GHSA-FW3G-2H3J-QMM7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-28 01:17 – Updated: 2023-01-28 01:17Impact
Using carefully crafted input, an attacker may be able to sneak arbitrary HTML through Sanitize >= 5.0.0, < 6.0.1 when Sanitize is configured with a custom allowlist that allows noscript elements. This could result in XSS (cross-site scripting) or other undesired behavior when that HTML is rendered in a browser.
Sanitize's default configs don't allow noscript elements and are not vulnerable. This issue only affects users who are using a custom config that adds noscript to the element allowlist.
Patches
Sanitize >= 6.0.1 always removes noscript elements and their contents, even when noscript is in the allowlist.
Workarounds
Users who are unable to upgrade can prevent this issue by using one of Sanitize's default configs or by ensuring that their custom config does not include noscript in the element allowlist.
Details
The root cause of this issue is that HTML parsing rules treat the contents of a noscript element differently depending on whether scripting is enabled in the user agent. Nokogiri (the HTML parser Sanitize uses) doesn't support scripting so it follows the "scripting disabled" rules, but a web browser with scripting enabled will follow the "scripting enabled" rules. This means that Sanitize can't reliably make the contents of a noscript element safe for scripting enabled browsers. The safest thing to do is to remove the element and its contents entirely, which is now what Sanitize does in version 6.0.1 and later.
References
Credit
Thanks to David Klein from TU Braunschweig (@leeN) for reporting this issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "sanitize"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-23627"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-01-28T01:17:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-28T00:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nUsing carefully crafted input, an attacker may be able to sneak arbitrary HTML through Sanitize `\u003e= 5.0.0, \u003c 6.0.1` when Sanitize is configured with a custom allowlist that allows `noscript` elements. This could result in XSS (cross-site scripting) or other undesired behavior when that HTML is rendered in a browser.\n\nSanitize\u0027s default configs don\u0027t allow `noscript` elements and are not vulnerable. This issue only affects users who are using a custom config that adds `noscript` to the element allowlist.\n\n### Patches\n\nSanitize `\u003e= 6.0.1` always removes `noscript` elements and their contents, even when `noscript` is in the allowlist.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUsers who are unable to upgrade can prevent this issue by using one of Sanitize\u0027s default configs or by ensuring that their custom config does not include `noscript` in the element allowlist.\n\n### Details\n\nThe root cause of this issue is that HTML parsing rules treat the contents of a `noscript` element differently depending on whether scripting is enabled in the user agent. Nokogiri (the HTML parser Sanitize uses) doesn\u0027t support scripting so it follows the \"scripting disabled\" rules, but a web browser with scripting enabled will follow the \"scripting enabled\" rules. This means that Sanitize can\u0027t reliably make the contents of a `noscript` element safe for scripting enabled browsers. The safest thing to do is to remove the element and its contents entirely, which is now what Sanitize does in version 6.0.1 and later.\n\n### References\n\n- [Release Notes](https://github.com/rgrove/sanitize/releases/tag/v6.0.1)\n\n### Credit\n\nThanks to David Klein from [TU Braunschweig](https://www.tu-braunschweig.de/en/ias) (@leeN) for reporting this issue.",
"id": "GHSA-fw3g-2h3j-qmm7",
"modified": "2023-01-28T01:17:44Z",
"published": "2023-01-28T01:17:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rgrove/sanitize/security/advisories/GHSA-fw3g-2h3j-qmm7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23627"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rgrove/sanitize/commit/ec14265e530dc3fe31ce2ef773594d3a97778d22"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rgrove/sanitize"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/sanitize/CVE-2023-23627.yml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Improper neutralization of `noscript` element content may allow XSS in Sanitize"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.