GHSA-GW85-XP4Q-5GP9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 23:03 – Updated: 2026-03-20 21:36Summary
In openclaw versions 2026.2.22 and 2026.2.23, the optional synology-chat channel plugin had an authorization fail-open condition: when dmPolicy was allowlist and allowedUserIds was empty/unset, unauthorized senders were still allowed through to agent dispatch.
This is assessed as medium severity because it requires channel/plugin setup and Synology sender access, but can still trigger downstream agent/tool actions.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
>= 2026.2.22, <= 2026.2.23 - Latest published affected version at patch time:
2026.2.23 - Planned patched version:
2026.2.24
Details
Root cause was a policy mismatch across plugin code paths:
1. Default resolved DM policy was allowlist.
2. Empty allowedUserIds was treated as allow-all.
3. Webhook auth in allowlist mode depended on that helper.
Result: allowlist with empty list behaved like open access for inbound Synology senders.
Fix Commit(s)
0ee30361b8f6ef3f110f3a7b001da6dd3df96bb57655c0cb3a47d0647cbbf5284e177f90b4b82ddb
Release Process Note
patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (>= 2026.2.24). Once npm release 2026.2.24 is published, the advisory can be published directly.
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
Publication Update (2026-02-25)
openclaw@2026.2.24 is published on npm and contains the fix commit(s) listed above. This advisory now marks >= 2026.2.24 as patched.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.2.23"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.2.22"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.24"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-31998"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T23:03:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nIn `openclaw` versions `2026.2.22` and `2026.2.23`, the optional `synology-chat` channel plugin had an authorization fail-open condition: when `dmPolicy` was `allowlist` and `allowedUserIds` was empty/unset, unauthorized senders were still allowed through to agent dispatch.\n\nThis is assessed as **medium** severity because it requires channel/plugin setup and Synology sender access, but can still trigger downstream agent/tool actions.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003e= 2026.2.22, \u003c= 2026.2.23`\n- Latest published affected version at patch time: `2026.2.23`\n- Planned patched version: `2026.2.24`\n\n### Details\nRoot cause was a policy mismatch across plugin code paths:\n1. Default resolved DM policy was `allowlist`.\n2. Empty `allowedUserIds` was treated as allow-all.\n3. Webhook auth in allowlist mode depended on that helper.\n\nResult: `allowlist` with empty list behaved like open access for inbound Synology senders.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `0ee30361b8f6ef3f110f3a7b001da6dd3df96bb5`\n- `7655c0cb3a47d0647cbbf5284e177f90b4b82ddb`\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`\u003e= 2026.2.24`). Once npm release `2026.2.24` is published, the advisory can be published directly.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.\n\n\n### Publication Update (2026-02-25)\n`openclaw@2026.2.24` is published on npm and contains the fix commit(s) listed above. This advisory now marks `\u003e= 2026.2.24` as patched.",
"id": "GHSA-gw85-xp4q-5gp9",
"modified": "2026-03-20T21:36:30Z",
"published": "2026-03-03T23:03:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-gw85-xp4q-5gp9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31998"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/0ee30361b8f6ef3f110f3a7b001da6dd3df96bb5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/7655c0cb3a47d0647cbbf5284e177f90b4b82ddb"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-authorization-bypass-in-synology-chat-plugin-via-empty-alloweduserids"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s Synology Chat dmPolicy=allowlist failed open on empty allowedUserIds, allowing unauthorized agent dispatch"
}
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