GHSA-HR4H-4C45-V4Q4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 21:40 – Updated: 2026-11-10 21:40Impact
0.31.0 fixed GHSA-6f4g-xm8v-pgv6, where text from a Compose file became GitHub Actions workflow commands in compose-lint's output. --format json and --format sarif output never passed through that fix, so ##[ inside a service name or other value reaches the log intact when the output is printed to stdout rather than written to a file. The runner acts on ##[ in the middle of a line, so the JSON layout does not prevent it.
A pull request can therefore create annotations, fold or hide parts of the job log, or issue other commands the runner accepts, when CI runs compose-lint over it, before anyone reviews it. The pass/fail result is not changed.
Affected setups print JSON or SARIF output to a CI log from the compose-lint package, the pre-commit hook or the Docker image. Writing that output to a file, which SARIF upload requires, is not affected. The GitHub Action turns command processing off around each compose-lint run, so it is not affected.
Found during an internal pre-1.0 security review. It was first published as part of GHSA-r7j4-crjv-h467, together with four other gaps in the same fix. Each gap now has its own advisory.
Docker image. composelint/compose-lint tag 0.31.0 and the matching minor tag are affected, as was latest while it pointed to 0.31.0.
Releases before 0.31.0 are covered by GHSA-6f4g-xm8v-pgv6.
Patches
Fixed in 0.32.0. JSON and SARIF on stdout escape ##[ inside strings as \u005b, which decodes to the same data.
Workarounds
- Upgrade to 0.32.0 or later.
- Write
--format jsonand--format sarifoutput to a file rather than the log. - On GitHub Actions, use the
tmatens/compose-lintAction, or bracket the compose-lint step with::stop-commands::<random token>and::<token>::, as the Action does.
Reproduction
On compose-lint 0.31.0 on a GitHub-hosted runner (runner 2.337.0), a service named a##[warning]X, linted with --format json or --format sarif to stdout, creates annotations. The same file linted with the text report creates none. The composelint/compose-lint:0.31.0 image produces byte-identical output to the package.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "compose-lint"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.31.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.32.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.31.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-125122"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-117",
"CWE-150"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-10T21:40:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-10T17:17:26Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\n0.31.0 fixed GHSA-6f4g-xm8v-pgv6, where text from a Compose file became GitHub Actions workflow commands in compose-lint\u0027s output. `--format json` and `--format sarif` output never passed through that fix, so `##[` inside a service name or other value reaches the log intact when the output is printed to stdout rather than written to a file. The runner acts on `##[` in the middle of a line, so the JSON layout does not prevent it.\n\nA pull request can therefore create annotations, fold or hide parts of the job log, or issue other commands the runner accepts, when CI runs compose-lint over it, before anyone reviews it. The pass/fail result is not changed.\n\nAffected setups print JSON or SARIF output to a CI log from the `compose-lint` package, the pre-commit hook or the Docker image. Writing that output to a file, which SARIF upload requires, is not affected. The GitHub Action turns command processing off around each compose-lint run, so it is not affected.\n\nFound during an internal pre-1.0 security review. It was first published as part of GHSA-r7j4-crjv-h467, together with four other gaps in the same fix. Each gap now has its own advisory.\n\n**Docker image.** `composelint/compose-lint` tag 0.31.0 and the matching minor tag are affected, as was `latest` while it pointed to 0.31.0.\n\nReleases before 0.31.0 are covered by GHSA-6f4g-xm8v-pgv6.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in 0.32.0. JSON and SARIF on stdout escape `##[` inside strings as `\\u005b`, which decodes to the same data.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Upgrade to 0.32.0 or later.\n- Write `--format json` and `--format sarif` output to a file rather than the log.\n- On GitHub Actions, use the `tmatens/compose-lint` Action, or bracket the compose-lint step with `::stop-commands::\u003crandom token\u003e` and `::\u003ctoken\u003e::`, as the Action does.\n\n### Reproduction\n\nOn compose-lint 0.31.0 on a GitHub-hosted runner (runner 2.337.0), a service named `a##[warning]X`, linted with `--format json` or `--format sarif` to stdout, creates annotations. The same file linted with the text report creates none. The `composelint/compose-lint:0.31.0` image produces byte-identical output to the package.",
"id": "GHSA-hr4h-4c45-v4q4",
"modified": "2026-11-10T21:40:51Z",
"published": "2026-11-10T21:40:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tmatens/compose-lint/security/advisories/GHSA-hr4h-4c45-v4q4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-125122"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tmatens/compose-lint/pull/945"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tmatens/compose-lint/commit/542e63126f795564a65c63887ea0dc558a500688"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/tmatens/compose-lint"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tmatens/compose-lint/releases/tag/v0.32.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "compose-lint: Text in a pull request can issue CI workflow commands through JSON and SARIF output on stdout"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.