GHSA-H7PQ-86H8-RP5X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-16 19:20 – Updated: 2026-07-16 19:20Vulnerability report without repro case. Repro case may be added later after harness is complete.
Preconditions (4): - Tenant can create EnvoyExtensionPolicy (baseline) - Controller has egress to attacker-controlled OCI registry - No registry allowlist (none exists in code) - Layer presents Docker/OCI media type
Description
At imagefetcher.go:287, make([]byte, h.Size) uses the attacker-controlled tar-header size; the LimitReader at :278 bounds bytes read from the stream but not the header-declared size returned by tr.Next() (a 512-byte header can claim a multi-TB entry via PAX/GNU encoding). Reached from untrusted tenant input via EnvoyExtensionPolicy spec.wasm[].code.image.url (envoyextensionpolicy.go:1157 → cache.go:262/299 → imagefetcher.go:218 → :287), and the allocation happens for every tar entry regardless of filename. The resulting Go runtime OOM throw is unrecoverable and, because the CRD persists, crash-loops the shared controller — single-request, non-volumetric, cluster-wide DoS.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/envoyproxy/gateway"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.8.0-rc.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.8.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/envoyproxy/gateway"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53717"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-789"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-16T19:20:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Vulnerability report without repro case. Repro case may be added later after harness is complete.\n\n**Preconditions (4):**\n- Tenant can create EnvoyExtensionPolicy (baseline)\n- Controller has egress to attacker-controlled OCI registry\n- No registry allowlist (none exists in code)\n- Layer presents Docker/OCI media type\n\n**Description**\n\nAt imagefetcher.go:287, make([]byte, h.Size) uses the attacker-controlled tar-header size; the LimitReader at :278 bounds bytes read from the stream but not the header-declared size returned by tr.Next() (a 512-byte header can claim a multi-TB entry via PAX/GNU encoding). Reached from untrusted tenant input via EnvoyExtensionPolicy spec.wasm[].code.image.url (envoyextensionpolicy.go:1157 \u2192 cache.go:262/299 \u2192 imagefetcher.go:218 \u2192 :287), and the allocation happens for every tar entry regardless of filename. The resulting Go runtime OOM throw is unrecoverable and, because the CRD persists, crash-loops the shared controller \u2014 single-request, non-volumetric, cluster-wide DoS.",
"id": "GHSA-h7pq-86h8-rp5x",
"modified": "2026-07-16T19:20:05Z",
"published": "2026-07-16T19:20:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway/security/advisories/GHSA-h7pq-86h8-rp5x"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Envoy Gateway: OCI layer extraction allocates make([]byte, h.Size) from untrusted tar header"
}
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