GHSA-F4J9-CRRJ-867Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-12 22:34 – Updated: 2026-11-12 22:34
VLAI
Summary
Astro: Reflected XSS via unescaped slot names in @astrojs/svelte
Details

Summary

The @astrojs/svelte renderer wraps slotted content passed to Svelte components in an <astro-slot> element, and writes the slot name into its name attribute without HTML escaping. A slot name containing " could end the attribute and inject arbitrary HTML into the page.

For example, a page that takes a slot name from the request:

---
import Tabs from '../components/Tabs.svelte';
const tab = Astro.url.searchParams.get('tab');
---
<Tabs client:load active={tab}><div slot={tab}>…</div></Tabs>

rendered with a Svelte 5 component that renders its snippets by name:

<script>
    let { active, ...snippets } = $props();
</script>
{@render snippets[active]?.()}

would output a tab value such as x"><img src=x onerror=alert(1)> as live HTML.

Impact

Reflected cross-site scripting. An attacker who gets a user to open a crafted link can run JavaScript on the site's origin, but only in applications where all of the following are true:

  • The page passes request-controlled input (such as a query parameter) as a slot name.
  • The Svelte component is hydrated with a client:* directive. For non-hydrated components the slot wrapper is removed from the output, together with its name attribute.
  • The Svelte component renders the attacker-chosen slot, which in practice means a Svelte 5 component that renders snippets by a dynamic name. Components that never render the slot only output Astro's already escaped fallback template.

This is the @astrojs/svelte counterpart of GHSA-8hv8-536x-4wqp (CVE-2026-50146), which fixed the same issue in astro core. The same unescaped value was also used when hydrating the component in the browser.

Affected versions

@astrojs/svelte >= 5.7.3, <= 9.1.1.

Patches

Fixed in @astrojs/svelte 9.1.2. Slot names are now HTML-escaped in the server renderer and in the client-side hydration code.

Workarounds

Upgrade to @astrojs/svelte 9.1.2 or later. Before upgrading, do not use request-controlled input as a slot name, or map it to a fixed set of known slot names before passing it to a component.

Credits

Reported by @manus-pi.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.1.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@astrojs/svelte"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.7.3"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-126362"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-12T22:34:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `@astrojs/svelte` renderer wraps slotted content passed to Svelte components in an `\u003castro-slot\u003e` element, and writes the slot name into its `name` attribute without HTML escaping. A slot name containing `\"` could end the attribute and inject arbitrary HTML into the page.\n\nFor example, a page that takes a slot name from the request:\n\n```astro\n---\nimport Tabs from \u0027../components/Tabs.svelte\u0027;\nconst tab = Astro.url.searchParams.get(\u0027tab\u0027);\n---\n\u003cTabs client:load active={tab}\u003e\u003cdiv slot={tab}\u003e\u2026\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/Tabs\u003e\n```\n\nrendered with a Svelte 5 component that renders its snippets by name:\n\n```svelte\n\u003cscript\u003e\n\tlet { active, ...snippets } = $props();\n\u003c/script\u003e\n{@render snippets[active]?.()}\n```\n\nwould output a `tab` value such as `x\"\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003e` as live HTML.\n\n## Impact\n\nReflected cross-site scripting. An attacker who gets a user to open a crafted link can run JavaScript on the site\u0027s origin, but only in applications where all of the following are true:\n\n- The page passes request-controlled input (such as a query parameter) as a slot name.\n- The Svelte component is hydrated with a `client:*` directive. For non-hydrated components the slot wrapper is removed from the output, together with its `name` attribute.\n- The Svelte component renders the attacker-chosen slot, which in practice means a Svelte 5 component that renders snippets by a dynamic name. Components that never render the slot only output Astro\u0027s already escaped fallback template.\n\nThis is the `@astrojs/svelte` counterpart of GHSA-8hv8-536x-4wqp (CVE-2026-50146), which fixed the same issue in `astro` core. The same unescaped value was also used when hydrating the component in the browser.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n`@astrojs/svelte` \u003e= 5.7.3, \u003c= 9.1.1.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in `@astrojs/svelte` 9.1.2. Slot names are now HTML-escaped in the server renderer and in the client-side hydration code.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to `@astrojs/svelte` 9.1.2 or later. Before upgrading, do not use request-controlled input as a slot name, or map it to a fixed set of known slot names before passing it to a component.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by @manus-pi.",
  "id": "GHSA-f4j9-crrj-867q",
  "modified": "2026-11-12T22:34:04Z",
  "published": "2026-11-12T22:34:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/security/advisories/GHSA-f4j9-crrj-867q"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/commit/5e476365378e41aa2745d003b2383d02008d7b44"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/releases/tag/@astrojs/svelte@9.1.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Astro: Reflected XSS via unescaped slot names in @astrojs/svelte"
}



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