GHSA-FGMC-2HQJ-86V4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 16:45 – Updated: 2026-06-05 16:45
VLAI
Summary
Vantage6: Set admin user and password from environment or configuration
Details
Impact
Vantage6 currently provides an initial user with username root and password root. This is not ideal for the following reasons:
- Attackers know that almost all vantage6 servers have a user with username root that probably has admin rights
- The initial password is very weak and it is possible that administrators forget to reset it.
Patches
No
Workarounds
It is possible to delete the root user after it has been used to create other users
References
We could consider doing this like mongodb
Additional info
Luis uses the following patch to mitigate it:
diff --git a/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py b/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py
index ea362c1e..c6dcbbd9 100644
--- a/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py
+++ b/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py
@@ -618,18 +618,30 @@ class ServerApp:
# TODO use constant instead of 'Root' literal
root = db.Role.get_by_name("Root")
- log.warn(
- f"Creating root user: "
- f"username={SUPER_USER_INFO['username']}, "
- f"password={SUPER_USER_INFO['password']}"
- )
+ # Temporary patch
+ # read initial root password from file (docker secret) if provided
+ # TODO: This is a workaround so we don't have an insecure vserver
+ # at the start. Ideally, we would provide an already hashed
+ # password. But as hashing is implemented via @validates on
+ # the field 'password', there isn't a nice way around this.
+ if os.environ.get("V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE"):
+ with open(
+ os.environ.get("V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE")
+ ) as password_file:
+ initial_root_password = password_file.read().strip()
+ log.info(
+ f"Creating root user with password provided via V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE"
+ )
+ else:
+ initial_root_password = SUPER_USER_INFO["password"]
+ log.warn(f"Creating root user with default credentials!")
user = db.User(
username=SUPER_USER_INFO["username"],
roles=[root],
organization=org,
email="root@domain.ext",
- password=SUPER_USER_INFO["password"],
+ password=initial_root_password,
failed_login_attempts=0,
last_login_attempt=None,
)
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "vantage6"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1393",
"CWE-204"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-05T16:45:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nVantage6 currently provides an initial user with username `root` and password `root`. This is not ideal for the following reasons:\n- Attackers know that almost all vantage6 servers have a user with username `root` that probably has admin rights\n- The initial password is very weak and it is possible that administrators forget to reset it.\n\n### Patches\nNo\n\n### Workarounds\nIt is possible to delete the `root` user after it has been used to create other users\n\n### References\nWe could consider doing this like [mongodb](https://hub.docker.com/_/mongo)\n\n### Additional info\n\nLuis uses the following patch to mitigate it:\n```diff\ndiff --git a/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py b/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py\nindex ea362c1e..c6dcbbd9 100644\n--- a/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py\n+++ b/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py\n@@ -618,18 +618,30 @@ class ServerApp:\n # TODO use constant instead of \u0027Root\u0027 literal\n root = db.Role.get_by_name(\"Root\")\n \n- log.warn(\n- f\"Creating root user: \"\n- f\"username={SUPER_USER_INFO[\u0027username\u0027]}, \"\n- f\"password={SUPER_USER_INFO[\u0027password\u0027]}\"\n- )\n+ # Temporary patch\n+ # read initial root password from file (docker secret) if provided\n+ # TODO: This is a workaround so we don\u0027t have an insecure vserver\n+ # at the start. Ideally, we would provide an already hashed\n+ # password. But as hashing is implemented via @validates on\n+ # the field \u0027password\u0027, there isn\u0027t a nice way around this.\n+ if os.environ.get(\"V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE\"):\n+ with open(\n+ os.environ.get(\"V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE\")\n+ ) as password_file:\n+ initial_root_password = password_file.read().strip()\n+ log.info(\n+ f\"Creating root user with password provided via V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE\"\n+ )\n+ else:\n+ initial_root_password = SUPER_USER_INFO[\"password\"]\n+ log.warn(f\"Creating root user with default credentials!\")\n \n user = db.User(\n username=SUPER_USER_INFO[\"username\"],\n roles=[root],\n organization=org,\n email=\"root@domain.ext\",\n- password=SUPER_USER_INFO[\"password\"],\n+ password=initial_root_password,\n failed_login_attempts=0,\n last_login_attempt=None,\n )\n```",
"id": "GHSA-fgmc-2hqj-86v4",
"modified": "2026-06-05T16:45:22Z",
"published": "2026-06-05T16:45:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vantage6/vantage6/security/advisories/GHSA-fgmc-2hqj-86v4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vantage6/vantage6/issues/1932"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vantage6/vantage6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Vantage6: Set admin user and password from environment or configuration"
}
Loading…
Loading…
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…