GHSA-F678-J579-4XF5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-28 18:56 – Updated: 2024-01-10 19:17Overview
An attacker with access to the SQL Lab and the ab_user and ab_user_role tables can elevate his privileges to become administrator.
Details
On a more general level, diverse tables who are supposed to be only readable can be modified using the WITH … AS and RETURNING keywords. Modification of the table key_value can also be done, which could lead to a Remote Code Execution (cf. "V7 - Insecure deserialization leading to remote code execution" report vulnerability).
Proof of Concept
Some tables are supposed to accept only SELECT requests from the SQL tab. - Attempt to create a new user injected_admin into the ab_user table: PoC_1
But this protection can be bypassed by using the WITH … AS () syntax with RETURNING value after the INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE query. INSERT query accepted by the database due to the use of WITH … AS ( … RETURNING ) syntax: WITH a AS ( INSERT INTO ab_user (id, first_name, last_name, username, email, password) VALUES (2, ‘injected_admin’, ‘injected_admin’, ‘injected_admin’, ‘injected_admin@gmail.com’, ‘{PASSWORD_HASH}’) RETURNING id ) SELECT * FROM a; PoC_2 - injected_admin added to the ab_user table: PoC_3
This method can also be used with UPDATE or DELETE request. A user with access to SELECT on the tables ab_user_role can escalate his privilege to become administrator. - Locating the ID of the user ‘Auditeur B’, who has no rights and is not an admin. The request is done being ‘Auditeur B’: PoC_4 - Locating the rows that keep the role of the user ‘Auditeur B’. The row 36 stores the value 3, indicating the role ‘Alpha’ for ‘Auditeur B’: PoC_5 - Modification of the row 36 with an UPDATE request embedded in a WITH request: PoC_6 - ‘Auditeur B’ role has been changed to Admin: PoC_7
This technique can also be used to inject or modify values of the table key_value, which can potentially lead to a Remote Code Execution (cf. ...).
Solution
Orange recommendation
To fix this vulnerability, we recommends reenforcing the SELECT filter to spot INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE keywords even in WITH requests.
Security patch
Upgrade to Superset version 2.1.2.
References
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40610 https://lists.apache.org/thread/jvgxpk4dbxyqtsgtl4pdgbd520rc0rot
Credits
LEXFO for Orange Innovation
Orange CERT-CC at Orange group
Timeline
Date reported: July 27, 2023 Date fixed: November 27, 2023
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "apache-superset"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-40610"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-28T18:56:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Overview\nAn attacker with access to the SQL Lab and the ab_user and ab_user_role tables can elevate his privileges to become administrator.\n\n### Details\nOn a more general level, diverse tables who are supposed to be only readable can be modified using the WITH \u2026 AS and RETURNING keywords.\nModification of the table key_value can also be done, which could lead to a Remote Code Execution (cf. \"V7 - Insecure deserialization leading to remote code execution\" report vulnerability).\n\n### Proof of Concept\nSome tables are supposed to accept only SELECT requests from the SQL tab.\n- Attempt to create a new user injected_admin into the ab_user table: [PoC_1](https://github.com/orangecertcc/security-research/blob/main/CVE-2023-40610/PoC_1.png)\n\nBut this protection can be bypassed by using the WITH \u2026 AS () syntax with RETURNING value after the INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE query.\nINSERT query accepted by the database due to the use of WITH \u2026 AS ( \u2026 RETURNING ) syntax:\n WITH a AS ( INSERT INTO ab_user (id, first_name, last_name, username, email, password) VALUES (2, \u2018injected_admin\u2019, \u2018injected_admin\u2019, \u2018injected_admin\u2019, \u2018injected_admin@gmail.com\u2019, \u2018{PASSWORD_HASH}\u2019) RETURNING id ) SELECT * FROM a;\n [PoC_2](https://github.com/orangecertcc/security-research/blob/main/CVE-2023-40610/PoC_2.png)\n - injected_admin added to the ab_user table: [PoC_3](https://github.com/orangecertcc/security-research/blob/main/CVE-2023-40610/PoC_3.png)\n\nThis method can also be used with UPDATE or DELETE request. A user with access to SELECT on the tables ab_user_role can escalate his privilege to become administrator.\n- Locating the ID of the user \u2018Auditeur B\u2019, who has no rights and is not an admin. The request is done being \u2018Auditeur B\u2019: [PoC_4](https://github.com/orangecertcc/security-research/blob/main/CVE-2023-40610/PoC_4.png)\n- Locating the rows that keep the role of the user \u2018Auditeur B\u2019. The row 36 stores the value 3, indicating the role \u2018Alpha\u2019 for \u2018Auditeur B\u2019: [PoC_5](https://github.com/orangecertcc/security-research/blob/main/CVE-2023-40610/PoC_5.png)\n- Modification of the row 36 with an UPDATE request embedded in a WITH request: [PoC_6](https://github.com/orangecertcc/security-research/blob/main/CVE-2023-40610/PoC_6.png)\n- \u2018Auditeur B\u2019 role has been changed to Admin: [PoC_7](https://github.com/orangecertcc/security-research/blob/main/CVE-2023-40610/PoC_7.png)\n\nThis technique can also be used to inject or modify values of the table key_value, which can potentially lead to a Remote Code Execution (cf. ...).\n\n### Solution\n#### Orange recommendation\nTo fix this vulnerability, we recommends reenforcing the SELECT filter to spot INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE keywords even in WITH requests.\n#### Security patch\nUpgrade to Superset version 2.1.2.\n\n### References\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40610\nhttps://lists.apache.org/thread/jvgxpk4dbxyqtsgtl4pdgbd520rc0rot\n\n### Credits\nLEXFO for [Orange Innovation][orange]\n\n[Orange CERT-CC][ora] at [Orange group][orange]\n\n[ora]: \u003chttps://cert.orange.com/\u003e\n[orange]: \u003chttps://www.orange.com/\u003e\n\n### Timeline\n**Date reported:** July 27, 2023\n**Date fixed:** November 27, 2023",
"id": "GHSA-f678-j579-4xf5",
"modified": "2024-01-10T19:17:04Z",
"published": "2023-11-28T18:56:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/orangecertcc/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-f678-j579-4xf5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40610"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/superset"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/jvgxpk4dbxyqtsgtl4pdgbd520rc0rot"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/11/27/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Apache Superset - Elevation of Privilege"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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