefore still require maintainer validation; the observations below establish that the reported security checks remain absent in public source. The original emailed PDF contains the original reproduction material. Please refer to that existing private attachment.
Archive duplicate continuation permits unauthorized published-content replacement
The overrideDuplicates() continuation still accepts client-supplied replacement choices, rather than binding them to a server-maintained, user-owned duplicate analysis. The replacement and write helpers do not establish a single canonical resource identity and authorization context before the update. This leaves the reported gap between draft editing authority and the published target selected for replacement unresolved at source level.
The original report describes a contributor crossing the publication boundary through duplicate replacement on an import-enabled localized type. We have not repeated that end-to-end sequence on 3.7.0.
Suggested remediation: bind continuation state to the initiating user, archive, job, permitted source/target mapping, locale and mode; reject inconsistent identity metadata; derive permissions from the actual loaded target and require publication authority for published targets.
Source: overrideDuplicates(), replaceDocId(), and insertOrUpdateDoc() in the importer.
Coordination
Vivek R / Winfunc Original reporting team: Mufeed VH / Winfunc
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@apostrophecms/import-export"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.7.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-112956"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-21T16:59:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T16:17:06Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Review scope and evidence limits\n\nPackage: @apostrophecms/import-export, version 3.7.0.\n\nRelease tag reviewed: @apostrophecms/import-export@3.7.0, commit 9500b8b0e1d630d5e07fbb5fd2c25ed0943845ce (September 30, 2026).\n\nCurrent main reviewed: 5ce3732be0ebdebb4db0f8ef160c81e8671157e6.\n\nThe importer, gzip extractor, import permission gate, and core permission implementation have no differences between that release tag and the reviewed main. This follow-up is a static remediation review. We have not repeated the original end-to-end reproductions against the latest release or tested a deployed site. Current exploitability and impact therefore still require maintainer validation; the observations below establish that the reported security checks remain absent in public source. The original emailed PDF contains the original reproduction material. Please refer to that existing private attachment.\n\n## Archive duplicate continuation permits unauthorized published-content replacement\n\nThe overrideDuplicates() continuation still accepts client-supplied replacement choices, rather than binding them to a server-maintained, user-owned duplicate analysis. The replacement and write helpers do not establish a single canonical resource identity and authorization context before the update. This leaves the reported gap between draft editing authority and the published target selected for replacement unresolved at source level.\n\nThe original report describes a contributor crossing the publication boundary through duplicate replacement on an import-enabled localized type. We have not repeated that end-to-end sequence on 3.7.0.\n\nSuggested remediation: bind continuation state to the initiating user, archive, job, permitted source/target mapping, locale and mode; reject inconsistent identity metadata; derive permissions from the actual loaded target and require publication authority for published targets.\n\nSource: overrideDuplicates(), replaceDocId(), and insertOrUpdateDoc() in the [importer](https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/blob/5ce3732be0ebdebb4db0f8ef160c81e8671157e6/packages/import-export/lib/methods/import.js).\n\n## Coordination\n\nVivek R / Winfunc\nOriginal reporting team: Mufeed VH / Winfunc",
"id": "GHSA-jf5h-36mg-rp6x",
"modified": "2026-10-21T16:59:19Z",
"published": "2026-10-21T16:59:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-jf5h-36mg-rp6x"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112956"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/06e4b377f3c360f9e89c32dccd7e505ad5ddf498"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/40b989b1a9dd23d30029b8ce7668634265cfe5ea"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/releases/tag/@apostrophecms/import-export@3.7.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "ApostropheCMS: Archive duplicate continuation lets contributors overwrite published content"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.