GHSA-HGV6-W7R3-W4QW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-30 20:07 – Updated: 2023-05-30 20:07
VLAI
Summary
Kyverno vulnerable due to usage of insecure cipher
Details

Summary

Insecure 3DES ciphers are used which may lead to exploitation of the Sweet32 vulnerability. Specifically, the ciphers TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) and TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) are allowed. See CVE-2016-2183. This is fixed in Kyverno v1.9.5 and v1.10.0 and no known users have been affected.

Details

The ciphers in affected versions can be read using the following command which uses nmap:

$ kubectl exec -it mypod -n kyverno sh 
kubectl exec [POD] [COMMAND] is DEPRECATED and will be removed in a future version. Use kubectl exec [POD] -- [COMMAND] instead.
**nmap -sV --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 kyverno-cleanup-controller** or  
**nmap -sV --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 kyverno-svc**
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-05-26 10:55 UTC
Nmap scan report for kyverno-cleanup-controller (10.103.199.233)
Host is up (0.000058s latency).
rDNS record for 10.103.199.233: kyverno-cleanup-controller.kyverno.svc.cluster.local

PORT    STATE SERVICE  VERSION
443/tcp open  ssl/http Golang net/http server (Go-IPFS json-rpc or InfluxDB API)
| ssl-enum-ciphers: 
|   TLSv1.2: 
|     ciphers: 
**|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - C**
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (secp256r1) - A
**|       TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - C**
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - A
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (rsa 2048) - A
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - A
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (rsa 2048) - A
|     compressors: 
|       NULL
|     cipher preference: client
|     warnings: 
|       64-bit block cipher 3DES vulnerable to SWEET32 attack
|   TLSv1.3: 
|     ciphers: 
|       TLS_AKE_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (ecdh_x25519) - A
|       TLS_AKE_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (ecdh_x25519) - A
|       TLS_AKE_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (ecdh_x25519) - A
|     cipher preference: server
|_  least strength: C

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 12.72 seconds
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/kyverno/kyverno"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-05-30T20:07:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nInsecure 3DES ciphers are used which may lead to exploitation of the [Sweet32 vulnerability](https://sweet32.info/). Specifically, the ciphers TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) and TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) are allowed. See CVE-2016-2183. This is fixed in Kyverno v1.9.5 and v1.10.0 and no known users have been affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe ciphers in affected versions can be read using the following command which uses `nmap`:\n\n```sh\n$ kubectl exec -it mypod -n kyverno sh \nkubectl exec [POD] [COMMAND] is DEPRECATED and will be removed in a future version. Use kubectl exec [POD] -- [COMMAND] instead.\n**nmap -sV --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 kyverno-cleanup-controller** or  \n**nmap -sV --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 kyverno-svc**\nStarting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-05-26 10:55 UTC\nNmap scan report for kyverno-cleanup-controller (10.103.199.233)\nHost is up (0.000058s latency).\nrDNS record for 10.103.199.233: kyverno-cleanup-controller.kyverno.svc.cluster.local\n\nPORT    STATE SERVICE  VERSION\n443/tcp open  ssl/http Golang net/http server (Go-IPFS json-rpc or InfluxDB API)\n| ssl-enum-ciphers: \n|   TLSv1.2: \n|     ciphers: \n**|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - C**\n|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - A\n|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (secp256r1) - A\n|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - A\n|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (secp256r1) - A\n|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (secp256r1) - A\n**|       TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - C**\n|       TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - A\n|       TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (rsa 2048) - A\n|       TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - A\n|       TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (rsa 2048) - A\n|     compressors: \n|       NULL\n|     cipher preference: client\n|     warnings: \n|       64-bit block cipher 3DES vulnerable to SWEET32 attack\n|   TLSv1.3: \n|     ciphers: \n|       TLS_AKE_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (ecdh_x25519) - A\n|       TLS_AKE_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (ecdh_x25519) - A\n|       TLS_AKE_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (ecdh_x25519) - A\n|     cipher preference: server\n|_  least strength: C\n\nService detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .\nNmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 12.72 seconds\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-hgv6-w7r3-w4qw",
  "modified": "2023-05-30T20:07:06Z",
  "published": "2023-05-30T20:07:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/security/advisories/GHSA-hgv6-w7r3-w4qw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/pull/7308"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/releases/tag/v1.9.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Kyverno vulnerable due to usage of insecure cipher"
}



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