GHSA-J7C9-79X7-8HPR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-03 16:27 – Updated: 2025-12-20 02:28
VLAI
Summary
step-ca Has Improper Authorization Check for SSH Certificate Revocation
Details

Summary

An authorized attacker can bypass authorization checks and revoke any SSH certificate issued by Step CA by using a valid revocation token.

Details

Step CA users can obtain SSH certificates from a few provisioners. The SSHPOP provisioner allows revocation of the SSH certificate (preventing future certificate renewals) using a token. Due to a missing validity check, this token could be used to revoke any SSH certificate issued by the CA.

To create a token, an attacker must have access to the CA endpoint and a valid SSH certificate, meaning they were already authorized to obtain an SSH certificate. The attacker must also know the serial number of the certificate they want to revoke.

Impact

There is no way to mitigate this attack. It is recommended to update to v0.29.0 or newer.

Fix

In v0.29.0, the token validation logic was strengthened to bind each token to a specific SSH certificate serial number.

Acknowledgements

This issue was identified and reported by Gabriel Departout and Andy Russon, from AMOSSYS. This audit was sponsored by ANSSI (French Cybersecurity Agency) based on their Open-Source security audit program.

Embargo List

If your organization runs Step CA in production and would like advance, embargoed notification of future security updates, visit https://u.step.sm/disclosure to request inclusion on our embargo list.

Stay safe, and thank you for helping us keep the ecosystem secure.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.28.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/smallstep/certificates"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-66406"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-03T16:27:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-03T20:16:26Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nAn authorized attacker can bypass authorization checks and revoke any SSH certificate issued by Step CA by using a valid revocation token.\n\n## Details\nStep CA users can obtain SSH certificates from a few provisioners. The SSHPOP provisioner allows revocation of the SSH certificate (preventing future certificate renewals) using a token. Due to a missing validity check, this token could be used to revoke any SSH certificate issued by the CA.\n\nTo create a token, an attacker must have access to the CA endpoint and a valid SSH certificate, meaning they were already authorized to obtain an SSH certificate. The attacker must also know the serial number of the certificate they want to revoke.\n\n## Impact\nThere is no way to mitigate this attack. It is recommended to update to v0.29.0 or newer.\n\n## Fix\nIn v0.29.0, the token validation logic was strengthened to bind each token to a specific SSH certificate serial number.\n\n## Acknowledgements\nThis issue was identified and reported by Gabriel Departout and Andy Russon, from [AMOSSYS](http://amossys.fr/). This audit was sponsored by [ANSSI](https://cyber.gouv.fr/) (French Cybersecurity Agency) based on [their Open-Source security audit program](https://cyber.gouv.fr/open-source-lanssi#:~:text=Financement%20d%27%C3%A9valuations%20de%20s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9%20de%20logiciels%20libres).\n\n## Embargo List\n\nIf your organization runs Step CA in production and would like advance, embargoed notification of future security updates, visit https://u.step.sm/disclosure to request inclusion on our embargo list.\n\nStay safe, and thank you for helping us keep the ecosystem secure.",
  "id": "GHSA-j7c9-79x7-8hpr",
  "modified": "2025-12-20T02:28:23Z",
  "published": "2025-12-03T16:27:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/smallstep/certificates/security/advisories/GHSA-j7c9-79x7-8hpr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66406"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/smallstep/certificates"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "step-ca Has Improper Authorization Check for SSH Certificate Revocation"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.