GHSA-HVC7-763R-4F3H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-01 21:11 – Updated: 2026-04-01 21:11
VLAI
Summary
openssl-encrypt has no owner verification on key revocation — any client can revoke any key
Details

Summary

The revoke_key method in openssl_encrypt_server/modules/keyserver/service.py at lines 195-270 accepts a client_id parameter but never verifies that the requesting client is the same as key.owner_client_id.

Impact

Any authenticated client can revoke any other client's key, as long as they provide a valid revocation signature. While the signature requirement mitigates this somewhat (you need the private key to sign), the lack of ownership check is a defense-in-depth gap.

Recommended Fix

  • Add an ownership check: verify client_id == key.owner_client_id before allowing revocation
  • Return 403 Forbidden if the requesting client does not own the key

Fix

Fixed in commit 05e45f3 on branch releases/1.4.x — added documentation that ML-DSA signature verification IS the cryptographic ownership check; added info-level logging on successful verification.

Severity
6.6 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "openssl-encrypt"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T21:11:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe `revoke_key` method in `openssl_encrypt_server/modules/keyserver/service.py` at **lines 195-270** accepts a `client_id` parameter but never verifies that the requesting client is the same as `key.owner_client_id`.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny authenticated client can revoke any other client\u0027s key, as long as they provide a valid revocation signature. While the signature requirement mitigates this somewhat (you need the private key to sign), the lack of ownership check is a defense-in-depth gap.\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\n- Add an ownership check: verify `client_id == key.owner_client_id` before allowing revocation\n- Return 403 Forbidden if the requesting client does not own the key\n\n### Fix\n\nFixed in commit `05e45f3` on branch `releases/1.4.x` \u2014 added documentation that ML-DSA signature verification IS the cryptographic ownership check; added info-level logging on successful verification.",
  "id": "GHSA-hvc7-763r-4f3h",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T21:11:32Z",
  "published": "2026-04-01T21:11:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jahlives/openssl_encrypt/security/advisories/GHSA-hvc7-763r-4f3h"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jahlives/openssl_encrypt/commit/05e45f393886b5bf7e924d2dd42099a9dd37f91d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jahlives/openssl_encrypt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "openssl-encrypt has no owner verification on key revocation \u2014 any client can revoke any key"
}



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